University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--History

History

2016

The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War
Theresa B. Crocker
University of Kentucky, tbcroc2@uky.edu
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.495

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Crocker, Theresa B., "The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War" (2016). Theses and
Dissertations--History. 42.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/history_etds/42

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--History by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s)
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File.
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to
register the copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements
above.
Theresa B. Crocker, Student
Dr. Philip Harling, Major Professor
Dr. Scott Taylor, Director of Graduate Studies

THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE:
MYTH, MEMORY, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

By
Terri Blom Crocker
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Philip Harling, Professor of History
Lexington, Kentucky
2016
Copyright © Terri Blom Crocker 2016

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE:
MYTH, MEMORY, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The 1914 Christmas truce, when enemy soldiers met, fraternized and even played
football in No-Man’s-Land, is frequently used to support the popular view of the First World
War as a “stupid, tragic and futile” conflict, the ultimate “bad” war. The truce, which one
historian describes as “a candle lit in the darkness of Flanders,” is commonly perceived as a
manifestation of the anger that soldiers felt towards the meaningless war which they had
been tricked into fighting. However, contemporaneous sources show that the impromptu
cease-fire was not an act of defiance, but rather arose from the professionalism of the soldiers
involved, the conditions of static trench warfare, the adaptation of the soldiers to their new
environment, the foul weather on the Western Front, the absence of major battles, and
memories of traditional celebrations of Christmas. The truce, in short, was caused by rain,
mud, curiosity, lack of personal animosity towards the enemy, and homesickness, rather than
by frustration and rebellion. Although the conventional narrative of the truce maintains that
soldiers defied their 0fficers to participate in it, this was rarely the case: in fact, LieutenantColonel Fisher-Rowe, commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards, wrote his wife that the
Germans “say they want the truce to go on till after New Year and I am sure I have no
objection. A rest from bullets will be distinctly a change.” No soldiers were punished for their
participation in the 1914 truce, and no troops refused to fire upon their enemies afterwards.
Newspapers published accounts of the armistice openly and many regimental histories later
featured the event prominently.
An evaluation of sources from 1914 through 2013 that reference the truce
demonstrates that the conventional narrative of the truce, like that of the war itself, took
many decades to develop. This work examines the myths that have defined the truce over the
past century, and contrasts them with the letters and diaries of British soldiers who
participated in it, the reports of it in the official war diaries of the battalions involved, and the
accounts of it published in the newspapers. By examining the support the soldiers felt for the
war, as well as their willingness to return to fighting after the impromptu armistice ended,
the book argues that the Christmas truce, which would seem to confirm the dominant view
of the First World War, instead challenges the war’s popular narrative. A soldier involved
described the temporary cease-fire as being “just like the interval between the rounds in a
friendly boxing match.” The boxing match that was the First World War was in fact a deadly
and tragic conflict, yet this soldier’s view of the truce broadly summed up the attitudes of

participants toward the event, who remained determined to win the war, while enjoying a
break from the battle.
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Chapter One
“A candle lit in the darkness”:
The Christmas Truce and the First World War

To fraternize was in itself an implicit condemnation of the war.
-Remy Cazals,
Meetings in No Man’s Land:
Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War (2007)
The three Battalions in the line, like the rest of the British Army, met the enemy in No-man’sland; exchanged the ‘souveneer’ so precious to the hearts of the Private Rifleman; smoked
German cigars and gave ‘gaspers’ in return; speculated with philosophically minded Teutons
upon the futility of the whole thing, and upon the ‘rumness’ of talking together today and
killing each other tomorrow; passed Boxing Day in the traditional spirit of sentimentality; and
resumed the war hammer and tongs on the 27th.
-Reginald Berkeley, M.C.
The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-1918 (1927)

“To die tomorrow,” proclaims a German soldier in Joyeux Noel after the Christmas truce, “is
even more absurd than dying yesterday.” 1 The 2004 film takes the futility of the First World
War as its theme, and uses the 1914 holiday armistice, the day when “(e)nemies leave their
weapons behind for one night as they band together in brotherhood and forget about the
brutalities of war,” to advance its theory that the soldiers who participated in the truce were
rebelling against the senseless conflict in which they were engaged. 2 Joyeux Noel begins with
British, French, and German schoolchildren parroting their national attitudes towards their
enemies; the British schoolchild recites, “To rid the map of every trace/Of Germany and the
Hun/We must exterminate that race.” This early scene establishes the film’s attitude towards
the war: that all combatants were equally culpable for the conflict, and yet equally innocent, as
they had clearly been indoctrinated by their governments to hate their enemies. The film then
shows French and Scottish soldiers on the Western front attacking a German trench in
December 1914, an assault that results in many casualties with no gain of territory. Soon
afterwards, on Christmas Eve, the Germans place lit Christmas trees on their parapets, a
soldier sings “Silent Night” and the men from all three countries walk hesitantly into the
1
2

Christian Carion, Director, Joyeux Noel (Sony Picture Classics, 2005).
Joyeux Noel, DVD liner notes.

1

bomb-cratered area between the trenches. The German, French and Scottish officers share a
bottle of champagne and arrange for an evening’s cease-fire. The lower ranks exchange drinks,
cigarettes and chocolate, and at midnight a Scottish priest leads them all in a mass.
On Christmas morning, the officers return to No-Man’s-Land and coordinate the
burial of the dead. After the bodies are interred and a service read over the graves,
fraternization resumes, with a hastily arranged football match and card-playing and even a
juggler entertaining the troops. The next morning Horstmayer, the German officer, walks over
to the French line. The French officer, Audebert, protests that the truce is over, but the
German has come not to extend the armistice. Horstmayer instead warns the French that they
will shortly be shelled by German artillery, and he invites the French and Scottish soldiers to
shelter in the safety of the German trenches during the bombardment. Once the German
shelling has ceased, the soldiers from all three armies then congregate in the French trenches
to avoid retaliatory shelling from the French artillery on the German lines. Afterwards, the
German soldiers return to their trenches on the other side of No-Man’s-Land, while the three
officers shake hands wistfully and a Scottish bagpiper plays “Auld Lang Syne”.
After the truce ends, the narration shifts to military censors reading the letters that the
soldiers have written home about the event, which also announce their intentions of
continuing the armistice:
“The Scots photographer promised us pictures at New Year’s. Be a chance to
get back together.”
“We and the British decided to accept the Kraut’s invitation. We’ll go spend
New Year with them.”
“And above all, drink to the health of all those bastards who, sitting pretty, sent
us here to slug it out.”
Joyeux Noel then shows the official consequences of participation in the impromptu cease-fire.
Audebert is chastised by a superior officer, who tells him that it was disgraceful for his unit to
have been involved. “If public opinion hears of this -” the officer warns, at which point
Audebert interrupts: “Have no fear, no one here will tell...because no one would believe or
understand.” Audebert also admits that he “felt closer to the Germans than to those who cry
‘Kill the Krauts!’ before their stuffed turkey!” His unit is then sent back into battle in a
different part of the front lines. The Scottish battalion that participated in the truce is
disbanded “by order of the King” and its soldiers scattered among other regiments. The
Germans are reprimanded for their participation in the truce by their crown prince, who
lectures the soldiers briefly on their insubordination before informing them that they are
2

being sent to “East Prussia to take part in an offensive against the Russian Army.” As
punishment, therefore, for their fraternization with the enemy, the Scottish battalion is
disbanded, the French soldiers are returned to a brutal sector of the front, and the Germans
dispatched to the Eastern front.
Joyuex Noel’s depiction of the Christmas truce will be familiar to many. As
demonstrated by the reviews it received, the film was accepted as an accurate representation
of the famous day in 1914 when enemy troops fraternized on the Western front. The Times
observed that it was “(i)nspired by the spontaneous ceasefire that occurred in the corpsestrewn no man’s land between the trenches in northern France on Christmas Day, 1914.” 3 The
New York Times noted that it “tells the true story of an improvised Christmas truce during the
first year of World War I.” 4 While it may sound unbelievable, the BBC asserted, Joyeux Noel
“is actually based on fact.” 5 Roger Ebert, the famous film critic, declared that the film’s
“sentimentality is muted by the thought that this moment of peace actually did take place,
among men who were punished for it, and who mostly died soon enough afterward.” 6
Christian Carion, the film’s director, stated that, while the characters presented in Joyeux Noel
were fictional, “the detail is historically accurate.” 7
As recounted in Joyeux Noel and echoed in many other sources, the story of the
Christmas truce is indeed a heart-warming tale - but one that bears little relation to the truth.
There may have been British soldiers who rushed out to meet the Germans with peace and
brotherhood in their hearts and mutiny on their minds, but for the vast majority of the troops
involved, the reality was much different. 8 The truce, which at the time it occurred was largely
perceived as an interesting but unimportant event, was not an act of defiance, but one which
arose from the convergence of a number of factors: the professionalism of the soldiers
involved, the unprecedented conditions of static trench warfare, the adaptation of the soldiers
3

“Merry Christmas (Joyeux Noel)” The Times, 17 December 2005.
Stephen Holden, “A Christmas Truce Forged by Germans, French, and Scots,” The New York Times, 3
March 2006.
5
Matthew Leyland, “Merry Christmas (Joyeux Noel), BBC, 13 December 2005.
6
Roger Ebert, “Joyeux Noel,” Chicago Sun Times, 9 March 2006.
7
Sheila Johnston, “The astonishing war story that a nation chose to forget/Lessons in humanity: Joyeux
Noel,”, Telegraph, 2 December 2005.
8
For the conventional narrative of the 1914 truce, see, among others, Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night:
The Story of the World War I Christmas Truce (New York: Penguin, 2002); Malcolm Brown and Shirley
Seaton, Christmas Truce (London: Pan Books, 1984); John Keegan, An Illustrated History of the First
World War (New York: Random House, 2001); Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London: Pimlico, 1961); Lyn Macdonald,
1915: The Death of Innocence (1993.; repr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); and Marc
Ferro, Malcolm Brown, Remy Cazals, and Olaf Mueller (with translations by Helen McPhail), Meetings
in No Man’s Land: Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War (London: Constable & Robinson
Ltd, 2007).
4
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to their new environment, the foul weather on the Western Front in the first winter of the
war, the absence of major initiatives along that front during the last two weeks of December,
and memories of traditional celebrations of Christmas. The holiday truce, in short, was caused
by rain, mud, curiosity, lack of personal animosity towards the enemy, and homesickness
rather than by frustration and rebellion.
The actual armistice, however, does not have the narrative appeal of the Christmas
truce as it is commonly portrayed in historical and fictional accounts. In the popular
imagination, the holiday cease-fire, which appeared out of nowhere and ended just as quickly,
has left behind the legend of a “candle lit in the darkness of Flanders,” and a lingering
collective memory of football matches, shared cigars and camaraderie. 9 In Britain, the
conventional story of the truce is well-known: on 25 December 1914, the soldiers in the
trenches, trapped in a pointless war and angry with both the politicians who had deceived
them into enlisting and the incompetent generals who commanded them, were eager to show
their opposition by defying their officers and consorting with the Germans. The military
leadership, outraged by the willingness of their men to fraternize with the enemy, issued harsh
orders commanding that the truce end, and the soldiers, now reluctant to fire upon opposing
troops, had to be coerced into resuming the war and were subsequently punished for their
participation in the cease-fire. Some regiments that took part in the truce even had to be
transferred to different parts of the line, or to other fronts altogether, as they refused to fight
the men they now considered comrades. Soldiers, whose letters were censored, were
forbidden to write home about the armistice, and press censorship, imposed by the
government to keep civilians ignorant about the truth of the war, prevented the news of the
truce from reaching the British public. In any case, the conspiracy that the press barons had
willingly entered into with the authorities to promote the war made it impossible, even
without government-imposed restrictions, for the newspapers to acknowledge the existence of
the truce or the soldiers’ attitudes that prompted it.
According to the widely accepted narrative of the truce, since the episode was covered
up at the time it occurred, only the soldiers who had been involved in it knew about the
holiday cease-fire. The general public supposedly did not find out about it until decades later,
when the truce was mentioned in the famous 1964 BBC documentary series, The Great War,
and memorialized in the anti-war play and film, Oh What a Lovely War. As soon as the British
became aware of the 1914 Christmas fraternization, the story of the truce and the desire for
9

Weintraub, Silent Night, pg. xvi. As the various cease-fires and fraternizations were unconnected, they
should more accurately be described as “the Christmas truces” rather than “the Christmas truce,” the
singular term will be used throughout this work
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peace on the part of the soldiers involved that it symbolized became a vital part of the
narrative of the war, as can be demonstrated by the number of books, newspaper articles and
websites devoted to it. It has been the subject of television documentaries, plays, children’s
books, and an opera, Silent Night. The truce was mentioned in the last episode of the popular
television series Blackadder Goes Forth, a cross has been put up in Ploegsteert Wood to
memorialize the spot where enemies met and fraternized in No-Man’s-Land, and the
centenary of the First World War will be celebrated by recreating the truce’s most famous
feature, “the football match played against German troops which remains one of the most
poignant moments of the conflict.” 10 As a recent Manchester Guardian article claims, the story
of the Christmas truce is one “that seems to gain in resonance and potency as the years go
by.” 11
It is certainly true that the tale of the truce is one that has expanded throughout the
years to encompass the changing narrative of the First World War, but as the holiday
armistice has gained a cherished position in public memory, myths about it have overtaken its
reality. Although the conventional narrative of the truce maintains that soldiers defied their
0fficers to participate in it, this was rarely the case: in fact, Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher-Rowe,
commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards, wrote his wife that the Germans “say they want the
truce to go on till after New Year and I am sure I have no objection. A rest from bullets will be
distinctly a change.” 12 No soldiers were punished for their participation in the 1914 holiday
armistice, and no troops refused to fire upon their enemies afterwards. The military diaries of
the regiments involved often reported the truce openly, and numerous accounts of it were
published in the British national press. The truce remained a part of the public narrative of
the First World War from the time the conflict ended through the early 1960s, when it was repackaged and re-purposed by historians and others who were anxious to advance a certain
view of the war.
In spite of the readily available information regarding the episode that demonstrates
otherwise, the romanticized version of the Christmas truce, with its defiant soldiers,
disapproving leadership and ignorant home front, is one that has increasingly been pressed
into the service of the conventional discourse of the First World War. That assessment of the
1914-1918 conflict, which came into prominence during the 1960s and is exemplified by the
works of authors such as Alan Clark, A.J.P. Taylor, Paul Fussell and John Keegan, is that it was
10

“Kickabout that captured futility of First World War to be replayed for Centenary,” Manchester
Guardian, 8 February 2013, http://www.ww1battlefields.co.uk/flanders/plugstreet.html.
11
Malcolm Brown, “When Peace Broke Out,” Manchester Guardian, 23 December, 2001.
12
st
L. Fisher-Rowe, 1 Grenadier Guards, Private Papers of L. Fisher-Rowe, Imperial War Museum
Collection No. 16978, 27 December 1914 letter.
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a “stupid, tragic and futile” war. 13 It is famous, firstly, for the enormous numbers of people that
died in it. Gerald De Groot, for example, opens his history of the war with the stark
observation that “nine million combatants and twelve million civilians died during the Great
War.” 14 The sheer scale of the war’s destruction and its unprecedented impact on the civilian
populations involved greatly surpassed any previous conflicts, as Martin Gilbert noted when
adding the “mass murder of Armenians in 1915, and the influenza epidemic that began while
the war was still being fought” to the butcher’s bill. 15
Of course, horrific as these totals are, the number of people killed by the war is not
necessarily sufficient grounds upon which to condemn it. The judgment of history, however, is
that in spite of the millions who died fighting in it, the 1914-1918 war achieved nothing. “The
First World War,” John Keegan states unequivocally, “was a tragic and unnecessary conflict.” 16
The twin themes of tragedy and futility are present in most works about the war, ceaselessly
underlining this view of the conflict and propagating the belief that the nations of Europe,
through lack of foresight and with insufficient justification, had blundered into a war that they
foolishly expected would be localized, short and relatively easy to win. As Adam Gopnik sums
up the attitudes of the countries involved, they went to war in 1914 because
(t)he Germans thought that, more or less, it would be like 1870; the French
thought that, with the help of the English, it wouldn’t be like 1870; the English
thought that it would be like a modernized 1814, a continental war with
decisive interference by Britain’s professional military; and the Russians
thought that it couldn’t be worse than just sitting there. 17
The catalyzing event that prompted the British to get involved in the war, the violation
of Belgian neutrality, is now perceived as an excuse rather than a reason, and the subsequent
emphasis on the atrocities committed against that country by the Germans is also viewed
cynically. In addition, many theorize that the British press deliberately published a number of
outright lies about the behavior of the German army in Belgium and France in order to sway
British public opinion in favor of the conflict and therefore assist with recruiting. Niall
Ferguson argues that in Britain “the most commonly aired justification for the war was that it

13

Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), pg. 3.
14
Gerald de Groot, The First World War (London: Palgrave/St. Martin’s Press, 2001), pg. 1.
15
Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (London: Orion Books Limited, 1994), pg. xv.
16
John Keegan, The First World War (London: Hutchinson, 1998), pg. 3.
17
Adam Gopnik, “The Big One: Historians rethink the war to end all wars,” The New Yorker, August 23,
2004, pg. 81. Of course, as the agreements France had entered into with Britain did not guarantee
British involvement if Germany attacked them or if they attacked Germany, they could not know before
entering the war that British help would be available. Gopnik was, however, pretty much spot-on about
the German, British and Russian motives.
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was necessary to defeat Prussian militarism and ‘frightfulness’, exemplified by the atrocities
perpetuated by the German army against Belgian civilians.” 18 John Simpson, the noted BBC
reporter, agrees that the situation in Belgium was exploited by the British government,
observing that based upon the “memory of 1870…there was an expectation that when the
Germans invaded Belgium and France they would behave savagely. It was this expectation
which the British wartime propaganda services took advantage of.” 19
According to the conventional narrative, the series of miscalculations and pretexts that
entangled Europe in the First World War paled in comparison to its sheer incompetence in
fighting it. Military leaders on both sides, trained for and expecting a war of movement,
proved unable to cope with the conditions of defense-oriented industrialized warfare. As a
result, soldiers were slaughtered in the millions on the battlefields of the war simply because
of the shortsightedness and callousness of the generals leading them, and the same generals
were willing to endure enormous casualties rather than admit to incompetence. On the
Western front, Fussell asserts angrily that “even in the quietest times, some 7000 British men
and officers were killed and wounded daily, just as a matter of course. ‘Wastage,’ the Staff
called it.” 20
The battles of the First World War – of which the Somme and Passchendaele are by far
the most infamous in British remembrance – are thought of today chiefly in terms of the
ineffectual generals who caused the gratuitous death and destruction of the men involved.
The combat on the Western front, with its characteristically static nature, came to embody the
typical soldier’s experience in the war: endless spells of duty in horrific conditions, interrupted
only by orders to ‘go over the top’ and take part in yet another fruitless, and generally fatal,
assault. The modern attitude toward the Western front can be inferred from the titles of the
books written about it, including Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I and The
Killing Grounds: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare,

18

Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (Great Britain: Penguin Press, 1999), pg. xxxviii.
John Simpson, Unreliable Sources: How the Twentieth Century was Reported (London: MacMillan,
2010), pg. 115.
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1900-1918. 21 The time spent in the hell of the killing grounds took its toll on those involved,
even if they survived; Keegan notes that the war not only “ended the lives of ten million
beings,” but also “tortured the emotional lives of millions more.” 22
One factor that contributed to the acceptance by the British of the continued slaughter
and mental torture of their soldiers on the Western front was the ignorance of civilians about
the conflict. “What actually happened,” Cate Haste claims, “was that so little information was
released that the home front was left in a state of bewilderment about the nature of the war.” 23
The public, however, had been made to believe in the war and therefore supported its
continuance; as A.J.P. Taylor argued, “(i)t was necessary to rouse public opinion in order to
fight the war; and this opinion then made it essential to keep the war going.” 24 Because
noncombatants, for the most part, did not come under attack, De Groot maintains that “a
chasm of experience developed between the home front and the fighting front. Soldiers felt
deep antagonism towards civilians who, they felt, could never understand the horrors of the
trenches.” 25 The hostility that active troops felt towards not only civilians, but also towards the
military leaders who took great care never to expose themselves to hostile fire and the
politicians who had chosen to sacrifice an entire generation in a unnecessary war only
increased the soldiers’ alienation from non-combatants, and their subsequent disillusionment
with the entire conflict.
As a result, British society was divided, in Arthur Marwick’s view, between the civilian
who was “aware of and almost inured to colossal slaughter, but oblivious to the real tortures,
physical and mental, of trench warfare, and on the other the soldier who was enduring
them.” 26 According to Simpson, however, this division was both necessary and deliberate, as
“(t)he horrors of front-line warfare were so great that if the newspapers had been free to
describe them honestly, it would certainly have been harder to persuade men to come forward
and join up in sufficient numbers.” It was, therefore, “(b)etter, the politicians and the generals
believed, to hide the truth from the British public, so that they would continue to support the
war and encourage their sons to join the forces.” 27 In fact, as Brian Bond maintains, it was not
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necessary for politicians and generals to direct the press to hide the reality of war, as the
newspapers were glad to take on that task themselves. “Censorship of the press was
inconsistent and astonishingly lax,” he notes, “but this hardly mattered given the press barons’
conviction that newspapers had a duty to maintain civilian morale and support the army.” 28
Keith Robbins further contends that, because the truth about the war was hidden from
the general public, many soldiers were later unable to talk about their memories of combat
with their families and friends and were therefore prevented from coming to terms with what
they had been through. He declares that the experiences of the war so traumatized the men
who fought it that “(n)o man who took part in the First World War ever completely shook off
the experience…For some, the only solution was silence. There was no way in which it was
possible to communicate with those who had not been through it themselves.” 29 According to
the modern narrative, there would be no survivors left to stifle the memories of their
experiences in any case, as service in the First World War is now assumed to mean death in
the First World War. As Simon Schama notes in his critique of Downton Abbey, if the series
had been a realistic portrayal of British life during the war, Matthew Crawley, who was
wounded during the Battle of the Somme, “would be one of the 750,000 dead.” 30 Although the
majority of British soldiers who fought in it survived the war, Schama admits no other
possibility for this fictional character: not ‘might be’ dead, but “would be.”
Beyond the boundaries of the war itself, and the damage it caused to the lives and
psyches of those who were involved in it, lay the aftermath of the conflict. Barbara Tuchman
believed that “the war had many diverse results and one dominant one transcending all
others: disillusion.” 31 Gilbert asserts that it “changed the map and destiny of Europe as much
as it seared its skin and scarred its soul.” 32 A major truism of the history of modern Europe is
that the First World War, and more particularly the treaty imposed upon Germany after that
war, was the proximate cause of the Second World War. “One of the tragedies of the Great
War,” Jay Winter and Blaine Baggett observe, “is that, despite all the suffering it had entailed,
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war simply begat another war.” 33 Gilbert holds the Treaty of Versailles, and particularly the
clause in that treaty blaming Germany for the war, responsible for the renewed world conflict
only twenty years later, maintaining that “(t)he link between the two world wars…was this
‘war guilt’ clause as perceived by Germany, aggravated by her extremist politicians, and set up
as a target to be shot down in flames and fury by Hitler.” 34 The final entry in the ledger against
the First World War, therefore, is the way it led inevitably, and inexorably, to the Second
World War.
The generally accepted narrative of the Christmas truce as a soldiers’ rebellion against
the tragic waste of the war and the stupidity of the warring countries’ politicians and generals
aligns perfectly with this interpretation of the conflict. In fact, by emphasizing the
disillusionment of soldiers with the war and the comradeship they felt during fraternization
with the enemy troops, their fellow sufferers in the trenches, the holiday cease-fire underlines
the moral of the war’s orthodox narrative. As Peter Bradshaw inaccurately notes in the
Guardian review of Joyeux Noel, the truce was “supposed to have begun not merely with carols
but cries of ‘No more war!’” 35 This typical misconception about the impromptu armistice helps
explain its overwhelming appeal to many who consider the First World War a futile and
senseless conflict and who use the truce to illustrate that discourse by emphasizing the anger
that the generals felt towards their rebellious soldiers who had fraternized with the enemy,
and the subsequent official cover-up of the story of the truce.
Fussell, for example, believes that the British military leadership was furious about the
insubordination of the men participating in the truce, claiming that when “British and
German soldiers observed an informal, ad hoc Christmas Day truce, meeting in No Man’s Land
to exchange cigarets and to take snapshots,” the army command was “outraged” and “forbad
this ever to happen again.” 36 Taylor took the same view, adding an element of irony by
including the reaction of the ignorant home front to the event when he observed that
(o)n Christmas Day in France firing stopped in the front line. British and
German soldiers met in No Man’s Land, gossiped, exchanged cigarettes. In
some places they played football. They met again the next day. Then, after
strong rebuke from headquarters, firing gradually started again. In the
churches at home, prayers were offered for victory and for the slaughter of the
men who were exchanging cigarettes. 37
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Winter and Baggett share the opinion that the truce was viewed as threatening by the army
command, claiming that “British generals were appalled at the news of the Christmas truce.
Explicit orders threatened serious punishment should any similar incident ever happen
again.” 38
Others endow the episode with even greater significance. Malcolm Brown and Shirley
Seaton, in Christmas Truce, a popular rather than academic history, maintain that the truce is
an event of continuing importance, and “can be now seen as a small but significant gesture
against the tide of international and nationalist rivalry and hatred which was flowing strongly
in 1914 and flows strongly – and no less dangerously – as the century moves towards its
close.” 39 In Silent Night, another work devoted to the holiday armistice, Stanley Weintraub
argues that the value of the truce as a symbolic event goes far beyond its temporal boundaries,
asserting that “Christmas 1914 evokes the stubborn humanity within us, and suggests an
unrealized potential to burst its seams and rewrite a century.” 40
The Christmas truce, therefore, is now considered to be a moment of sanity in the
midst of the brutal and senseless lunacy that the First World War comprised. The orthodox
narrative of the First World War, which this view of the 1914 holiday armistice underlines,
argues that the war killed enormous numbers of people but achieved nothing, that it was
caused by an irrelevant assassination in the Balkans, that the violation of Belgian neutrality
merely provided British politicians with a convenient excuse to get involved in the war, that
the stories about German atrocities in Belgium were invented to incite hatred against the
enemy, that the war was incompetently fought, that the civilians of the combatant nations
blindly supported the war, with no idea of its realities, that the few soldiers who survived the
conflict were forever haunted by the horrors of the war that festered in their repressed
memories, and that the First War World was the proximate cause of the Second World War.
To those who subscribe to the conventional narrative of the conflict, the Christmas truce
represents a golden opportunity lost: a moment when the two sides met up in No-Man’s-Land
in the spirit of peace and fellowship, and the war’s madness might have been stopped.
More recently, however, the generally accepted discourse of the First World War, into
which this version of the truce fits so cozily, has been challenged. Adrian Gregory, Niall
Ferguson, Daniel Todman, John Terraine and Gary Sheffield, among other modern historians,
have examined many of the orthodoxies of the First World War narrative and argued for a
more nuanced view of the conflict. Gregory believes, for example, the more clear-cut goals of
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the Second World War contributed to the perception that the 1914-1918 war was futile. “Both
morality and long-term self-interest,” he observes, “appear to argue that Britain was right to go
to war against Nazism in 1939,” but he notes that it is important to remember that the British
public “believed precisely the same thing about the Kaiser’s Germany.” 41 While current
conventional wisdom may maintain that this was a delusion, Gregory argues that the war “was
not fought in retrospect and to understand it we must stop re-fighting it that way.” 42 Sheffield
agrees, stating categorically that, while the war was tragic, “it was neither futile nor
meaningless. Just as the struggles against Napoleon and, later, Hitler, it was a war that Britain
had to fight and win.”43
John Horne, the editor of A Companion to World War I, claims that the expectations
raised by the conflict’s magnitude inspired its reputation for futility, observing that “(t)he
scale of the effort and the size of the sacrifice inclined many who fought in the war to believe
while it lasted that such an experience must have a decisive result, a closure that would be
worthy of the conflict.” 44 However, owing “to the gulf between cause and effect, and to the
ways in which it set in motion more than it resolved…(p)opular perceptions and official
memory have likewise reflected the divisive legacies of the conflict.” 45 Terraine advances a
more sanguine view of the war, believing that, for Britain, preventing German domination of
the continent meant that “victory lay in what had been averted, not in what had been
achieved.” 46
Equally, many scoff at the notion that the war was sparked by the assassination of the
Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, seeing their deaths at the hands of a Serbian nationalist as
merely the excuse Austro-Hungary and Germany seized upon to begin the desired conflict.
Blackadder Goes Forth highlights the irrelevance of the actual event in the following exchange
between two soldiers:
Private Baldrick: I heard it started when some fella called Archie Duke shot an
ostrich 'cos he was hungry.
Captain Blackadder: I think you mean that it started when the Arch-Duke of
Austro-Hungary got shot.
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Private Baldrick: No, there was definitely an ostrich involved. 47
Gopnik observes that the only person who seemed genuinely concerned about the deaths of
the Austrian royals, whom he describes as “notably unmourned,” was the Kaiser, “who had a
class interest in protecting Germanic royalty from Slavic terrorists.” 48 On the subject of why
the British in particular chose to get involved in the First World War, Marwick looks past the
German invasion of Belgium to “the growing awareness in Britain that her world economic
power was steadily being challenged by Germany [and] the conviction that any German
aggrandizement on the European continent would fatally upset the balance of power.” 49
Todman agrees, observing that “British ministers in 1914 went to war to maintain the balance
of power in Europe,” and arguing that it “was in Britain’s best interests then, as it had been for
centuries, to prevent a single hegemonic power dominating the whole mainland of Europe.” 50
Additionally, many historians now maintain that the outrage over purported German
brutality towards the Belgian population was in fact prompted by the existence of real
atrocities in that country. Although some of the more inflammatory stories about German
soldiers chopping off the hands of children, raping nuns, and tying priests to bell clappers
were discredited almost as soon as the war was over, it has been noted lately that a number of
the press reports written about German behavior in Belgium were accurate in their
descriptions of German soldiers killing non-combatants, including women and children, on
flimsy military pretexts, and behaving savagely towards the civilian population generally.
Gregory observes that the German soldiers in Belgium engaged in both “cold-blooded
executions of large numbers of hostages and more spontaneous massacres carried out by units
that went on the rampage.” 51 Todman contends that German actions against Belgian civilians
“were not just the actions of soldiers out of control of their officers: German atrocities were a
matter of policy, not just panic.” 52
The idea that the war was incompetently fought is one that has also come under attack
in recent historiography. Terraine, for example, protests that too many people think about
Douglas Haig in terms of the “grim casualty list” of the battles of the Somme, Ypres, and
Passchendaele. Instead, he argues, “(w)hat is exceptional about Haig is the hundred days of
uninterrupted victory by which he did so much to bring the War to an end.” 53 Gopnik agrees,
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observing that recent accounts of the war “conclude that the generals did the best they could”
and maintaining that if “a steering committee of Grant, Montgomery, Napoleon and
Agamemnon had been convened to lead the allies, the result would have been about the
same.”54 Horne notes that, although the current understanding of the war has “moved
decisively” in the direction of a narrative of horror and disproportionate suffering, military
historians have emphasized “the ‘learning curve’ of the British army which, they suggest,
achieved one of the finest performances ever on the western front in the last three months of
the war.” 55
The view that service on the Western front consisted of nothing but suffering and
death is also one that is, to a certain extent, a creation of modern attitudes. While no one
would deny the horrific number of fatalities that occurred on that front, as well as the misery
caused by the conditions of trench warfare, it is also important to remember that this was not
the overall or even dominant experience of every man involved. One First World War veteran
estimated that, while serving with an infantry battalion in France, a soldier would spend
approximately 100 days out of a year in the front line, and although sniping and shelling
remained almost a daily fact of life while in the trenches, actual attacks would only occur a few
times a year. The rest of a soldier’s time was spent in reserve trenches, in billets, in training
out of the line, and on leave. This does not mean that time serving in the lines was in any way
easy, but the troops passed the majority of their time away from the front, making the
conventional image of soldiers living exclusively for four years in the unrelieved mud and
misery of the trenches inaccurate. 56
However, the famous poetry of the First World War, with its stress on the horrors of
the front unmitigated by spells out of the line, has influenced the collective British memory of
the conflict and shaped its perception of the lives of soldiers who served in it. Samuel Hynes,
in A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture, examines literature written
during and after the war and traces the myths that dominate the literary narrative of the
conflict: the idiotic generals and uncaring politicians sacrificing the brave and idealistic young
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soldiers who went off so gallantly to the trenches, to be slaughtered there by the millions. 57
Many other historians maintain that the emphasis in British school curricula on the poetry of
writer/soldiers, such as Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves, encourages
students to believe that this body of literature represents the “truth” of the conflict rather than
the specific reactions of a group of non-professional junior soldiers to their experiences of
battle. As Emma Hanna notes, “(i)n Britain, the idea that the First World War can be
understood through its literature has proved particularly enduring…British historians,
although they have produced an enormous body of very good work, have had a negligible
effect on the way the majority of the nation thinks about the war.”58 Hew Strachan advances a
similar argument, observing that the “legacy of literature, and its effects on the shaping of
memory, have proved far more influential than economic or political realities.” 59
Other modern portrayals of the war have also influenced the way it is perceived. Lynn
Macdonald’s popular and compelling books about the First World War use extensive personal
narratives to focus on the miseries of the trenches, the high death toll and the surviving
soldiers’ subsequent disillusionment with the conflict, and therefore, according to Ferguson,
tend “to endorse the idea that the war was sheer hell and the soldiers its victims.” 60 In fact,
Gregory believes that “it is reasonable to suggest that many working-class men in the armed
forces found their experiences less unusual and shocking than might be expected.” 61 It can be
argued that the very qualities, such as patience and a sense of responsibility towards the men
with whom they fought, which enabled soldiers to survive four years of regular spells of trench
warfare conditioned their post-war attitudes as well, prompting them to retain a belief in the
war for which so many had paid a high price. Gary Sheffield agrees, countering the suggestion
that soldiers were disillusioned by their experiences with the observation that “many who
fought in the war did not hold the view that it was futile, and maintained their pride in their
achievements to the end of their days.” 62
The ignorance of civilians about the horrors of the war, which springs from the belief
that press reports during the war consisted of nothing but propaganda and lies, is another
First World War truism that has been lately revisited. Horne, for example, notes that neither
censorship nor propaganda “was as powerful as was made out by…[an] interwar myth,
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according to which governments and the press deliberately manipulated opinion with
mendacious tales.” 63 To demonstrate that the public received more information about the war
and its associated terrors than is currently credited, Ferguson includes in his work a
photograph of a German corpse on barbed wire, which he notes was taken by an accredited
press photographer and “reproduced for use in stereoscopic viewers. The horror of war,”
Ferguson infers, “was concealed less from the public than is sometimes thought.” 64 While
Gregory does believe that soldiers had trouble expressing the truth about their experiences at
the front, he nevertheless concludes that “they tried to recount conditions far more than is
sometimes realized, and were listened to by their friends and relatives, much more so than is
usually acknowledged.” 65
Finally, the contention that the First World War was the proximate cause of the
Second World War has also received considerable attention from revisionist historians.
Ferguson, for example, argues that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles did not cripple the
German economy, thereby leaving its population open to the appeal of fascism: “(t)he reality,”
he maintains, “was that the economic consequences of the Versailles Treaty were far less
severe for Germany than the Germans and Keynes claimed.” 66 In fact, Ferguson claims, the
German economy was wrecked by bad economic policies, not reparations. Todman concedes
that there were issues with post-war settlements and the Treaty of Versailles but believes that
these issues should not retroactively deny the war its meaning. The fact that the treaty was
flawed, he observes, does not mean “that the war that preceded it was futile. The First World
War stopped the German threat that had erupted in 1914. Perhaps that was enough. The
Britons who had gone to war in 1914-18 had achieved their objective.” 67
The existence of websites with titles such as “Fighting the Myths of the First World
War” demonstrate that resistance to the generally accepted narrative has become a battle of
its own, pitting the forces of orthodoxy against the armies of revisionism. 68 However, as
Todman points out in The Great War: Myth and Memory, these onslaughts on the
conventional discourse have not “made the slightest difference to what most people actually
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believe.” 69 The surprisingly persistent myths that dominate the popular conception of the war
have been the focus of many scholars who have tried to elucidate the reasons for the
“(s)tupidity plus tragedy equals futility” view of the conflict. 70
Some historians believe this interpretation can be traced to attitudes towards the war
prevalent in the 1920s; Nicoletta Gullace, for examples, argues that scholarship between the
two world wars “subordinated itself to the overriding imperative of turning World War I into a
morality tale” with the aim of avoiding future wars by labelling the late conflict the creation of
government, press and commercial lies, and therefore futile and unnecessary. 71 “The moral
and ethical imperatives of this interpretation,” she observes, “have made it unusually difficult
to dislodge.” Michael Nieberg, like Gullace, places the narrative shift in the inter-war period,
but provides an alternative explanation. Neiberg, in fact, contends that the belief that the war,
which had been a disaster for all of Europe, should never have happened “built up steam in the
comparatively co-operative and pacific atmosphere of the mid-1920s because it moved blame
away from Germany in the hopes of creating future peace.” 72
Other scholars situate the attitudinal shift against the First World War in the 1960s.
Emma Hanna notes that during that decade, the Second World War became perceived “as a
‘good’ war, with a relatively low number of casualties, while the memory of 1914-18 was
reduced to images of mud, blood and cemeteries.” 73 Adrian Gregory similarly credits the
changing attitudes towards the First World War to the memory of the second conflict,
claiming that in its aftermath the earlier conflict became “an apocalyptic fall from grace, at
best, the definitive bad war.” 74 Todman, in addition, believes that, during the 1960s and after,
the passing of the generations most hurt by the First World War’s deaths, the parents, siblings
and wives of soldiers killed and wounded in battle, freed critics of the war from the need to
respect the feelings of the bereaved, and therefore allowed a more unfavourable view of the
conflict and its aftermath to surface.
Janet Watson sees the narrative shift as more thematic, arguing that the emphasis on
trench warfare as the essential experience of the First World has strongly conditioned its
discourse: as a result, the “received history of the war starts with idealistic volunteers and ends
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with shattered veterans and names carved in stone on memorials.”75 While all these factors
certainly contributed to the First World War’s reputation for futility and tragedy, this book
will argue that an even more important factor in the construction of the conventional
narrative of the war is the fact that a second world war began before the embers of the first
had barely died out. The necessity for another global conflict twenty years later is the most
telling argument that, for whatever reasons the First World War was fought, the conflict
solved nothing, and the soldiers who died fighting it gave their lives in vain. The national
commitment to this interpretation is demonstrated by John Simpson in his work on
twentieth-century British journalism, in which he confidently asserts that every appalling
episode of both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can be credited not only to the First
World War, but, more precisely, to the purported cause of the conflict. The murders of the
Archduke and his consort, he argues, led
not just to the start of the First World War five weeks later, but directly or
indirectly to many of the most important events of the twentieth century: the
Russian revolution, the rise of Stalin’s Communism and Hitler’s Nazism, the
Second World War, the Holocaust, the atomic bomb, the decline of Europe and
its colonial empires, the Cold War, the seemingly endless conflict in the Middle
East, the growth of militant Islam. If the Archduke’s car had not taken a wrong
turn and stalled, would any of these things have happened? Perhaps, but they
would have happened differently. The balance of Europe could well have been
maintained indefinitely, had it not been for one particular chain of events. 76
As this passage demonstrates, while the orthodox narrative of the war has been continuously
challenged by revisionist contentions about the inaccuracy of its various elements, and
numerous myths about the conflict have been thoroughly dissected, British cultural memory
remains fiercely loyal to the dominant First World War discourse of waste and futility.
Within these various challenges to the conventional discourse of the First World War,
however, the Christmas truce has not yet found its place in the revisionist narrative. If the
truce can no longer be used to underline the moral of the war, does it continue to have any
meaning? Without a privileged place in the orthodox view of the war, the event appears to
become merely a day off for the soldiers involved and a temporary curiosity for the British
public, and many historians challenging the war’s orthodox narrative view it in precisely those
terms. This dismissive attitude, however, obscures the meaning that the 1914 truce had for
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those who had participated in it. As demonstrated by the letters, diaries and memoirs of the
soldiers involved, the impromptu cease-fire was a significant moment for all those who were
involved, and remained a cherished memory for veterans long after the war was over. In
addition, even within a more revisionist view of the war, the Christmas truce can still maintain
an important role: as an episode that illuminates the attitudes of the soldiers who participated
in it, including their belief that the conflict had meaning and purpose, their willingness to
share information about their experiences with those at home, their adaptation to the
conditions under which they fought, and the professionalism they brought to their service on
the Western front. Furthermore, the way the news of the Christmas truce was received by the
home front illustrates that the British public was not, as is often argued today, protected from
the truth about the war, but was instead aware of the realities of life at the front and what its
soldiers had to endure in the trenches.
A new assessment of the 1914 Christmas truce demonstrates that the holiday cease-fire
was neither “the only meaningful episode in the apocalypse,” as Weintraub would have it, nor
“relatively minor and inconsequential,” as Nieburg argues. 77 The armistice was an event of
significance for those involved, even if its contemporaneous meaning was not the defiant
moral that was imposed upon it long afterwards. The truce meant time off for weary soldiers,
providing them with an opportunity to move about in the lines without fear of snipers, rebuild
their trenches and enjoy Christmas as best they could under the circumstances, as well as a
chance to satisfy their curiosity about the enemy and write home about something besides the
endless mud and shelling. The holiday cease-fire became a valued memory for the
participants, as demonstrated by the way it was discussed in letters written by the soldiers,
fondly recalled years later in interviews and memoirs describing their service, and featured in
many regimental histories. “It will be a thing to remember all one’s life,” was how R.J. Armes,
one truce participant, put it, and most of the men writing home about the impromptu
armistice expressed similar sentiments, noting that they would never forget the Christmas Day
they had spent fraternizing with the enemy in No-Man’s-Land. 78 An examination of the
accounts sent home by the soldiers who took part in the holiday cease-fire, as well as the
reports of it that appeared in the war diaries of the participating regiments and subsequently
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in the same regiments’ official histories, will refute the legends and fictions that have come to
obscure the reality of the truce. 79
In addition to its personal importance for those involved, the episode is significant for
another reason, which is that attitudes towards the Christmas truce have tracked the evolving
popular narrative of the war. Examining works written about the war and the way they deal
with the truce illustrates how the discourse of the conflict has evolved since the firing stopped
on November 11, 1918. In the century that has passed since it took place, the 1914 Christmas
truce has been invoked by many as confirmation that their assessment of the war is accurate.
The episode has been utilized by a number of historians and writers who believe that their
view of the conflict can be proven, or at the minimum underlined, through reference to the
impromptu armistice. In the 1960s, the truce became, and has remained since then, a
historiographical touchstone for the conventional narrative of the First World War and an
enticing shorthand for the view that the conflict was futile and senseless. As Emma Hanna
has noted, the holiday armistice has proved to be “a historical soft spot,” engaging emotions
“which render the audience uncritical” and therefore much less likely to question the point
which the truce is being used to prove. 80
The myth of the truce, like that of the conventional interpretation of the war, has its
roots in the “lions led by donkeys” interpretation of the First World War promoted so strongly
in the 1960s, and the parallel discourses of the war and the truce demonstrate the power of an
appealing and simplistic narrative to drive out the voices of dissent, even if in this case the
“dissenting” voices are those of the original participants in the event. With the centenary of
the 1914 Christmas truce approaching, it is past time for the opinions of soldiers who were
involved in the cease-fire to be heard.
While Joyeux Noel and other similar works use a romanticized Christmas truce to
advance their view of the First World War as a futile conflict, this book will instead engage
with the reality of the 1914 holiday armistice as a means of challenging the popular perception
of the war. Rather than reacting to the Christmas truce in the monolithic manner now
embraced by historians who subscribe to the conventional view of the war, the soldiers who
participated in it brought a range of feelings, from elation to suspicion, to the event. There
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were officers who joined in the truce, and commanders who were willing to allow its
temporary continuance. No one was punished for participation, and very few of those who
took part allowed the event to alter their view of the war. The truce did include shared drinks
and spontaneous games of football, but also featured solemn burial parties and moments of
treachery. Furthermore, the manner in which the details of the truce were accepted by the
British public demonstrates that the home front was ignorant neither of the conditions on the
Western front nor the attitudes of the soldiers who served there. Consequently, the holiday
armistice, in itself a fascinating and complex episode, also serves as a means of achieving
further insight into the experiences and attitudes of soldiers on the Western front, the views of
the British public towards the war, and the evolving discourse of the war over the past
century. As a result, the 1914 Christmas truce, an event which at first glance appears to confirm
the popular discourse of the First World War, can instead contribute to a more complete
understanding of both the conflict and the development of the war’s orthodox narrative.
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Chapter Two
“Absolute Hell”:
The Western Front in 1914

It was almost impossible for a man to convey the reality of life at the front to family or friends,
even if social convention had permitted such frank discussions.
-Gary Sheffield
War on the Western Front (2007)
The firing died down and out of the darkness a great moan came. People with their arms and
legs off trying to crawl away; others who could not move gasping out their last moments with
the cold night wind biting into their broken bodies and the lurid red glare of a farm house
showing up clumps of grey devils killed by the men on my left further down. A weird awful
scene; some of them would raise themselves on one arm or crawl a little distance, silhouetted
as black as ink against the red glow of the fire.
-Captain H.M. Dillon
2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
24 October 1914 letter to his sister

To understand what motivated British soldiers to become involved in the Christmas
truce, it is necessary first to examine their attitudes during the first year of the conflict, and
more particularly, one of the most persistent tropes of the First World War, which is the belief
that soldiers fighting in it did not share the truth of their experiences with the home front.
This theory, coupled with the perception that the civilians in Great Britain had absolutely no
idea about the conditions in which their soldiers fought, including the mud, miseries and
dangers of the trenches, colors the approach of many historians and other writers towards the
war, and helps explain the conventional narrative of the holiday armistice. “What people at
home had heard of the fighting man’s war was only a confused murmur,” the historian Arthur
Marwick wrote about British non-combatants during 1914-1918 conflict. “They knew the
statistics of death…but not the foul horror of it; they saw the glory, but not the sordid filth of
trench life. Fighting men, appalled at the nature of the war in which they found themselves,
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were unable to convey the unbelievable substance.” 81 This narrative was heavily featured in
First World War historiography during the 1960s but was by no means limited to that period.
John Terraine similarly theorizes that “the inexhaustible patience and cheerfulness of the
troops…cut them off from communication with their relatives,” and Modris Ecksteins also
notes that “soldiers were inclined to hide the gruesome reality of the war from their loved ones
at home.” 82 Even Dan Todman, otherwise adept at skewering First World War myths,
maintains that, in addition to the restrictions imposed on the soldiers by army censorship,
“more powerful was a self-censorship which was designed to protect those at home from the
worries they might have experienced if they had known the dangers that their correspondents
were facing.” 83
This theme runs through many works on the war. In Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare
in the First World War, John Ellis contends that “the men were always at pains to conceal the
reality of what was happening from their loved ones” when writing letters home. 84 A. Fletcher,
in “Between the Lines,” an article on communications between front-line soldiers and their
friends and relations, concedes that, while “messages sent by British soldiers of the First
World War to their loved ones back home have long been valued for what they tell us about
daily life in the trenches,” while noting at the same time that “their authors were often at pains
not to reveal too much of the horror and pain they endured.” 85 Robert Graves, whose memoir
Goodbye to All That greatly influenced the orthodox narrative of post-war veterans’
disillusionment, sharply underlined the division between soldiers and their families when he
described the emotions he felt upon returning home on leave. “England looked strange to us
returned soldiers,” he wrote in 1929. “We could not understand the war madness that ran
about everywhere, looking for a pseudo-military outlet. The civilians talked a foreign
language, and it was newspaper language. I found serious conversation with my parents all but
impossible.”86
Recent studies that have used soldiers’ writings as the focus of their analysis have
chipped away at this dominant narrative; however, the emphases of their work have prevented
the myth of soldierly reticence from being completely exposed. Michael Roper’s monograph
on soldiers’ strategies for emotional survival, which takes a psychoanalytic approach to their
81
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writings, seeks to “discern states of mind from the often oblique clues given in letters, diaries
and memoirs,” and maintains that the information in their letters is “opaque,” forcing scholars
“to read between the lines.” 87 Jessica Meyer, on the other hand, acknowledges in Men of War:
Masculinity and the First World War in Britain that soldiers were more forthright in their
letters home than is commonly believed, but her focus on manifestations of masculinity leads
her to emphasize the writings of soldiers who “manfully” attempt to reassure their families
about their safety over those who wrote openly about the experiences of battle. 88
The British soldier suffering in the mud and danger of the trenches, therefore, is now
assumed to be writing home cheerfully mendacious letters assuring his relatives that he was
relatively safe, warm, and dry, that he remained a patriotic supporter of the war in which he
fought, and that he confidently expected he and his fellow soldiers would thrash the cowardly
Hun with the next big push. According to this narrative, the British civilian, safeguarded from
the ghastly truth by his protective soldiers, as well as the government and press conspiracy to
keep him ignorant of the war so he would continue to support it, was able to give the conflict
his whole-hearted backing, and by doing so prolonged both the war and the agonies of the
front-line soldiers. By creating the perception that the troops on the Western front did not
share their experiences with their friends and relations, which reticence in turn increased the
soldiers’ alienation from civilians and their disgust with non-combatants’ strong support for
the war, these views about the fraught relationship between the home and fighting fronts have
strongly influenced the war’s discourse and, indirectly, have provided a convincing rationale
for the generally-accepted narrative of the Christmas truce. If in fact, as John Morrow argues,
“(f)ront soldiers’ writings reflected a stark division between the fighting and home fronts and
their anger and hostility toward the latter,” it is only natural that the British troops, when
presented with an opportunity to do so by the convenient excuse of holiday celebrations,
would turn to their brothers-in-arms in the opposite trenches, who were the only ones who
understood the miseries with which they had to deal daily. 89
An examination of letters written home by British soldiers during the first year of the
war, including both those kept privately by the families who received them and those
forwarded to nationally circulated newspapers for publication, however, shows that, at least in
the first year of the war, this great divide between soldiers and civilians did not exist. The
horrors of front-line warfare were exposed from the moment the guns started firing, and
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soldiers freely shared information about the war with their families and friends, writing letters
about the dangers of battle, the ghastly trenches, and their attitudes towards their enemies. In
addition, soldiers’ letters openly discussing the conditions at the front were published in
nationally circulated British newspapers. Men serving on the Western front were surprisingly
forthright about the war and the conditions under which they fought, and, as censorship of
letters home appears to have been minimal, those attitudes were communicated freely. In a
1985 interview, George Ashurst, who served with the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, dismissed the
idea that there was extensive suppression of news written home by soldiers. “(W)e give ‘em to
the officer,” he said, “but I don’t think he bothered any further. You had to give it to the
officer, you know, your letter…he didn’t bother to look at them, no.” 90 Of course, officers’
letters were subject only to self-censorship, and were quite frank as a result. 91 Because of the
flow of information from the battlefields of France to the home front, civilians were much
better informed about the conditions of the war than the current narrative allows.
In addition to these private sources of information, the British public as a whole was
also able to attain a certain level of understanding about the Western front through its
newspapers, which were not always as deceptive about the reality of war as is now believed.
From the first days of the war, the surprising amount of information available to the home
front through soldiers’ letters published by the mainstream press, including stories not only
about the horrors of the war but also about the occasionally friendly relations between the
opposing sides, helped give the British the sense that they understood what life in the front
lines was like. The reports that were shared with the home front through these letters
included information about the changing nature of war, the dangers of battle, the horrors of
the trenches, the proximity of the Germans, and soldiers’ attitudes towards their enemies. By
providing those back at home in Britain with vivid first-hand accounts of the lives of their
soldiers in the trenches, the press conditioned the public to accept the stories of those who
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served in the Western front as the ‘truth’ of the war, paving the way for general acceptance of
the seemingly incredible story of the truce.
By the time the truce occurred, the war was nearly five months old. One of the many
tropes of the conventional narrative of the First World War is that everyone expected it to be
over quickly. 92 While this assertion is not altogether correct, what no one involved predicted
was that it would be a war of stalemate rather than mobility; the stationary trenches of the
Western Front, although not a new development in modern warfare, were one that the
military leadership on both sides struggled to overcome. 93 For four years, every new offensive,
whether undertaken by the Entente or the Central Powers, was supposed to produce the
breakthrough that would decide the conflict, but for four years, those offensives failed, at the
cost of millions of lives over the course of the war. Generals were trained in, and trained their
troops for, wars of movement, and the conditions of static warfare were a reality to which both
military leaders and common soldiers had to adapt. “It’s a war with no glamour or glory such
as one expects in a huge world-wide show like this,” John Liddell, who served on the Western
Front with the 2nd Argyll and Sunderland Highlanders, wrote home to his father. “Modern
weapons are too deadly, and the whole art of war, and all tactics as laid down in our books,
and in the German dittoes, has been quite altered. No advancing across the open by short
rushes.” 94 Liddell, like many other soldiers, found his expectations of war confounded by the
enforced shift from standard offensive campaigns to tactics that favored the defence. While no
one knew in 1914 that the stalemate on the Western Front would continue for four long years,
soldiers nevertheless quickly became aware that war, as everyone previously understood it,
had changed dramatically.
In addition to the restrictions imposed by a static war, men also had to adjust to the
conditions they found at the front. Unfortunately, as the historian Charles Cruttwell pointed
out, those conditions were dreadful: the trenches “had not been deliberately sited; they were
more often an elaboration of the holes into which the combatants had dug themselves when
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unable to advance.”95 As a result of their haphazard placement, the trenches were generally
hastily constructed, situated in muddy and flat areas, prone to flooding, and always
uncomfortable. In fact, the soldiers serving on the Western front often found the Flanders
mud to be as persistent an enemy as the Germans, and that mud and its attendant discomforts
featured largely in soldiers’ letters home.
“I have been up to my knees and over them at times in this horrible cold mud – the
awful part is having to stand there until the frost comes and binds all together into one
congealed mass,” Tom Lucey, of the 1st Loyal North Lancashires, wrote to his mother. 96 Arthur
Pelham-Burn, with the 6th Gordon Highlanders, echoed that assessment, remarking in a letter
to England that “I used to think I knew what mud was before I came out here but I was quite
mistaken. The mud here varies from 6 in. to 3 and 4 ft. even 5 ft. and it is so sticky that until
we were all issued with boots, half my men used to arrive in the trenches with bare feet.” 97
Lieutenant Berryman, who served with a Garhwali regiment, described the physical effect of
living in such conditions, observing how “after standing in water and mud” for days “you can’t
imagine the state your feet get into, soft and swollen and no good for walking on, just good
enough to stand upon and no more.”98 (*See figure I for Berryman’s drawing of a soldier going
into and then returning from the trenches) Similar vivid portrayals of the physical discomforts
of the front featured prominently in the letters written home by many soldiers, and left their
friends and relations in no doubt about the conditions in which they were living.
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Figure 1: A soldier leaving for and returning from the trenches. Drawing by E.R.P. Berryman,
2/39th Garhwal Rifles. (Used by permission of Tamsin Baccus.)
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Far from protecting those at home from the horrors of the trenches, soldiers instead
kept their correspondents very well informed about their daily experiences, including the
dangers to which they were exposed. 99 Frank Black, an officer with the 1st Royal
Warwickshires, wrote to a friend in early December 1914 that his unit was “having an easier
time now, spending four days in the trenches and four days out.” This “easier” time, however,
consisted of trying to hold “a very warm corner” where “shots are flying up the trenches, down
the trenches and across them all day, and most of the night; and all of us except the sentries
sit tight in our dug-outs all day, and only venture out when it is absolutely necessary.” 100
Captain H.M. Dillon, who served in Flanders with the 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire
Light Infantry, sent his sister grim details of an attack on the Germans: while first taken by
surprise, the enemy, he reported,
must have seen us as from then on it was absolute hell let loose, one could not
move a finger and the opposite bank was plastered with shell and shrapnel.
One high explosive burst right above where I was and the 2 poor devils on my
right got a piece of it between them. It tore the flesh clean away from the bone
of one of their legs, and there was a piece of bone 6 inches long with the flesh
hanging over the heel. 101
E. Daniell, a major with the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, told his mother at the end of September 1914
that his battalion had “not had a day’s repose since we started the campaign; previous to this it
has been march, fight, hell-fire from shells continuously.” 102 Pelham-Burn also noted in a letter
written home that the “hardships to be suffered in the trenches are really quite beyond
anything I could have imagined while still in England. The cold, the wet, the mud, are awful,
also the frequent lack of water means continual risking of life.” 103
Percy Jones, with the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles, described the trenches in a
letter to his brother as “a wet hell.” 104 Wilfred Spencer of the 2nd Wiltshires agreed, writing to
99
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his mother that he wondered “how many people realize what Hell the trenches can be. No
shelter from rain or cold and in some places mud right over one’s knees nearly always over
one’s ankles.”105 Lieutenant John Aiden Liddell reported in a letter to his mother that the
soldiers heard gruesome stories about “trenches where both sides have sapped forward until
they are about 20 yards from each other.” Because, he explained, “the ground is full of dead
bodies…when the walls of a dug-out or part of the trench falls in, there is generally a body
exposed.” Liddell ended his macabre tale with the information that a soldier “wanted to cut
some ends of roots that were sticking out of his dug-out wall, and discovered they were a
corpse’s fingers!” 106 Even the most shocking details about the horrors of active service in the
line, it appears, were considered appropriate subjects for inclusion in letters home.
At the same time that these gruesome depictions of the war were keeping the soldiers’
correspondents well-informed about conditions at the front, the men also wrote home about
the enemy whose trenches were so close to their own. The fiancée of Maurice Mascall, who
served with the Royal Garrison Artillery, must have been concerned to receive a letter from
him stating matter-of-factly that he was “in trenches at the edge of a large wood, with the
German trenches only about 70 yards distant.” 107 Captain Dillon reported to his sister that in
his battalion’s current position, “the German trenches were 25 yds in front of us, i.e. about the
length of a tennis court,” although he did add the reassuring fact that in between the two lines
was “a fairly thick wood.”108 Captain Lucey wrote to his brother that his battalion’s place at the
front was “slap up against the Germans,” noting that “in some cases only 30 yards separates
the two lines and we chuck bombs at one another.” 109 As alarming as these descriptions of the
nearness of the enemy must have been to those at home, it should also be noted that the
proximity of the trenches of the British and Germans had an unexpected result for both
armies: that of a better acquaintance with the soldiers in the opposing trenches.
Soldiers, even in the early parts of the war, became used to their places in the line; as
both armies on the Western Front dug in for the long haul, they could not avoid growing
familiar with the soldiers opposite them. Under these conditions, whatever the men in the
front lines felt about the enemy as a political entity, they recognized that the soldiers whose
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trenches they were facing, and whose daily activities not only mirrored theirs but could also be
observed, were enduring the same discomforts and fears as they were. As a result, the two
sides developed, in addition to a certain amount of familiarity with each other, a surprising
level of acceptance, considering the natural antipathy that must have been felt as a result of
the terrible death toll of the first months of the war.
Contributing to this atmosphere of mutual tolerance was the fact that almost all the
soldiers in the trenches in winter 1914, on both sides of the line, were either professionals,
previously conscripted soldiers, or from reserve units, all of whom had enlisted in or been
drafted into the army before the war. As a result, their service was generally motivated by
reasons other than hatred of the opposing side, as opposed to the attitudes of at least some of
the men who enlisted once the war had started. With its small, all-volunteer army, Britain was
able to initially send only a small number of men to France, in the form of the British
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.). While both the Germans and French were subject to
conscription, their troops who were sent to the front during the early winter of 1914 were
mainly comprised of men who were in service before the war began, as it took time to train
and equip those who joined at the beginning of the conflict. The British forces did receive
supplements in the form of newly-enlisted men throughout the late autumn and early winter,
but those recruits were absorbed into already formed units, meaning that the men who joined
up early in the war served with career officers and soldiers, and the presence of newly
recruited soldiers in a particular unit, therefore, would have been diluted. 110
The fact that so many of the men, and particularly the officers, in the front lines during
the winter of 1914-1915 were pre-war professionals contributed to the relative lack of personal
enmity between the opposing lines of trenches at that time. The historian B.H. Liddell Hart, in
particular, credited at least part of the tolerance that developed towards the enemy during the
first winter of the war to the fact that the British army, because of its professional character,
was “relatively immune” to what he described as “the natural ferocity of war accentuated by a
form of mob spirit which is developed by a ‘nation in arms.’” 111 As Robert Graves observed
colloquially in a story about the Christmas truce, “‘(r)egulars, you see, know the rules of war
and don’t worry their heads about politics or propaganda.’” 112 This resistance to partisan hatred
by the troops who fought on the Western front in 1914 created more opportunities for the
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opposing sides to develop a respect for the professionalism of their enemies. An example of
this was provided by E.W. Cox, an intelligence officer at GHQ, who wrote to his wife in
September 1914 that “(t)he Germans are making a splendid stand. They are wonderful
soldiers.” 113 Such mutual esteem, even among the fierce battles and debilitating conditions of
the trenches, informed the attitudes of the soldiers on both sides, and British troops, as a
result, spoke in their letters home about the Germans in a way that made it clear to their
families and friends that the enemy was not the stereotypical “fiendish Hun” of the more
sensationalist British press.
The professional soldier’s resistance to “politics and propaganda” created more
chances for the opposing sides to develop a respect for their enemies’ positive qualities,
leading Major Daniell to write to his mother about the consideration shown by the enemy to
the British who were injured in battle, which he contrasted to anti-German propaganda. “All
these stories of cruelty to our wounded are I think a pack of lies,” he observed, “our
information is very reverse, because we have direct evidence repeatedly of the extreme
kindness extended to our wounded.” After one battle, he noted, the British had “to leave our
wounded … and when our Dr. went out to bring them in he found they had been bandaged by
the Germans, given them water and removed them to a comfortable place. Many of the
Germans said you English treat our wounded well and we do the same for you.” 114 Cuthbert
Lawson, who served in an artillery unit, praised the abilities of the enemy, telling his mother
in October 1914 that the war “is going to last a jolly long time unless something unforeseen
happens – the German army is a highly efficient fighting machine, and the German staff is very
nearly perfect, and certainly the best in the world – they won’t make any silly mistakes, and
can only be decisively beaten by really superior numbers.” 115 Such observations reflected the
way these professional soldiers viewed their enemies, and many of the British troops showed
no hesitation about reporting these opinions to the civilians at home.
Because of the proximity of the two lines of trenches, soldiers on both sides shared not
only respect and common miseries, but were able to appreciate mutual jokes and
entertainment. Alfred Chater of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, for example, reported in a letter
how the British troops used a German’s tin chimney as a target for rifle practice: “After each
shot the German waved a stick or rang a bell according to whether we hit the chimney or not!
There are lots of amusing incidents up there,” he continued, “and altogether we have quite a
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cheery time our worst trouble is the wet and mud which is knee-deep in some places.” 116
Liddell also talked about friendly relations with the enemy, writing to his mother that he had
heard about some British officers who “were reported to have made a practice of going over to
the Germans’ lines by day for a chat with the men, the latter warning them when one of their
officers was approaching, and helping them over the parapet so that they could get back.” 117
Foreshadowing the carols on Christmas Eve that ushered in some truces, singing in the
trenches often occurred on quiet evenings in the line, and both British and German troops
enjoyed the impromptu performances. M. Holroyd, a subaltern in the 1st Hampshires, wrote
about a battalion “who had a fine singer among them, whom both sides delighted to honour:
so the Germans just shouted ‘Half time, Wessex,’ when desiring music, and everyone stopped
firing. The songster climbed on the parapet of the trench, and both sides joined in the
chorus.” 118 F.E. Packe, a company commander with the 2nd Welch, also reporting singing across
No-Man’s-Land, writing to his mother in October 1914 that some cheering from the German
trenches “was followed by singing, the tune being the Austrian National Anthem – do they
sing ‘Deutschland Deutschland Uber Alles’ to that tune I wonder? Our men responded with
‘counter cheers’ and sang ‘Who Killed Cock Robin’ and ‘Down by the Old Bull and Bush’ – so
very characteristic of Atkins.”119 As can be seen by these excerpts, the two armies certainly had
the miseries of trench life in common, but jokes and music were also shared with the enemy –
and, through the soldiers’ letters, with the British home front.
Besides noting the details of daily life on the Western Front, soldiers also wrote home
occasionally about the larger topic of the war, or more explicitly, their perceptions of the
conflict’s rationale. Their thoughts on the war itself did not constitute a large portion of their
letters: as Ashurst explained years later, soldiers did not tend to write about the war itself,
because “they really weren’t interested in that, your parents, you know what I mean, they
just wanted to know how you was.” 120 While the British troops were able to admire the
Germans soldiers’ professional abilities, they still felt anger over their behaviour towards the
Belgians. An examination of British soldiers’ writings demonstrates that, contrary to modern
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cynicism about atrocity stories, many of them found the sufferings of Belgium sufficiently
compelling, even without any propagandistic embellishments, to serve as a reason for fighting.
As temporary residents of Belgium, the British troops were in a position not only to see
the effects of the war upon it, but also to tell their relatives and friends about what they had
observed. Cox told his wife that although he tried to be tolerant towards the enemy, “since
reading a German officer’s diary yesterday, I feel I only want to get into Germany and raze
everything to the ground and let their people feel the effects of the war to the very utmost
limit. They are incredibly brutal and should be treated as they have treated the Belgians.” 121
Dillon, who was fatalistic about the fact that he would eventually be wounded or killed during
the war, felt that his sacrifice would be worthwhile: “I don’t care one farthing as far as I am
concerned,” he wrote to his sister in September 1914, “but the whole thing is an outrage on
civilization. The whole of this beautiful country devastated. Broken houses, broken bodies,
blood, filth and ruin everywhere. Can any unending everlasting Hell fire for the Kaiser, his son
and the party who cause this war repair the broken bodies and worse broken hearts which are
being made.” 122 Lieutenant Chandler shared Dillon’s sentiments, writing that, while he didn’t
know “which is the worst – high explosive shells, shrapnel or rifle bullets,” what “upsets me
most of all is the plight of the civilians and hearing the kiddies crying with fear. It is a strange
and awful state of things.” 123 These statements, while firmly contradicting the idea that
German atrocities in Belgium were concocted to provide fodder for the sensationalist press in
Britain, demonstrate that British soldiers felt strongly that the war was worth fighting, and
also that they believed that there were clear differences between the behaviour of the two
sides, however much they might admire the professionalism of the troops opposite.
As revealed by the letters that they wrote home from the Western front, British
soldiers found the conditions of the trenches and the defensive warfare they faced both
horrific and challenging, but were forthright about sharing with their correspondents details
of their lives in the front-line. As a result, those on the home front were able to receive
information about the war from unimpeachable informants: the soldiers themselves. At the
same time, if individual letters from the trenches were its only source of such information, the
British public as a whole, particularly those households that did not have a near relation at the
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front, would have found itself largely ignorant about the war. An examination of British
newspapers published during the first five months of the conflict, however, shows that they in
fact revealed much more about the conditions on the Western front and attitudes of the
soldiers fighting there than the orthodox narrative customarily allows.
When discussing the way the First World War was reported in the British press, it
must be remembered that access to the Western front was strictly controlled by the military
and that before the middle of 1915, there were no journalists at the front at all. 124 As a result,
the accounts of the war that the newspapers published during 1914 were based entirely on
official briefings, and therefore tended to run along the now familiar lines of how splendidly
the Allies were fighting, and how easily the treacherous and brutal Germans were being
beaten. A report in the Daily Telegraph on 12 December 1914, for example, flatly insisted that
no other outcome was imaginable, except on a temporary basis. “A few days ago,” the article
began, “there was suddenly a rumor that a repulse had been met with, and this was rather a
shock, considering that a repulse anywhere along the Franco-British front is, according to a
foregone conclusion, impossible, and it was received, therefore, with incredulity.” The report
went on to state that this incredulity was “entirely justified, for the so-called repulse consisted
simply of the loss of one advanced trench, which had been insufficiently guarded, and which
the French immediately recaptured the following day, and to the success of which they added
by capturing several other trenches in the same district from the enemy.” Lest the Telegraph’s
readers worry that there was more to this enemy assault than the French merely being caught
temporarily off-guard, the paper went on to reassure them that this was just another example
proving “that the Franco-British ascendancy is asserting itself more and more over the enemy,
who may sometimes capture a trench, but is never able to hold it long, whereas the Allies
thoroughly maintain themselves in every position conquered.”125
If all the newspapers had to rely upon were official sources, it is unlikely that their war
reporting would have gone beyond these clichéd and misleading accounts. However, in an
effort that was probably aimed at providing ‘human interest’ for readers while simultaneously
filling column inches about the main subject of the day, all the major daily newspapers
regularly solicited and printed letters received from soldiers’ families. 126 Columns featuring
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this type of correspondence were not printed as prominently in the newspapers as the war
news itself, but neither were they tucked away in small print on the back pages. Although not
all these letters were completely forthright about the war – there were examples printed from
soldiers who were anxious to get to the front before the conflict reached an untimely end, and
missives that echoed such contemporaneous phrases as “but are we downhearted? No!” - the
majority of soldiers’ writings included in the “Letters from the Front” columns presented sober
and detailed descriptions of the realities of war. Through these letters, the British public was
able to catch glimpses of the war beyond the military’s heavily censored, and often fantastical,
accounts. A sampling from the “Letters from the Front” columns featured in all the major
British newspapers demonstrates that these letters displayed a remarkable freedom of
information, given the papers’ commitment to self-censorship and the desire on the part of
the British press to keep accounts of the war positive. 127 It was in these columns of letters that
the truth about the war, at least as far as the soldiers’ experiences of it, was told, and these
same columns later provided the medium through which the details of the Christmas truce
would be transmitted to the general British public.
The “horrors of front-line warfare” which were supposed to be so carefully kept from
the home front were in fact freely shared with the readers of the Daily Mail, who learned
through a letter from an officer that “(w)e do endure ghastly tortures in this war. The cold is
perfectly appalling, however many clothes one wears, and I haven’t slept for nearly a fortnight,
so I am awfully tired and done up.” 128 The Mail, which was the British newspaper with the
widest circulation at that time, also published a letter in December 1914 under the headline
“What Modern Shell Fire is Like,” from an officer with the Army Service Corps who described
the troops coming out of the line. “The experiences in the trenches are sometimes so terrible
that those who come out sound in body look absolutely indifferent to all their surroundings;
they are always covered with mud from head to foot, clothes torn, tired out through lack of
sleep and having in many cases seen half their pals killed or wounded alongside of them and
in all cases having existed for days under a continuous shell fire,” the officer reported. “This is
Guardian similarly grateful for letters “written by soldiers who are, or have been, taking part in any of
the campaigns which are now being waged,” both the Morning Post and the Daily Mail preferred to
solicit their material from “relatives and friends of officers.”
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the kind of thing all our fellows in the firing line are going through to keep the Germans back,
and in many instances it is enough to send them out of their minds.” The letter concluded
with the bitter observation that “(p)eople say the Army is paid to do this job. No pay can ever
compensate a man for a few days under modern shell fire.” 129
Another letter reprinted in the Daily Mail from a soldier in a West Yorkshire regiment
described an attack on a British trench. “We were subjected to a murderous fire from machine
guns and shrapnel, and our men fell like sheep in this terrible rush, and the few who arrived in
the firing line found very few of the original line alive,” Sergeant Woodcock’s letter reported.
“We had to get in the trench somehow, and in places dead, wounded, and living piled on top
of each other.” 130 In case the Mail’s readers failed to understand how badly the British troops
suffered in this attack, the letter was printed under the headline “Letters from the Front/204
Left out of 1,250,” a reference to the number of soldiers able to answer the battalion’s roll call
the next day. The Mail also printed a number of soldiers’ letters that tried to sum up the entire
experience of the conflict. Echoing Liddell’s observations to his father, one staff officer wrote
his wife that “(t)he war is absolutely different from what I expected it to be. There is no what I
call glamour about it or any kind of chivalry.” 131 A letter written by a Lieutenant in a
Northamptonshire regiment to his mother summed up the experience of life on the Western
front even more succinctly: “It’s awful,” he wrote. “Nothing can describe it but the two words,
‘absolute hell.’”132 His assessment was echoed by an officer from a Cheshire regiment: “If there
is such a thing as hell on earth this must surely be it.” 133
Other newspapers provided equally honest views about the trenches in the letters they
chose to reprint. In December 1914, the Manchester Guardian’s “Letters from the Front”
column featured a letter from a sergeant in the Stalybridge Territorials which provided a frank
assessment of the conditions at the front. “The trenches are awful,” the sergeant wrote. “In
some parts they are up to the waist in water and slush, and we were practically doubled up for
60 hours. The men were absolutely done when they were relieved.” 134 A captain in an East
Kent regiment presented a sombre description of life at the front. “It is the poor devils in the
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trenches who get shelled day and night, who sit in mud, and seldom get a hot meal, and who
then, disheartened and cold, are asked to run over a sea of mud under a hail of lead to capture
another mud ditch,” he wrote. “Depend upon it, in the present show the country’s thanks and
compassion should be to the sufferers in the trenches. Poor devils!” 135
The Times’ “Letters from the Front” column also contained frank accounts about the
horrors of the war. A letter from a “general officer,” published in November 1914, talked about
life in the trenches under fire, noting that his troops were “shot at all day and night by bullets
and shells. The latter do far the most damage, but the bullets are particularly deadly, being all
fired by picked marksmen, who lie in wait to pick off heads moving in the trenches.” 136 On the
same day, the Times also printed a letter from an infantry officer who described a battle in
which he had led some troops. The German heavy guns were trained on their trenches, and
“more than once” the shells “buried whole sections of men in the earth of the parapet. Some of
these took no harm, and we dug them out and used them again. Others died, being torn to
fragments. Shrapnel killed others, and then as the infantry crept nearer rifle bullets made their
mark.” 137 The letter goes on to describe the confusion of battle, when at one point the British
soldiers stopped firing at advancing Germans, with catastrophic results, because they believed
the soldiers were British; how multiple messengers were sent to fetch reinforcements and
killed in the attempt; and a final retreat after no support for the British troops was made
available, due to the prevalence of enemy fire and overall muddle. It seems incredible, in the
face of such readily available public information, that historians can continue to argue that
only “sanitized” reports of the war were presented by the British press to the public, when it is
clear that civilians were frequently exposed to graphic accounts from soldiers serving on the
Western front.
The Times also freely reprinted letters which praised the abilities of German soldiers
and directly contradicted the information routinely found in the major British newspapers,
including in its own columns. One letter published in November 1914 came from a major in a
Highland regiment. Bemoaning the slowness of recruiting, he blamed “the home papers
tremendously for publishing articles saying the Germans cannot shoot straight, that they run
away, that their armies are now composed of old men and boys, &c.,” noting that “such things
are not true, or, if they are, their old men and boys fight wonderfully well.” He finished with
the sobering prediction that the British were “up against a thundering good army, and it will
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take us all our time to break ‘em.” 138 In the same edition of the Times, the officer who found
life in the trenches so deadly remarked that he was “disgusted by the accounts I see in the
papers of the inferiority of Germans as soldiers; don’t believe one word of it. They are quite
splendid in every way. Their courage, efficiency, organization, equipment and leading are all
of the very best, and never were surpassed by any troops ever raised.” 139 A private from a
Cheshire regiment, in a letter published in the Manchester Guardian, agreed with this
assessment. “It is no use saying the Germans are a ‘rotten lot’ as fighters, because I think their
artillery is very fine,” he wrote. “German aeroplanes were on top of us, and found us out every
time. They worked well, helping their troops and giving the guns the range.” 140
The British press also, rather astonishingly, printed some letters discussing friendly
relations between the British and Germans in the trenches. The short distances between the
opposing armies not only increased the danger of exposure to rifle fire, but also the
opportunities to eavesdrop on the enemy. The Daily Mail, for example, published a letter from
a private in the Seaforth Highlanders, who wrote that his unit was in trenches so close to the
Germans “that we can hear them talking and sometimes singing.” He also reported that they
had a gramophone, which “must have broken down, for one of them shouted across to us in
quite good English, ‘Hey, you chaps, can any of you mend a gramophone? This one has got
broken.’” One of the British soldiers even volunteered to fix it. “So you see,” Private Rogan
concluded, “we are on quite friendly terms with them.”141 The Daily Mail also reprinted a letter
from a major serving on the Western Front, who recounted a story he had heard about two
opposing regiments whose “trenches are only fifty yards apart.” They “have established very
friendly relations with one another,” he claimed, and “hardly ever snipe at one another now,
although they attack each other vigorously when they are required to do so.” 142
The Manchester Guardian also published letters describing friendly behavior between
the two sides. A private in the King’s Own Royal Lancashires wrote in a letter to his wife,
published in December 1914, that a “German patrol shouted out to a party of our transport
bringing rations to us, ‘Halt, you fools; you are going right into the German trenches.’” 143 The
contrast between the German soldiers presented, through these letters, as capable of sharing a
joke and establishing friendly relations with the British, or warning off a group that was
headed into the wrong trenches, and the Germany that the same papers referred to as “a jack138
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booted Colossus seeking to stamp out the liberties of Europe” shows that the coverage of the
war in the British press was not nearly as monolithic as is often believed; in fact, those
newspapers did not hesitate to present the soldiers’ point of view, with all its divergence from
the official line, in the same editions as their censored and stereotypical accounts of the war.
It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that the Manchester Guardian felt able to
publish an editorial on 24 December 1914 which reflected on the approach of Christmas and
the fact that the holiday, which “celebrates the coming into the world of the religion of peace,”
still “finds half the world at war.” The editorial argued that any settlement of that war must
include the defeated nations, and therefore blind hostility, “however natural and even justified
the strongest hostility may be,” will not give “the results we seek, and is not in place any more
during the continuance of the struggle than it will be at the close. Nor is it necessary even as a
condition of the hardest fighting. For in this we may take example by the conduct of our own
troops.” These troops, the Guardian contended, fight with “no fury” but rather
professionalism, endurance, military pride and patriotism, and “coupled with this a great deal
of good humour and respect for and even a kind of queer sense of comradeship with the
soldier on the other side of the trenches who is enduring the same hardships and daring the
same dangers with feelings and from motives largely similar to his own.” 144
The Manchester Guardian, it appears, had no qualms about admitting that British
soldiers did not hate the dreaded Hun of newspaper clichés, but rather felt respect for, and
even a certain kinship with, the enemy. In addition, the paper felt justified in setting before its
readers an image of a peace that included the defeated powers. Of course, the Guardian was
assuming that the Allies would win the war, but to be arguing in late 1914 against the
atmosphere of hatred and propaganda that characterized much of the British reporting on the
conflict shows that there were newspapers, and therefore members of the public, who were
able to view the war in a more balanced way. By echoing the attitudes towards the enemy
expressed in letters written home by men serving in the trenches, the editorial demonstrated
that the soldiers’ views about the war were reaching British civilians.
Although the conventional narrative of the First World War emphasizes that soldiers
were deceived into fighting it through deliberate propaganda and programmed blind hatred of
the enemy, an examination of their letters show they had a much more complex and nuanced
view of the war and their German opponents. In addition, contrary to the orthodox view that
the British public was kept entirely in the dark about the course of the war and the conditions
under which their soldiers were fighting, even a cursory examination of the newspapers in 1914
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demonstrates that information which provided a more accurate picture of the fighting
conditions was readily available. In fact, papers such as the Daily Mail, the Times, and the
Manchester Guardian had no compunctions about publishing letters and articles that
discussed the falsity of reports of atrocities, the respect the British troops felt for their German
counterparts, and their occasional acts of friendliness towards the enemy.
The fact that realistic information about the Western front was readily available to
civilians has, however, had no discernible effect on the conventional narrative of the war,
which continues almost uniformly to insist upon a discourse composed of soldierly reserve
and public obliviousness. The reasons for the claim by many scholars of the Great War that
soldiers kept their experiences from their correspondents, and that those on the home front
were unaware of their sufferings, can be credited to a view of the war which has caused the
contemporaneous testimony of the soldiers who fought in it to be overlooked in favour of an
insistence by the war’s poets, memoirists and historians on a more monolithic interpretation
of the conflict. “And when they ask us, how dangerous it was/Oh, we’ll never tell them, no,
we’ll never tell them,” sang the soldiers in the 1969 film Oh! What a Lovely War, helping to
reinforce the myth that the home front was protected from the facts of the conflict and the
miseries their soldiers had to endure, a discourse that may, at least unconsciously, have been
adopted by post-war civilians as a way to deflect criticism for their support of the war. 145
Such views, however, are firmly contradicted by the available evidence. Even if the
later inhabitants of the trenches on the Western front, the volunteers of Kitchener’s Army,
were more circumspect about their experiences, and newspaper censorship became more
prevalent later in the war, this was a bell that could not be unrung. Anyone with access to a
British national newspaper during the first six months of the war – at a time when it could be
argued that interest in the conflict was at its height – could not, with any amount of
conviction, claim ignorance of the conditions on the Western front. As a result of the
forthright manner in which British soldiers wrote home about their experiences, and the
extent to which the press were willing to circulate accounts from the front that ran counter to
its stereotypical war reporting, the British public was in a better position to understand the
truth of the war than someone who read only typical newspaper reports. By presenting the
first-hand accounts of life on the Western front as a way of helping the home front understand
the circumstances under which their men lived, fought, and even died, the British press
certified the authenticity of the soldiers’ statements and prepared the public to accept a reality
from the front lines that deviated from the official reports.
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The Christmas truce, which can only be understood through an examination of the
circumstances prevailing on the Western front during the first five months of the war and the
attitudes of the soldiers who served in the trenches during that time, grew out of those
conditions. While it is true that the impromptu cease-fire was, as is currently believed, a
response by those soldiers to the war and the way it was fought, the nature of that reaction
diverges sharply from the conventional view, firmly lodged in the public imagination since the
1960s, that the men involved perceived the war as futile and senseless. Instead, the truce was a
consequence of the professional attitudes of the troops involved and the adaptation of the
troops to a relatively new type of warfare that, at least initially, promoted an altered
relationship with the enemy, based upon proximity and shared experiences. As the letters they
sent home demonstrate, soldiers who were faced with a static military situation learned how
to cope with the uncomfortable and dangerous conditions they found on the Western front,
and while doing so grew to appreciate the skills of their opponents who shared in the miseries
of life in the front lines. Although their motivations for fighting did not change as a result of
their increased familiarity with the enemy, the lack of personal animosity most British soldiers
felt towards the German troops enabled them, while under the influence of the Christmas
spirit, to approach the enemy with a surprising level of tolerance and understanding. The
sense of shared experiences and mutual professionalism which contributed to the unofficial
cease-fire was displayed by soldiers on the Western front long before the truce occurred, and
placing their participation in the truce within the context of those early war experiences helps
to explain its occurrence.
Because the home front was exposed to a more realistic portrayal of what their soldiers
endured in the trenches, and the way the troops viewed their enemies, the British public was
better prepared for the news of the Christmas truce than would have been possible had they
been less well-informed about the war. As a result, the understanding that civilians attained in
1914 through letters and newspaper accounts about the conditions in which their soldiers were
fighting and living, and the way that the same newspapers promoted the first-hand accounts
of soldiers as the authentic voices of the war, contributed to the way the story of the truce
would be presented by the soldiers involved and received by the British public.

42

Chapter Three
“A great day with our enemies”:
The Christmas Truce
The impromptu truce seemed dangerously akin to the populist politics of the streets, the
spontaneous movements that toppled tyrants and autocrats.
-Stanley Weintraub
Silent Night
Spent a very quiet Xmas day. Troops fraternized with enemy on 6th Div. front and held a
concert and football match. Pork for dinner.
- J. S. Fenton
2nd Field Company Royal Engineers
26 December 1914 diary entry

“But who would have guessed that, on December 25,” the jacket copy of Truce: The Day
the Soldiers Stopped Fighting asks rhetorically, “the troops would openly defy their
commanding officers by stopping the fighting – and spontaneously celebrating Christmas with
their ‘enemies’.” 146 Jim Murphy’s children’s book focuses on the motivations of the soldiers
involved in the Christmas truce, and takes a far different stance on the cause of the First
World War from Joyeux Noel’s: while that film blamed deliberately incubated nationalist
hatreds for the conflict, Truce, as a way of emphasizing the war’s futility, instead stresses how
easily it could have been prevented. 147 The book describes the First World War as “this
calamitous conflict that could have been avoided,” and the first chapter of the work, entitled
“Those Stupid Kings and Emperors” after a quote from Winston Churchill, lists the putative
reasons that the world went to war in 1914, apportioning blame between all the countries
involved but focusing on the flimsiness of their motives: Germany fearful and jealous of other
nations’ dominance, Austria concerned about Serbia’s growing power, France “tensed and
anxious” while still nursing a grudge over the Franco-Prussian War, England nervous about
Germany’s naval fleet, and Russia worried about the prospect of a German invasion of
146
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Poland. 148 In the shadow of each country’s culpability, the war that did not have to happen
begins, and almost immediately got bogged down in the trenches of the Western front.
Murphy contends that the barriers between the enemy troops began to break down in
the early months of the war because of the physical proximity of the two armies fighting in
France and Belgium. Germans and British soldiers “had been induced to fight in part because
they’d been led to believe the enemy was inferior to them or a mindless monster,” Truce
argues, but under the conditions of prolonged trench warfare, the “more friendly contact they
had with the enemy, the less anger they felt toward them.”149 As a result, according to Murphy,
on Christmas Eve, although commanders on both sides told the men to keep “on alert, hoping
to discourage fraternization,” such warnings were in vain. 150 The desire on the part of the
soldiers involved to defy their officers and implicitly condemn the war by celebrating
Christmas with their enemies resulted in the Christmas truce which took place “all along the
Western front” on 25 December 1914. 151 According to Murphy, the soldiers involved defied the
orders of their commanders to participate in the truce, the episode that “demonstrated that
the combatants were more alike than not.”152 While it was only “a very small step toward peace
on earth, a tiny bit of light in a vast and threatening darkness,” the armistice, Murphy believes,
still “offered reassurance and hope that a kinder, humane spirit could prevail amid the
horrible brutality of war.” 153
The cease-fire presented in this book conforms to one the main myths of the 1914
truce: that the troops who participated in the holiday armistice did so as a form of rebellion
against a war they had come to see as a farce, and deliberately disobeyed their leadership’s
commands so they could fraternize with the soldiers that, within just a few months of the war
starting, had been transformed by the conflict’s futility from opponents into “‘enemies’.”
Truce’s reception bears out the acceptance of this narrative: Kirkus Review, for example,
observes that the book describes “that magical, spontaneous Christmas truce of 1914, when
peace broke out all along the Western Front.” 154 In an interview after the publication of Truce,
Jim Murphy emphasized the research he had undertaken while writing the book, noting that
he would trace participant’s names back to the original sources, “usually museums or military
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organizations in England, France, or Germany,” thus suggesting that his view of the Christmas
truce has a factual basis. 155
The reality of the war and the holiday armistice, as attested to by the soldiers involved
in it, however, varies widely from Murphy’s simplistic and clichéd account. As already noted,
the letters and diaries of British soldiers fighting in Flanders in 1914 demonstrated that they
felt no blind hatred towards the enemy, and that while they found trench warfare dangerous
and the conditions under which they fought horrific, they did not feel that they had been
tricked into fighting the war or find it futile. While the holiday armistice can indeed be
attributed to a number of causes, including, as Murphy notes, a familiarity with the troops
opposite and the short distances between the opposing trenches, he erroneously contends that
the increased knowledge of the other side led to the unmasking of the myth that the enemy
was an “inferior” being or a “mindless monster.” In fact, in the first months of the war, any
British or German soldiers that might have volunteered out of hatred towards the enemy were
still back at home drilling and preparing for later battles. The soldiers in the trenches at
Christmas 1914, both regular and territorial troops, were fighting because fighting, if their
country was involved in a war, was the job for which they had signed up, and their letters
reflected this professional attitude long before the truce began.
At the same time, the Christmas truce was not, as Murphy does admit, an
unprecedented event. Although it did occur on a much larger scale than any previous
armistices in prior wars, military history shows that soldiers often established temporary
cease-fires, particularly after battles, for the purposes of burying the dead or giving both sides
a brief rest. The web-site “Wartime Truces in History” discusses fraternization between the
French and British soldiers during the Peninsular War of 1807-18, truces arranged between
French and Russians during the Crimean War, and a football match between Boers and the
British troops during the Second Boer War. 156 Brown and Seaton, in their work on the truce,
point out that localized cease-fires in wartime were common enough occurrences, and cite
examples from the Peninsular War, the American Civil War, the Boer War and the RussoJapanese War to prove their case. 157 “So the Christmas truce of 1914,” they concede, “does not
stand alone,” while at the same time contending that “it is undoubtedly the greatest example
of its kind.” 158
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To speak of the Christmas truce so monolithically, however, is fundamentally to
misunderstand the holiday armistice. The separate truces that occurred on 25 December 1914
and for a few days afterwards were not pre-arranged, centrally coordinated, or consistent, but
rather were composed of individually arranged armistices, entered into at different times
ranging from early Christmas Eve through Christmas afternoon, and widely divergent in
nature. As a result, they were really no different in intent or effect than the isolated friendly
instances that had occurred both in previous wars and earlier in the First World War. Only the
fact that so many battalions participated in the 25 December 1914 truce caused it to be so
much more well-known than any amicable episodes between opposing troops that had already
taken place during the conflict. There had already been, for example, some instances of
friendly British interactions with the Germans before the holiday season began. The 2nd Essex
reported in their official battalion diary that on 11 December 1914, “(o)fficers & men of A & B
Co. meet Germans ½ way between the trenches.” The diary further noted that the “Germans
said they were fed up” and that their trenches were in the “same state” as the British ones,
indicating that there was conversation between the two sides, and that some British soldiers
got close enough to the German lines to note the conditions there. 159 Closer to Christmas, the
2nd Queen’s Royal West Surreys’ diary recorded a “little armistice” on 19 December, the day
after a bloody and unsuccessful British attack on the German trenches. “At daybreak Germans
were seen beckoning to our men to come out and collect wounded and bury dead,” the diary
reported. “Several of our officers including the M.O. and 30 men went out. About 50 Germans
and 10 German officers also came out.”160 The Germans helped bury the British dead and
collect the wounded, and the cease-fire only ended when a British gun started shelling the
enemy trenches.
While in terms of the numbers of soldiers on both sides who were involved in the
holiday cease-fire, the description of the truce as “greatest” certainly applies, even those
British soldiers who participated enthusiastically in the event had no idea that many others
were doing the same on other parts of the front, which indicates that there was no overall
159

nd

Entry for 11 December 1914, 2 Essex, WO 95/1505, National Archives. This episode was also featured
nd
in the 2 Essex’ regimental history, which noted without censure that on 10 December 1914 “(a)t 10 a.m.
st
th
officers and men of ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies met a party of the 181 Regiment, 19 Saxon Corps, midway
between the trenches, and the latter stated, in the expressive language of the War Diary, that they were
‘fed up.’ Their trenches appeared to be held in about the same strength as those of the Essex and were in
nd
th
a similar state.” John Wm. Burrows, The Essex Regiment, 2 Battalion (56 ) (Pompadours) (Southendon-Sea: John H. Burrows & Sons, Ltd., 1927), pg. 119.
160
nd
Entry for 19 December 1914, 2 Queen’s Royal West Surreys, WO 95/1664, National Archives.
Although two officers and two stretcher bearers from the battalion were taken prisoner during the
nd
cease-fire, the soldiers of the 2 Queen’s Royal West Surreys do not seem to have taken offense: at
least, it didn’t prevent them participating in the Christmas truce a week later.

46

coordination of the separate truces. J. Selby Grigg, for instance, described the armistice in
which he was involved as “quite ‘unofficial’ and local,” apparently believing as late as 27
December that it had been confined to his unit’s area of the line only. 161 As the historian Keith
Robbins observes, “(t)here was no single war shared by all who took part in it”; similarly, there
was no single truce, and any attempt to impose a uniform interpretation, as Jim Murphy does,
upon the motivations of the troops who took part in the various armistices on Christmas 1914
on the Western front is doomed to frustration by the actual experiences and reports of the
soldiers involved. 162
Interestingly, the idea of a truce for Christmas did not necessarily originate
spontaneously in different areas on the Western front, but was first suggested by Pope
Benedict XV earlier in December 1914. His proposal that all combatant countries should cease
warfare for the Christmas season as a precursor to searching for a peaceful solution to the
conflict was not, as The Times delicately put it, “crowned with success,” but the suggestion
must surely have inspired at least some soldiers to create their own version on the ground. 163
When M. Holroyd, an officer with the 1st Hants, wrote to his parents describing his “very
remarkable” Christmas, he noted that it included a “peace on earth that really happened, in
spite of the Pope’s failures,” demonstrating that the Pontiff’s proposal was known by at least
some soldiers serving on the Western front. 164
The Christmas truce, being driven by the specific situation existing on the front lines
at the end of December, 1914, including perhaps the seed planted by the Pope’s suggestion,
owed both its existence and its grand scale to those circumstances. The attitudes towards the
truce by the soldiers who participated in it reveal a great deal about their opinions on the war
and the enemy, and the way they wrote about the temporary cease-fire, both in their diaries
and in letters home, shows that their views of it were much more complex than the
conventional narrative, as depicted in such works as Truce and Joyeux Noel, allows. Although
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it is true that some of those involved expressed regret that the truce would eventually come to
an end and the war continue, these sentiments appear to have been motivated by distaste for
being shot at rather than an expectation that the temporary cease-fire would result in any
lasting peace. Even in the middle of the truce, none involved expected the episode to end the
conflict – and few even expressed a hope that it would.
Even though many of the soldiers involved made the holiday armistice the main
feature of their letters home on or immediately after Christmas, or wrote at length about
fraternization in the diaries they kept, they were clearly focusing more on the event’s novelty
value than they were on its significance. In a month when there was little besides mud and
rain to discuss, the truce must have come as welcome fodder for the otherwise monotonous
subjects covered in letters written by weary and homesick soldiers. Most importantly,
although the British soldiers all described the truce as “weird” or “unbelievable” when writing
home about it, they apparently felt no need to apologize for or explain away their participation
in the event. The lack of excuses or justifications offered for fraternization with the enemy
makes it clear that they expected their friends and relations to situate the episode within the
contemporaneous narrative of the war already jointly assumed and endorsed by those on both
the Western and home fronts.
In scale alone, the 1914 truce was indeed great, covering (albeit sporadically) more than
fifteen miles of the twenty mile front fought over by the BEF and the German forces. Brown
and Seaton estimate that two-thirds of the British troops along this front, which at the time
stretched from Ypres south to the town of La Bassee, participated in some type of Christmastime cease-fire. 165 In total, fifty-four British battalions who were in the line either on or
immediately following Christmas joined in a truce with their German opponents opposite.
However, in spite of the widespread nature of the various cease-fires, the form the truce took
varied widely in different parts of the British/German line. In some cases, the Christmas truce
was foreshadowed by carol singing on both sides on Christmas Eve and the placing of lit
Christmas trees on the German parapets, but in others, the night before Christmas was merely
a bit quieter than usual. On the day itself, in certain areas, firing still took place in some places
along the line; for a few battalions, the truce consisted of nothing more than a general cease
fire, with no interaction between opposing sides; some units arranged for a collection and
burial of the dead in No-Man’s-Land before returning to their respective trenches; and a
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number of troops engaged in what is now thought of as a conventional “Christmas truce,” with
full-scale fraternization between the lines. 166
When fraternization occurred, the soldiers on both sides would gather in No-Man’sLand and exchange pleasantries, cigars, cigarettes, food and drink. Often, as soldiers reported
in their letters home, the two sides discussed the war, although in the most simplistic terms;
these communications were aided by the presence, among the German troops, of soldiers who
in civilian life had worked in Great Britain as waiters, cabdrivers, barbers and hotel attendants,
and spoke English well. There were even some football matches between the opposing sides,
although not nearly so many as would be later believed. 167 Photographs, which often became
valued keepsakes, were taken, and souvenirs, such as regimental tunic buttons, were swapped.
In some cases, the truce lasted for little more than an hour or two; in quieter parts of the line,
a general cease-fire and noticeably friendly feeling between the opposing troops persisted
until New Year’s Day and even afterwards. Although there were a few soldiers who wondered
whether the temporary armistice would have any impact on the war, the majority of the
participants viewed the truce as merely a welcome holiday after a difficult and exhausting five
months of fighting, and obviously expected the recipients of their surprising news to
appreciate the event in the same spirit.
In their letters home, soldiers often introduced the story of the Christmas truce by
indicating that they were about to share something unexpected. “We have just had the most
extraordinary experience of our lives,” Jack Chappell wrote to his mother and father two days
after Christmas. 168 Alfred Chater tried to place the cease-fire in context, noting that it was
“really very extraordinary that this sort of thing should happen in a war in which there is so
much bitterness and ill feeling.”169 Sergeant Hancock, with the 1st Royal Fusiliers, wrote to a
school-age pen-friend that he had spent an “interesting if not a happy Xmas” in “a truce with
the enemy opposite us.” 170 The letters home rarely provided more than one line of preamble
before launching into the news of the truce: while soldiers were free with their use of the word
“extraordinary” to describe the cease-fire, they apparently believed their friends and relations
166
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could easily withstand, without a great deal of preparation, the surprising news they were
about to impart.
Having briefly primed the way for “a Christmas Day which I shall never forget in all my
life,” the soldiers then recounted the details of their respective truces. 171 The cease-fires were
often arranged by meetings in No-Man’s-Land between representatives of both sides, although
British participants generally agree that the Germans initiated the negotiations. Wilbert
Spencer, for example, wrote home that on “Xmas Day we heard the words ‘Happy Christmas!’
being called out, wherefore we wrote up on a board “Gluckliches Werhnnachten!’ and stuck it
up. There was no firing, so by degrees each side began gradually showing more of themselves,
and then two of their men came halfway over and called for an officer.” 172 J. Selby Grigg
reported a similar experience, writing that early on Christmas Day, “small parties on both
sides ventured out in front of their trenches all unarmed and we heard that a German officer
came over and promised that they would not fire if we didn’t.” 173 Lieutenant Chater wrote to
his mother that on Christmas morning “I was peeping over the parapet when I saw a German,
waving his arms, and presently two of them got out of their trenches and came towards ours –
we were just going to fire on them when we saw they had no rifles so one of our men went out
to meet them.” 174 The variety of truce beginnings demonstrates the lack of coordination that
went into the event overall, as soldiers from different battalions all reported differences in the
approaches taken.
In a number of cases, the Christmas truce was preceded by German soldiers placing
traditionally lit Christmas trees on the parapets of their trenches the evening before. Both
German and British soldiers indulged in carol singing, sometimes in harmony with each other.
Private Squire reported to his parents that “(o)n Christmas Eve they were singing away as hard
as they could go and they had lights all along their trench in front of us,” and Ted Lack told his
niece that, on the evening before Christmas Day, the British soldiers “listened to the nasty
Germans singing carols on Xmas Eve night and we sung some to them.” 175 The songs drifting
across No-Man’s-Land often invited responses from the opposing trenches: as John
Wedderburn–Maxwell, a 2nd Lieutenant in the artillery, wrote in a letter to his father, upon
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seeing the trees and hearing the Germans singing on Christmas Eve “(o)f course we stopped
firing and both sides sang carols.” 176 Captain Armes heard reports that “the Germans had
lighted their trenches up all along our front,” so he went out on top of the parapet to view a
scene that “somehow” became peaceful. As men from both sides sat on top of their trenches
throughout the evening of 24 December, enjoying the Christmas lights and the quiet
countryside, Armes “talked German and asked them to sing a German Volkslied, which they
did, then our men sang quite well and each side clapped and cheered the other.” 177
Many of the British soldiers hoped that the presence of Christmas trees and carol
singing on the previous night would portend a peaceful holiday, and “(s)ure enough,” as
Holroyd wrote in a letter to his parents, “the carols of Christmas Eve were followed by friendly
exchange of greetings on Christmas morning. During the day both sides came out and
fraternized in between the lines, buried stale corpses and reconoitred the ground.” 178
Holroyd’s experience, while not universal, was certainly not unusual; on Christmas day itself,
many truce participants left their trenches and went out into No-Man’s-Land to meet with the
enemy. Sam Lane recorded one such encounter in his diary, noting that on Christmas Day,
after an agreement with the troops opposite to cease firing for 12 hours, “some of our fellows
went over and met the Germans who came out of their lines, and shook hands with each other
this seems hardly believable but it is true.” 179 Percy Jones similarly observed that for the entire
day “the ground between the two lines was simply swarming with little knots of Saxons and
English.”180 Grigg, coming up on Christmas afternoon from the reserve line to the front, found
“a crowd of some 100 tommies of each nationality holding a regular mothers’ meeting between
the trenches.” 181 While not all cease-fire agreements involved meetings with the enemy, many
participants in those truces that featured fraternization report a general lack of hesitation in
venturing forth from the relative safety of the British trenches and joining the enemy in NoMan’s-Land.
Those who took part in the fraternizations generally did not go out to meet the enemy
empty-handed: soldiers from both sides brought food, tobacco and other items to share with
the enemy soldiers. Private Squire wrote home that, after the British left the trenches, the
“Germans came out of theirs and we met halfway and talked and exchanged souvenirs our
176

th

J. Wedderburn-Maxwell, 45 Brigade R.F.A., Private Papers of J. Wedderburn-Maxwell, Imperial War
Museum Collection No. 9362, 26 December 1914 letter.
177
R.J. Armes, 24-25 December 1914 letter
178
M. Holroyd, 31 December 1914 letter.
179
nd
Sam Lane, 2 Wiltshires, Private Papers of S. Lane, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 11686, 25
December 1914 diary entry.
180
Percy Jones, 25 December 1914 diary entry.
181
J. Selby Grigg, 26 December 1914 letter.

51

own bullets for theirs and they also gave some of our fellows cigars of which they said they had
plenty and we gave them tins of bully beef as they said they had very little food.” 182 A soldier
from the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles reported in his diary that, when visiting the front
lines on Christmas Day, he “found about 200 English drawn up across it & 20 yds further down
about 300 Germans looking at each other in the end they all mixed up & started exchanging
fags & buttons. I got some fags a cap badge a button & some cigars.” 183 Frank Black had a
similar experience: while negotiating terms of the truce with some German officers, he told a
friend, “crowds of Germans came out and more of my men, till we formed a group of about
100, all shaking hands, and trying to make each other understood and exchanging
souvenirs." 184
In addition to the exchange of food and souvenirs, another standard element of many
individual truces was a proposal to engage in a football match. Considering that both the
British and Germans were enthusiastic footballers, and that international fixtures had been
recently regulated after the creation of the Federation Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) in 1904, it is hardly surprising that the thoughts of the opposing troops would turn to
the possibility of a match. 185 Although in most cases a game was impractical for many reasons,
including lack of a ball or a suitable patch of ground, it was apparently frequently suggested.
Wedderburn-Maxwell, for example, wrote that the two sides “wanted to have a football match
yesterday afternoon but couldn’t get a ball.” 186 Colonel Diggle, a staff officer with the 8th
Division Headquarters, reported that he heard “that there was a football match between the
trenches on one part of the line against the Germans. The Germans got beaten again 1-0.” 187
J.A. Liddell wrote his mother that the Germans “were awfully keen to get up a football match
against us; whether it will come off or not I don’t know.”188 Sergeant Bryan with the 1st Scots
Guards did report an actual match, which he claimed his men had won “easily by 4-1.” 189
Although most of the stories of football games were rumors rather than reality, the fact that so
many soldiers either mentioned matches being proposed, or reported hearing that they took
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place, has given the mostly mythical games the air of reality, and embedded them firmly into
the collective memory of the truce.
Thus far, the event these soldiers experienced conforms closely to the Christmas truce
of the conventional war narrative, including negotiated cease-fires, cheerful fraternizing,
proposed football matches, and sharing of food, drink, cigars and souvenirs. Where these
accounts diverge from the standard truce discourse is in the lack of rebellious motives on the
part of disaffected soldiers. In fact, these reports are mostly notable for the cheerfully matterof-fact way the British troops approached these individual cease-fires, viewing them as
opportunities to have a good time without any significance beyond the celebration of a
holiday with other soldiers – who, in this case, happened to be from the opposing army.
At the same time, further examination of accounts of the truce reveals other, more
nuanced interactions, many with mournful or ominous undertones that do not often find their
way into the standard discourse. A number of battalions involved used the cease-fire as an
opportunity to retrieve bodies from previous battles that had been lying in No-Man’s-Land; in
some cases, the dead were soldiers who had been killed long before Christmas. Sergeant
Richard Lintott, for example, recorded in his diary walking up to the front line of trenches to
find the two sides “burying some dead which had been lying about since Oct. 21st.” After the
burial, “(w)e all (Germans and English) stood bareheaded round the grave while a German
officer read the service.” 190 Grigg participated in a similar ceremony, which occurred after the
British retrieved the body of a dead German. At the burial, a German officer provided a brief
prayer service over the grave. After the ceremony, the Germans thanked “‘our English friends
for bringing in our dead,’ and then said something in broken English about a merry Xmas and
happy New Year. They stuck a bit of wood over the grave – no name on it only ‘Fur Vaterland
and Freheit’ (for Fatherland and Freedom).” 191 Captain Armes wrote home that he gave the
German officer in command of the troops opposite his “permission to bury some German dead
who are lying in between us, and we agreed to have no shooting until 12 midnight
tomorrow…We saluted each other, he thanked me for permission to bury his dead, and we
fixed up how many men were to do it, and that otherwise both sides must remain in their
trenches.” 192 Negotiations between officers regarding the parameters of individual truces,
including how many men could participate and the time an armistice would cease, were
common, which illustrates the transient nature of the episodes.
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For some soldiers, the burial of the dead seems to have been the primary reason for,
and the main feature of, the Christmas Day cease-fire. D. Lloyd-Burch, who served in France
with an ambulance corps, wrote in his diary that upon hearing of a truce he “went to the EastLanc trenches and found the Germans and English troops burying the dead between the
trenches cigarettes and cigars were exchanged.” 193 Cecil Lothian Nicholson of the 2nd East
Lancashires also reported the same incident in his diary, noting that, upon moving towards
the opposing trenches, he discovered that the Germans “wanted leave to bury the dead of
which there were a good many lying in No-Man’s land.”194 Nicholson offered the Germans “an
hour and a half,” for both sides to “bury all the dead lying close to our line and they could do
the same with theirs.” This offer was “subsequently extended for another hour in the course of
which we buried all the dead and Sanders went out from the Adv. Post in the 3rd Sector and
recovered the body of Dilworth Sher. For. who had been killed about a month before.”
Pelham-Burn, with the 6th Gordon Highlanders, wrote that he found the joint burial service for
the British and German dead, some of whom “had been there 6 weeks or more,” a very moving
experience. 195 “Our Padre who was up in the trenches for a few hours arranged the prayers and
Psalms etc. and then our interpreter wrote them out in German,” he reported. The service was
“then read first in English by our own Padre and then in German by a boy who was studying
for the ministry. It was an extraordinary most wonderful sight. The Germans formed up on
one side the English on the other the officers standing in front, every head bared.”
While some British soldiers found the improvised ceremonies, consisting of men from
both armies united in memorializing their fallen comrades, a meaningful and at times heartwarming experience, others were more distressed, particularly by the sight of the dead. Percy
Jones described in his diary how, in No-Man’s-Land, there was a “long ditch about four feet
wide and four feet deep. It was simply packed with dead Germans. Their faces, brown and
leather-like, with deep sunken cheeks, and eyebrows frozen stiff, stared up horribly through
the clear water.” 196 Some of the soldiers had been killed in a battle that took place on 18-19
December, and the sight of their recently slain comrades strongly affected the troops who had
to bury them. A diary from an unidentified soldier in the 2nd Battalion Border Regiment
recorded on 25 December that an officer told his unit “that we were to Bury our Comrades that
fell in the Charge on the 18th of Dec. so we all started diging and Burying them side by side
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and made them a Cross out of the wood of a Biscuit Box and layed them to rest on Xmas day.”
When the soldiers had been buried, “we all kneled and offered up a Prayer to God above for
our Comrades who fell in Honour.”197
Second Lieutenant Spencer’s unhappy truce consisted of a four-hour armistice during
which the Germans carried “dead men back halfway for us to bury. A few days previous we had
an attack with many losses.” Spencer noted bitterly in a letter home that he did not want to
describe “the sights I saw, and which I shall never forget.” After burying the dead “as they
were,” Spencer wrote, he went “back to the trenches with the feeling of hatred growing ever
stronger after what we had just seen.” 198 While the truce provided some soldiers with the
welcome relief of being able to collect and bury the bodies of their comrades as well as honor
their memories, the grisly remains reminded others of the horrors of the war and the reasons
they had to hate the enemy. 199 Even Pelham-Burn, who found the joint burial party in which
he joined “a wonderful sight”, described the collection of the dead for burial as “too awful to
describe so I won’t attempt it.” 200
In addition to the burial parties, however peaceably conducted, which reminded the
soldiers of the presence of the war, there were also signs of continued fighting throughout the
holiday week. Grigg, for instance, noted ironically that, while Christmas Eve had been quiet in
their trenches, “there has been a little sniping on our right where the Germans are evidently
not quite such good friends with their enemies.” 201 Captain Wellesley, who served with the 2nd
Lincolnshires, the battalion that relieved the 1st Royal Irish Rifles on 26 December, similarly
remarked that “on our right and left they have been going on fighting as usual,” and William J.
Chennell, with the 2nd Queen’s Royal West Surreys, observed that during the truce “the most
peculiar thing was that on our right and left the Germans and English were still fighting.”202 In
spite of the temporary armistice, many soldiers involved were unable to forget the war entirely
and remained aware that, while they were fraternizing with the Germans, other British troops
nearby in the front lines were still fighting them and perhaps being wounded or killed.
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Even without the reminders of dead bodies or adjacent fighting, however, there were
soldiers who were still not able to overlook their distrust of the Germans during the ceasefires. Although the modern narrative of the truce has everyone participating happily in the
event, many could not, even for Christmas, forget the war and their resentment of the enemy.
Spencer’s sight of the dead British soldiers, as already noted, upset him badly, and he was not
the only soldier who found the truce aroused negative emotions. Colonel Diggle, who reported
in a letter home that the Germans in his area had asked for a truce on Christmas Day,
remarked on the treachery of the enemy, who shot “one of our officers dead who was doing his
half of the truce.” Diggle concluded angrily that the Germans “are dirty dogs and you can’t
trust them.” 203 Frank Black was very nervous during 1st Royal Warwick’s truce: when
fraternization took placed between “crowds of Germans” and his men, during which they
shook hands, tried to converse and exchanged souvenirs, he observed that “(t)he Germans
outnumbered us by 4 or 5 to 1.” With understandable caution, Black “told the Captain I
thought we had better get back to our trenches, which we did after a great deal of bowing." 204
Bernard Brookes, who served in France with the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles,
recorded a similar watchfulness among his battalion, observing that, when an officer went out
to meet a German emissary, we “stood at our posts with rifles loaded in case of treachery.” 205
Captain Armes reported that although he believed that the Germans offer on Christmas Eve
for a mutual cease-fire was sincere, and that “they mean to play the game,” he intended to be
awake all night so as to be on the safe side.” The next day, he and the German officers fixed up
between them “that the men should not go near their opponents’ trenches, but remain about
midway between the lines.” 206 This was a standard truce precaution, designed to prevent the
enemy from learning too much about the opposing sides’ defences, and demonstrates how,
even in the free atmosphere of fraternization, reasonable care was taken to prevent the
collection of information that could assist their opponents in the next attack. 207 Although,
under the conventi0nal narrative of the holiday cease-fire, the soldiers were supposed to feel
confident about the motives of their “comrades” on the opposing side, similar caution was
displayed by many truce participants, as their distrust of the enemy was never completely
subsumed in the general holiday atmosphere.
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Along with a very understandable suspicion of the Germans, many British were also
startled to discover how badly misinformed they were. Instead of making common cause by
bonding over their shared dislike of their leadership and the futile war, the two groups
discussed the conflict during fraternization - or rather, as often reported by the British, they
listened politely to the Germans’ asserted belief in their country’s eventual victory. Lieutenant
Liddell, for example, wrote his parents that the Germans he met “were quite convinced that
the Russians were absolutely beaten, and also the Servians. Also that they would win, and the
war would be over in about 6 months at most.” 208 Ernest Morley, who served with the 1/16th
Queen’s Westminster Rifles, said that one German asked him about the sentries “posted
around Buckingham Palace” as he was under the impression that German troops had reached
England. 209 Another soldier recorded in his diary that, during fraternization, the first thing the
enemy asked “was when are you going to give in you are beat.” 210 The Germans further claimed
that their newspapers reported “they had troops reviewing in Hyde Park and also troops in
Calais.” The soldier responded that “well I must admit that you have got troops in London But
they are Prisioners of War,” however, the Germans “would not take that so my Chum gave
them the News of the World.” 211 Leslie Walkinton, also with the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster
Rifles, was apparently tactful with his particular group of Germans: although he met some who
came from London and hoped to return after the war, “of course we did not talk about who
was going to win or anything touchy like that.” 212
In spite of the confidence with which the Germans presented their tales of conquest
and impending victory, none of the British soldiers recorded any doubt about the progress of
the war and the possibility of Allied defeat. Perhaps the generally outlandish nature of claims
about German soldiers standing guard at Buckingham Palace were too ridiculous to
contemplate seriously, but at the same time, for the conventional narrative of the First World
War and the Christmas truce to retain any credibility, the soldiers at this point in the war
should have begun to question the lack of progress and the futile nature of the conflict. After
all, the war had not ended as quickly as anticipated: at the time of the truce the Allies had
been fighting for five months and yet the Germans still occupied Belgium and all of northern
France, while the British troops were stuck firmly in the mud of the trenches and apparently
208

J.A. Liddell, 25 December 1914 letter.
th
E.G. Morley, 1/16 Queen’s Westminster Rifles, Private Papers of E.G. Morley, Imperial War Museum
Collection No. 2450, 29 December 1914.
210
Unidentified soldier (2), 25 December 1914 diary entry.
211
Apparently this British soldier had faith that, whatever lies the German press might be reporting, the
British newspapers could still be relied upon.
212
th
M. Leslie Walkinton, 1/16 Queen’s Westminster Rifles, Private Papers of M.L. Walkinton, Imperial
War Museum Collection No. 12061, 26 December 1914 letter.
209

57

going nowhere fast. Instead of harboring doubts about the meaning and progress of the
conflict, however, British soldiers appear to have cheerfully listened to the Germans brag
about their war news, including one soldier who, as Ralph Blewitt reported, refused to
contradict a German who had great faith in his country’s victories “as he didn’t like to hurt his
feelings!!” 213 It seems incredible that, after the retreat of the Allied forces before the German
onslaught in the autumn, and their experiences with the miseries of trench warfare, British
soldiers continued to feel confidence and optimism about the course of the war and its
eventual outcome, but contact with similar confidence and optimism displayed by the
Germans does not seem to have shaken their belief that the Allies would ultimately prevail.
Many British also reported that the Germans with whom they fraternized confessed
that, while they were confident about their country’s progress in the war, they also felt tired of
the conflict. Ralph Blewitt, for example, wrote to his fiancée that the Germans “were all fed up
with the war and wanted to know when we were going to give in!” 214 In some cases, the
weariness with war (without a corresponding loss of faith in its prospects) was shared by both
sides: Frank Black noted that the Germans “are just as tired of the war as we are, and said they
should not fire again until we did.” 215 Chater agreed, writing home that “(f)rom what I
gathered most of them would be as glad to get home again as we should.” 216 Grigg claimed
that none of the Germans with whom he had fraternized “seemed to have any personal
animosity against England and all said they would be jolly glad when the war was over.” 217
Although these statements appear to track the conventional truce narrative, emphasizing the
bond formed between the opposing sides over their dislike for the war and reluctance to
continue fighting it, closer examination of the letters and diaries of the men involved show
that these were standard soldiers’ complaints about army service, exacerbated by the holiday
season, which would naturally be the occasion for additional homesickness. 218
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It is worth noting that many of the cease-fires ended with firing that had been prearranged, indicating that both sides understood that the truce was a temporary measure and
that the war would resume at a set point. J. Fenton, who served in the Royal Engineers,
provided a case in point, recording in his diary that the Germans “threw a message over to say
they are going to start firing at midnight and that they take it as an honour to inform us of the
fact.” 219 J. Ray, with the 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, which was out of the line on
Christmas but relieved the 1st Devonshires on 28 December, said the Germans had signaled the
British “that they were going to shell us.” 220 Harold Atkins of the 1/5th London Rifles wrote that
“it is understood that when hostilities must recommence they will be preluded by a volley in
the air.” 221 These courtesies enabled the truces to end in many areas with fewer hard feelings
than they might have had the firing started without any warning, and further demonstrate
how many soldiers in the line understood that the truces into which they had entered were
finite arrangements, and were to last only as long as the holiday period itself.
Another interesting aspect of the truce was observation by the British of the origins of
the soldiers opposite them. While the phrase ‘the enemy’ in modern British discussions of the
war now refers to all Germans, the men on the front line at that time clearly drew a distinction
between Saxon and Bavarian soldiers and Prussians. As Brown and Seaton note, the onus of
dislike towards the enemy mostly fell on one sub-group, and “the Saxons were assumed to
have had no hand in excesses blamed either on the Prussian soldiery or on the German
leadership.” 222 The writings of the men involved in the truce bear out this observation. LloydBurch recorded in his diary the belief that the cease-fire was due entirely to the identity of the
troops opposite: “(t)he Saxon’s were in front of my brigade at this time had the Prussians been
there no truce would have been held.” 223 Holroyd agreed, noting that he would be “greatly
surprised if they or we fire a shot tomorrow; whatever Prussian war-lords may do, Bavarian
troops are pretty sure not to desecrate Christmas Day.” When he discovered that the troops
opposite were in fact Saxons rather than Bavarians, he emphasized their communal heritage
across the lines, referring to the British and German troops collectively as “(w)e and the other
Saxons.” 224 Edgar Cox also reported in a letter home that all soldiers “except the Prussians”

219

nd

J.S. Fenton, 2 Field Company Royal Engineers, Private Papers of J.S. Fenton, Imperial War Museum
Collection No. 12033, 27 December 1915 diary entry.
220
st
John Ray, 1 Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, Private Papers of J. Ray, Imperial War Museum
Collection No. 4652, 25 December 1914 letter.
221
th
Harold Atkins, 1/5 London Rifle Brigade, Private Papers of Harold Atkins, Imperial War Museum
Collection No. 16505, 27 December 1914 letter.
222
Brown and Seaton, Christmas Truce, pp. 93-94.
223
D. Lloyd-Burch, undated diary entry.
224
M. Holroyd, 31 December 1914 letter.

59

were fraternizing. He even noted that the non-Prussian troops provided a friendly warning to
the British, telling them “not to go south of a certain line as there were Prussians there.” In
fact, Cox claimed, “(t)wo of our fellows who disregarded the warning were shot dead.” 225 As
these examples demonstrate, it is apparent that the British soldiers believed that the impetus
for war originated with the Prussian militaristic influence on the German leadership, and that
the Bavarian and Saxon regiments were less responsible for the situation in which the British
now found themselves, making it easier for them to respond to the overtures of friendship
offered by these regiments during the Christmas truce.
The British soldiers closed their accounts of the truce with relatively brief summingsup of the event. “It was indeed an ideal Christmas,” Brookes noted in his diary, observing that
“the spirit of Peace and Goodwill was very striking in comparison with the hatred and deathdealing of the past few months.” 226 Ernest Morley light-heartedly characterized his Christmas
turn in the trenches as “not so bad as regards weather, it being chiefly frosty and as regards
the war was a perfect scream.”227 Pelham-Burn predicted that the enthusiastic fraternization
between the soldiers of the opposing sides “was a sight one will never see again,” and John
Wedderburn-Maxwell called it “the most wonderful thing of the war.”228 Percy Jones summed
up the event by noting in his diary that “(a)ltogether we had a great day with our enemies, and
parted with much hand-shaking and mutual good wishes.” 229 Lance-Corporal Gaunt of the
1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles did observe that “(i)t seems most weird, talking and
laughing with them one minute and killing each other the next,” but this was a minority
opinion. 230 J. Selby Grigg unconsciously adopted the majority view towards the truce when he
wrote that “(o)n the whole, apart from the wet, cold and lack of sleep which one has to get
used to, I have quite enjoyed our three days up and wouldn’t have missed it for anything.”231 It
is clear from the words of the soldiers who participated in the event that the Christmas truce
was a memorable episode, but at the same time was considered a temporary and likely
unrepeatable one.
In many ways, the letters and diaries of those who participated in the Christmas truce
are remarkable more for what was not recorded than what was. While soldiers wrote
cheerfully about the opportunities to fraternize with the Germans and move about freely in
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the trenches without fear of snipers, and less happily about being able to bury the dead lying
in No-Man’s-Land, they did not voice any belief that the existence of the truce meant the end
of the war (although some, heartily fed up with life in the trenches, hoped it would stop soon),
or that contact with the Germans removed their rationale for continued fighting. Therefore, at
the same time that the men were marveling at what they described as “a very weird Xmas Day”
or “an extraordinary state of affairs,” they still clearly expected that the war would resume
after the brief respite. 232 Claims by British soldiers that the Germans would have prolonged the
truce if the British had agreed did occur but were infrequent; similarly, observations by
soldiers who believed that the truce had any significance beyond that of a brief holiday were
also rare. 233
As the accounts written by the soldiers involved demonstrate, the Christmas truce was
not the monolithic event that the current orthodox First World War narrative claims. In spite
of Lloyd-Birch observing in his diary that “(i)t seems terrible to think that they were
exchanging souvenirs one day and killing one another the next,” and Ralph Blewitt writing
that he believed that “if it wasn’t stopped jolly quick I suppose it would spread all down the
line and the armies would cease to fight at all,” most participants wrote about “this funny
unofficial truce” with “our friends the enemy” as if it were a purely temporary episode. 234
Although many men reported fraternizing with the Germans with unreserved enjoyment,
there were other soldiers, such as Wilbert Spencer, who were unable to completely subsume
their resentment of the enemy during the holiday cease-fire. In addition, except for the
occasional comment about how the truce demonstrated “what a remarkable show this war is,”
most of those involved in the truce accepted that they would go back to killing the opposing
side as soon as the extraordinary event ended. 235 “(I)t really is a funny war isn’t it,” Captain
Wellesley wrote home rhetorically, without any indication that the truce had caused him to
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rethink his attitude towards the conflict. 236 Even after the truce finished and bitter fighting
resumed, soldier’s attitudes remained unchanged: three months after fraternizing with the
Germans, W.J. Chennell wrote his wife that “I should like the war to finish and yet I should
like to see them wiped out, as they thoroughly deserve it,” demonstrating that a friendly
afternoon spent with the enemy had not changed his mind about the need to defeat them. 237
In spite of claiming that the truce could have spread and caused the armies to cease fighting,
Ralph Blewitt noted without surprise that the armistice only lasted on Boxing Day “till some
officer came down and said they’d had enough now” at which point “both sides retired to their
trenches and started off sniping with increased vigour.” 238
Contrary to the orthodox narrative of the war, the British soldiers involved appeared to
have no constraints in writing home to their friends and relations about singing songs in
harmony with the Germans, meeting them in No-Man’s-Land, exchanging food and souvenirs
with the enemy, and joining with the soldiers from the opposing sides in joint burial parties.
These accounts of the truce, including descriptions of open fraternization and the burial of the
frozen and rotting corpses in No-Man’s-Land, arrived home uncensored, demonstrating that
the news of the cease-fire, even in its friendliest or grisliest aspects, was not suppressed or
kept from the home front. Additionally, the ease with which these soldiers related stories
about their experiences in the truce contradicts the conventional war narrative which insists
civilians had no idea of what life on the Western front was like. Having generally kept their
correspondents informed since they had arrived at the Western front about their attitudes
towards the war, the conditions of life in the front lines, their feelings of comradeship with
their enemies, their respect for the professionalism of the German soldiers, and the horrors of
the war, the British truce participants obviously expected that their friends and relations
would view the holiday cease-fire as they did: a temporary break from fighting, but not a
reason to cease doing so. The absence of attempts to reassure their correspondents about their
unchanged attitudes towards the war or their continued desire to fight demonstrates that the
soldiers believed their letters’ recipients would enjoy the story of a peaceful Christmas and
fraternization between the two armies as much as they did, and would view it in the same
spirit: as a welcome, but transitory, holiday from the battle.
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It is impossible to detect in these letters and diary entries the disaffected, embittered,
and disillusioned soldiers that participated in Murphy’s Truce. The men fighting in Flanders in
1914 did not need the proximity of the trenches to convince them the German soldiers were
not inferior beings or mindless monsters. They already knew that the troops opposite were
much as themselves: homesick and tired of rain, cold, and mud. This did not obviate the need
to win the war and prevail against German militarism and global ambitions, but it did mean
that, for many soldiers along the British front, there was no impediment to celebrating the
holiday with the enemy troops that could not be overcome by the Christmas spirit. Although
others found that they could not enter into the holiday mood and therefore spurned the
advances of the enemy, this did not necessarily indicate a different attitude towards the war.
Frederick A. Brown, who served on the Western front with the 2nd Monmouthshires, wrote
years later about a company sergeant who responded to overtures from the German trenches
on Christmas morning, only to be shot by a sniper. 239 Although in the afternoon many of his
fellow soldiers went out to fraternize with the Germans, Brown recalled that he did not, as he
was too upset about the death of a fellow Monmouth. Brown was no more or less enthusiastic
a soldier than the rest of his company – in fact, his memoir records a strong level of irritation
with petty army rules – but his reaction to the truce was very personal: he could not overlook
the treacherous death of his sergeant and therefore declined his opportunity to fraternize with
the enemy.
The Christmas truce, for those who did decide to participate in it, was clearly a
response by professional soldiers to the holiday season and the unusual proximity with the
enemy owing to the trench system on the Western front. Even Brown and Seaton, who
desperately want the temporary cease-fire to mean more than just a day off for the war-weary
troops, acknowledge that it was prompted “by the dramatic revolution in the style of warfare
which took place in 1914 within weeks of the onset of hostilities.” 240 Considering that the
soldiers on both sides were experiencing an unfamiliar and largely unexpected type of war,
with its attendant discomforts and dangers as well as unavoidable close contact with the
enemy, the collective truces were probably in retrospect not nearly as surprising as they would
be later characterized.
The impromptu cease-fires were entered into by many without hesitation and
experienced by most of those who took part in it as a holiday from fighting and a ‘breather’
before renewed combat. The absence of any major battles or ongoing engagements during the
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Christmas season helped provide an opportunity for the soldiers on both sides to take some
time out to reinforce their trenches, appreciate the arrival of parcels and letters from home,
and, in many but not all cases, celebrate the first Christmas of the war by negotiating a brief
cease-fire with their enemies. 241 As the parameters of those individually-arranged armistices
varied widely, the result was a largely unconnected series of truces, some of which resemble
the now-conventional narrative, and some of which diverge sharply from that image. In the
current discourse, they have all merged into one “Christmas Truce,” in which all soldiers
happily fraternized with their new comrades, with whom they joined in defying their hated
high-ranking officers, who feared any breach of discipline and wanted to stamp out all signs of
friendliness between the two sides. An examination of the British military leadership’s
reaction to the truce will determine whether they indeed wanted to bring the truce to an
immediate end, and if they were successful in doing so.
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Most soldiers at the front reported being inundated with mail and presents from home for the first
holiday season of the war. Percy Jones probably summed up at least a minority view in a letter dated 24
December 1914 when he wrote that “I am keeping well in spite of the large number of Christmas parcels
received.” (Percy Jones, 24 December 1914 letter).
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Chapter Four
“No war today”:
The Christmas Truce as Reported in Official War Diaries and Regimental Histories

Although soldiers and officers thought, for a moment, that they could forget the war, the war
itself had not forgotten them – and for that reason it punished them.
-Malcolm Brown
Meetings in No-Man’s-Land: Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War (2007)
After a night entirely free from sniping, a kind of informal truce took place all day. The
Germans, who were not allowed near our wire, met our men between the lines on most
friendly terms, cigars, cigarettes and news being exchanged freely.
-11th Brigade, III Corps
Official War Diary entry for 25 December 1914

The Christmas Truce, a 2004 documentary in the BBC Days that Shook the World:
series, features the moment in the First World War “when enemies stopped fighting, and a
brief window opened into a world of peace.” 242 The dramatization, which claims that the
conflict “consumed more than 20,000,000 men, fourteen and a half thousand a day,” contrasts
the misery of the soldiers in the trenches during December 1914 with the situation of General
Smith-Dorrien, leader of the British army’s II Corps, who dines in comfort in his quarters
while confidently announcing that he plans to take Ypres after the holiday. 243 “But this
Christmas proves to be an even bigger obstacle than he can imagine,” the narration declares,
before the camera cuts to a British soldier in No-Man’s-Land on Christmas Eve hearing carols
from the German trenches.
The documentary observes that the truce starts “between lower ranks,” and then
spreads down the lines. By mid-day, “nearly half the British front-line army is involved in the
truce. They are, in effect, committing mass treason, an offense that can mean the firing
242

Days that Shook the World: The Christmas Truce (BBC documentary: 2004).
Each day’s 14,5000 casualties totals 23,490,000 for the entire war. The casualty figures generaly
accepted for the war are 9-10 million military deaths and 6-7 million civilian deaths – still horrific, but
not the more than 20 million asserted in this documentary. Of course, the civilian deaths would include
women and children as well, whereas the documentary implies that the casualty numbers cited are
military deaths only.
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squad.” After showing some soldiers defying their junior officers’ orders to cease contact with
the German troops, the dramatization moves to the headquarters of Field Marshall John
French, the leader of the British forces in France. 244 It shows the opulent Christmas lunch to
which he has invited both Smith-Dorrien and General Douglas Haig, the leader of I Corps,
with whom French intends to discuss restructuring the B. E. F. French, however, is distracted
by rumors of a truce in the lines. “British High Command is worried” about these reports, the
documentary maintains, “but not nearly worried enough. So far, they have just seen the tip of
a very large iceberg.” 245
The BBC program observes that Smith–Dorrien, who had issued orders on 5 December
1914 forbidding instances of friendly contact with the Germans, “has the power to courtmartial all those involved.” The Christmas Truce does concede that no actual punishments
were handed down to those who participated in the truce, but a threat of impending doom
pervades the entire documentary: ominous background music plays every time military
officials learn more about the truce. The documentary makes much of the fact that SmithDorrien, who is treated throughout as the commander of half of the British forces in the field,
issued an order on 26 December 1914 asking for the names of officers and units that took part
in the truce, but admits this was a “hollow gesture,” as there were too many troops involved in
the armistice to prosecute, and “the very men he would have to condemn are his best troops.”
The focus in the documentary on French’s Christmas lunch with Smith-Dorrien and Haig
glides over a number of inconvenient facts about the structure of the B.E.F. on 25 December
1914, and the battalions that participated in the truce. Although it is true that Haig
commanded I Corps and Smith-Dorrien II Corps, the documentary fails to mention that there
were three other B.E.F. corps in the front lines in Flanders – III Corps, IV Corps and the Indian
Corps (See figure 2). It further ignores the fact that no battalions in I Corps participated in any
cease-fires with the Germans, and that, of the twenty-three battalions in II Corps, only seven
fraternized with enemy troops. The battalions comprising the III, IV, and Indian Corps, on the
other hand, were much more enthusiastic truce participants: in III Corps, under LieutenantGeneral Pulteney, twenty-three out of twenty-eight battalions joined in the holiday armistice,
while the numbers for IV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Rawlinson, were twentyone out of twenty-eight, and three of the four battalions in the Indian Corps, headed by
Lieutenant General Willcocks, fraternized with the enemy.

The battalions under Smith-
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In this documentary, the assertion that soldiers in the line defied orders from junior officers to cease
fraternization is based upon the memoirs of Francis Philip Woodruff (alias Frank Richards), written
many years after the event. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of Woodruff’s work.
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Of course, no mention is made of the leaders of III and IV Corps, whose battalions were much more
heavily involved in the truces on 25 December 1914.
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Dorrien’s command comprised only a small portion of the British fraternizers, and therefore
emphasizing, as the 2004 documentary does, his role in issuing orders to end the Christmas

Figure 2. Structure of British Expeditionary Forces on 25 December 1914, showing which
battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps participated in the Christmas Truce. (Tables by Dick
Gilbreath)
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Figure 2, continued.
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truce ignores the much more relaxed attitude towards the event taken by the leadership of III
and IV Corps, which commanded over 80% of the British troops that took part in the
impromptu cease-fire. 246
Before further analysis of the reactions of the B. E. F.’s leadership to the truce,
however, it is worth examining the Christmas Truce documentary’s contention that junior
officers tried to keep their men from joining in the armistices. In fact, the majority of the
officers in the front line on 25 December 1914 neither forbade the truces in which their
battalions joined nor refused to participate in the episodes. Arthur Pelham-Burn, Frank Black,
Ralph Blewitt, H.J. Chappell, J.A. Liddell, L. Nicholson, M. Holroyd, R.J. Armes and John
Wedderburn-Maxwell, all quoted in the previous chapter, were front-line officers who had no
objection to the negotiated cease-fires, and, in addition, wrote extensive letters home about
the truces in which they participated. 247 Captain Arthur Bates of the 1/5th London Rifles of III
Corps even wrote to his sister on 24 December 1914 that “my orders to the Co[mpan]y are not
to start firing unless the Germans do,” indicating that he not only tolerated but even
encouraged a Christmas cease-fire in the front lines. 248
This attitude was shared by other battalion officers. Lt. Colonel Fisher-Rowe,
commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards of IV Corps, wrote approvingly to his wife on 25
December that he believed the Germans “want a bit of Peace like us and the Scots Guards I
hear have arranged not to have any shooting last night or tonight.” 249 In fact, Fisher-Rowe
wrote home about the truce daily for a week and not only took no steps to stop the 1st
Grenadier Guards from participating in the cease-fire, but was obviously happy for it to
continue, at least for the holidays. Additionally, Fisher-Rowe’s writings on the subject make it
clear he did not believe the truce was either dangerous or bad for discipline, and he certainly
did not punish any of his men for their involvement. While there were a few instances of
front-line officers putting an end to individual armistices, they were not preventing the truces
themselves, but rather bringing specific episodes of fraternization to a close, often at a prearranged time. Chater’s letter home about the truce, for example, records that conversation
246

While it is true that, after the British forces in France were re-organized at the end of December 1914,
Smith-Dorrien was put in charge of the new Second Army, which comprised the former II and III Corps,
at the time of the truce he commanded only one out of five British corps in France, and therefore the
order he issued on December 26 was addressed to the II Corps only – not the entire army, as the
documentary implies.
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While Black, as already noted, did confess to being slightly apprehensive about being surrounded by
the Germans on a 4 to 1 ratio with British troops, he still had no compunctions about shaking hands and
exchanging souvenirs with the enemy. (F.H. Black, 31 December 1915 letter)
248
th
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with the opposing troops “continued for about half an hour,” after which “most of the men
were ordered back to the trenches.” 250 Liddell similarly reported that the German officers put
an end to the cease-fire, whistling the men “back after about an hour.” However, this action
does not appear to have been prompted by any animosity, as Liddell wrote that, while the
Germans were leaving, “there was a lot of handshaking and ‘Auf wiedersehen’” which would
hardly have been the case if the officers involved had disapproved of the fraternization. 251
This information about the attitudes of front-line officers towards the Christmas truce
appears, it should be noted, in their letters and personal diaries rather than any authorized
record. After all, as Tony Ashworth argues in his work on the ‘live and let live’ system that
allowed for a certain level of mutual accommodation in the front lines between the two sides,
there would be little point in examining military records for details regarding any sort of
defiance of orders or friendly contacts with the enemy, as this is hardly the sort of information
that officers in the field would admit to in official documents. 252 War diaries, for example,
which were kept by officers in the field and chronicled the daily actions of troops in the line
were intended, according to the 1914 Field Service Pocket Book issued by the War Office’s
General Staff, “to furnish an accurate record of the operations from which the history of the
war can subsequently be prepared.” 253 These accounts, which were sent to divisional
headquarters monthly, became the permanent records of the actions of a battalion, brigade or
division. Because they served as the official record of all military activities, and were collected
and reviewed by the army leadership, it is reasonable to expect that no news of the truce
would be documented in them by participating battalions.
An examination of the diary entries for many battalions that joined in the holiday
cease-fire, however, disproves this theory. “A local truce British and Germans intermingled
between the trenches,” proclaimed the 1st Royal Warwickshires’ official record for 25 December
1914. “No shot fired all day.” 254 In fact, a review of the war diaries kept by the fifty-four
battalions that participated in the truce shows that thirty-five of those battalions – almost
two-thirds of those involved – featured the truce in these records. 255 Some of those battalions
went far beyond a mere mention of the armistice, recording a surprising level of detail about
250
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the cease-fire. The 25 December diary entry for the 1/16th Queen’s Westminsters, for example,
was particularly forthright: “No war today,” it announced boldly. “Much conversation with
enemy between trenches.” 256 (See Figure 3)

Figure 3, 1/16th Queen’s Westminsters’ diary for 25 December 1914. (Used by permission of the
National Archives, London.)
Confounding the theory that those involved in the Christmas truce feared reprisals
from their leadership should their participation become known, the diaries of battalions
comprising the 25th Brigade of IV Corps recorded the fact that their superior officers were told
about the armistices as well as the details of their respective cease-fires. The 1/13th London (the
Kensingtons), for example, noted that not only did they refrain from firing on Christmas Day,
but also that the voluntary cease-fire was “reported personally by Adjutant to O.C. [officer in
charge] 25th Brigade at 9 am.,” and that the “same conditons” persisted the next day. 257 The 2nd
Royal Berkshires recorded that their truce began on Christmas Eve and continued for two
days, until they rotated out of the trenches. During that time, “soldiers got up on parapet and
advanced half way towards German trenches and in some cases conversed with them.” 258 The
2nd Rifles, who relieved the 2nd Royal Berkshires on the evening of 26 December, observed that
at that time “an informal truce reigned,” and that the “opportunity was taken to do a lot of
work in the open and mending wire.” 259 When the cease-fire continued through 27 December,
“this curious state of affairs” was reported to the brigade headquarters. No adverse reaction
from the 25th Brigade leadership was recorded.
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The diaries of many brigades, the immediate commanding units for battalions, took
much the same relaxed attitude towards the impromptu armistices that sprang up in their
ranks. Perhaps because all five of its battalions were involved in the truce, the diary of the 20th
Brigade of IV Corps included a vivid description of the event. Drawing heavily on a report
about the truce from the 2nd Scots Guards, one of its battalions , the entry mentioned the
approach by the Germans on Christmas Eve, the agreement not to shoot, the dead soldiers
who were located during the cease-fire, the burial party, the information gathered, and the
continued fraternization on 26 December. On 27 December, the 20th Brigade reported that the
“Germans tried to come over and enjoy another day’s so-called ‘armistice’ but were informed
that they must keep in their trenches,” which refusal left them “quite indignant.” 260 During the
rest of the week, the foul weather conditions prevented both sides from focusing on anything
except trying to keep dry; the brigade noted the “constant heavy rain,” which flooded the
trenches and left the Germans, who could “be seen at pumping operations daily,” similarly
handicapped.
The diary of the 10th Brigade of III Corps also includes detailed information about the
truce, noting on 24 December that the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers reported a quiet day, when
the “Germans were singing and seemed cheerful,” and that on the next day the “Germans
appear to think that an armistice exists for Christmas day.” 261 It appears that the soldiers of the
10th Brigade, all of whose battalions joined in the truce, thought the same, as an “informal
interchange of courtesies took place between troops in the fire trenches of both belligerents.”
The diary declares that “valuable information was gleaned during the intercourse,” but this
was limited to a sketch of the enemy’s barbed wire placements and the observation that the
Germans looked “cheerful and well fed.” Burial of German and British dead also took place,
and the diary reported little sniping or shelling over the rest of the week, although actual
fraternization was clearly limited only to Christmas Day.
On the battalion and brigade level, as demonstrated by these examples, the official war
diaries of the units involved were often very forthcoming about the truces in which they
participated. It was, however, the military leadership at the divisional and corps level that
would have been more concerned about the effects of a continuing cease-fire in the lines. I
Corps, which was led by General Douglas Haig - whose command of the British Army has
become a byword for incompetence and butchery - had two divisions comprising five brigades
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Dublin Fusiliers’ diary noted only that Christmas Day was “very quiet,” with “no shelling or sniping
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with a total of twenty-four battalions near or at the front around Christmas-time. Although
neither Haig nor his subordinates appeared to forbid fraternization in advance of Christmas,
as Smith-Dorrien did, none of the battalions in I Corps participated in the armistice, which
directly contradicts the conventional truce narrative of soldiers rebelling against their
despised leadership. Additionally, Major-General J.A.L. Haldane, the commander of II Corps’
3rd Division, reported in his autobiography that he had also issued orders just in advance of
Christmas prohibiting fraternization with the enemy. 262 Haldane’s directions appeared to have
had the desired effect, as the fourteen battalions that made up the three brigades under his
command refrained from friendly contact with the enemy, although soldiers in the line just
south of them, such as the 6th Cheshires and 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, were fraternizing freely
with the Germans. In fact Haldane, who noted in his memoirs that during September 1914 he
“insisted on an aggressive policy – that is to say, no opportunity should be lost for inflicting
casualties on our opponent,” would, in particular, have made a useful target for the
dissatisfaction of soldiers from the 3rd division had they been inclined to rebel against army
leadership. They did not do so. 263
While it is valid to note that the 3rd Division of II Corps was north of the part of the
line where the truces occurred, and the battalions comprising I Corps were just south of it, the
areas involved were close enough to each other that fraternization could easily have spread
throughout these corps. 264 (See figure 4 and 5). In fact, the complete lack of participation in
the truce by I Corps and the 3rd Division of II Corps demonstrates that a wish to defy their
superiors did not form a motivation for soldiers to join in the truce, and in fact, when
forbidden outright to do so, soldiers generally obeyed those orders. The restriction on friendly
behavior issued to the battalions comprising II Corps is the only example of a corps-wide
prohibition found in the official diaries of the British Expeditionary Forces in the time leading
up to the truce, and Haldane’s self-reported order the only example of a division-specific
one. 265
262
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Richebourg, where the 1/39 and 2/39 Garhwal Rifles and the 2/3 Gurkhas became so friendly with
the Germans that, as one participant described it in a letter home, you “would never believe that we had
th
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been fighting for weeks,” was only two miles north of Festubert, where the 4 Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1
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Gloucesters and the 4 Seaforth Highlanders had no such contact with the enemy. Similarly, the 1
rd
Bedfords, in trenches along the Wulverghem-Messines Road, fraternized with the Germans while the 3
Worcesters, less than two miles north in Kemmel, did not.
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The Brigadier General of the 12 Brigade (III Corps), to whom the 2 Essex, which had reported an
earlier meeting with the Germans, belonged, had also issued an Operation Order dated 13 December
which forbade “further parlaying with the enemy in any form,” adding that the “Germans will be
informed of this as soon as possible but no further communication of any sort will be made to them.”

73

Figure 4. The front and the general area of fighting on the Western front in December 1914.
The area of detail is shown in figure 5. (Map by Dick Gilbreath.)
In the 5th Division, the other half of II Corps, the situation was more complicated.
Reports of occasional amicable relations between the British and Germans in the trenches had
reached General Smith-Dorrien around the beginning of December 1914. As a result, his Chief
of Staff, George Forestier-Walker, issued a memorandum on 4 December which included a
prohibition on “(f)riendly intercourse with the enemy, unofficial armistices (e.g. ‘we won’t fire
if you don’t’ etc), and the exchange of tobacco and other comforts, however tempting and
occasionally amusing they may be.” 266 Although this ban on any form of fraternization was
only a part of Smith-Dorrien’s general injunction to the 3rd and 5th Divisions of II Corps that
“Brigade, Battalion and Company Commanders must be enjoined to take every opportunity of
carrying out minor enterprises to annoy and intimidate the enemy, and to place him in a state

This was no doubt in response to the 11 December meeting reported earlier in the Pompadours’ diaries.
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No other brigade-level orders prohibiting fraternization were found in the war diaries. 12 Brigade, WO
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95/1501, National Archives. The 2 Essex did, in fact, participate in the Christmas truce, but no
indication that they did so can be found in their battalion diary or regimental history. No copy of
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Haldane’s order was located among the 3 Division diaries.
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of continual anxiety,” it does demonstrate that some localized pre-Christmas cease-fires had
attracted the attention of the British military leadership. 267
This directive forbidding fraternization clearly had some effect, as only seven
battalions from the entire 5th Division took part in the truce. In addition, probably as a result
of those order, the diaries of the seven 5th Division battalions that did engage in some form of
armistice were fairly taciturn on the subject. 268 The aftermath of the Christmas truce for II
Corps was to prove more problematic. The diary of the 15th Brigade of the 5th Division recorded
a visit by Smith-Dorrien on 26 December 1914, undertaken for the purposes of assessing the
state of the front lines. Later that day, the General issued a confidential memorandum to the
“General Officers Commanding Divisions and Brigades, and Officers Commanding Battalions,
of the 2nd Corps.” 269 In it, Smith-Dorrien expressed his displeasure with the large number of
shelters in the fire trenches, gaps in the line, lack of support trenches, the inadequacy of firing
loopholes, and the general lethargy of the troops at the front.
After this laundry list of complaints, the general further added that he had just
received a report that “on Christmas Day, a friendly gathering had taken place of Germans and
British on the neutral ground between the two lines, recounting that many officers had taken
part in it.” Smith-Dorrien regretted that his previous orders forbidding fraternization had been
“useless” in preventing this behavior and instructed commanders to “keep up the fighting
spirit and do all we can to discourage friendly intercourse,” while requesting the “names of
officers and units who took part in this Christmas gathering, with a view to disciplinary
action.” 270 This communication was forwarded on 28 December to the 14th and 15th Brigades,
reminding the commanders of those brigades about the earlier order prohibiting
fraternization, and asking for “a fuller investigation of the circumstances…and that the names
of the officers present, who should have been responsible for preventing the meeting reported,
shall be forwarded together with your report as early as possible.” 271
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Smith-Dorrien’s primary aim at this point in the war was to seize the initiative in the conflict, which
“has hitherto generally been with the enemy”; these orders were part of that effort.
268
th
st
Although the 14 Brigade papers did include a report from a sergeant in the 1 Devons who, on
Christmas, “was able to go forward” and as a result “had some talk with an English speaking officer,” a
conversation that clearly could not have occurred had the battalion not been fraternizing with the
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Figure 6. The area of the German-British truce on 25 December 1014. Location of British Corps
on the front line are marked. (Map by Dick Gilbreath.)
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Before receiving this request, Brigadier General Gleichen, commander of the 15th
Infantry Brigade, had already prepared a brief report about the truce, which stated that “an
informal meeting took place yesterday between the lines of trenches of ourselves and the
Germans, at which about 200 of our men assisted, and an even larger number of Germans.” 272
The account included the names of participating regiments and some minor intelligence
details gleaned from the encounters with the enemy. Gleichen’s report, which further noted
that the Germans said they would not fire between the 25 and 27 December, was fairly casual,
as befitting a statement about an incident that did not appear to be of great importance but
did yield some information about the enemy. 273 However, after receiving the demand for
further information and the names of the officers involved, Gleichen prepared a second report.
This stated tersely that he had only heard of the truce after it was over, that he understood the
armistice had been started by the Germans opposite the 4th Division, and that although “the
moving out of a good many men and a few officers was not in accordance with the
instructions” provided in the 4 December memo issued by Smith-Dorrien, he believed “that,
had they not moved out, the Germans would certainly – though principally with amicable
intentions – have come close up to our trenches and quite possibly have come into them in
some cases.”274
Gleichen also included reports from the 1st Norfolks and the 1st and 6th Cheshires that
provided brief explanations for the Christmas cease-fire. The Norfolks’ account noted rather
defensively that the first advances that come from the enemy, and that the only alternative to
participating in the cease-fire was to shoot unarmed men. 275 The 1st Cheshires’ report stated
tactfully that the captain commanding “gave orders that his officers and men were not to go
across, but before he quite realized the situation he is inclined to think that individuals did go
over,” and further provided the names of the officers in charge. 276 The 6th Cheshires’ account
was even shorter, describing the armistice as “entirely spontaneous and unexpected” before
claiming that the “officers of the 6th Btn. Cheshire Regiment stopped their men from going
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forward until after some considerable time when they saw that the whole line was out in
front.” Again, the names of the officers involved were given. 277
These reports, prepared on the same day Smith-Dorrien’s directive was issued, were
immediately forwarded back to II Corps headquarters. With this information, which
acknowledged that at least three of the battalions in the 15th Brigade had participated in the
truce, admitted that the officers of those battalions had either permitted or joined in the
fraternization, and even provided the names of the officers involved, General Smith-Dorrien
was now in a position to take the threatened “disciplinary action” against those officers and
battalions. His response was issued two days later, on 30 December 1914, and is worth quoting
in full: “The Corps Commander is quite satisfied with the explanation given, and the matter
may be considered to be closed.” 278 In other words, Smith-Dorrien only took two days to
consider the reported fraternizations with the enemy, which had occurred in “direct
contravention” of his earlier orders, and in the end decided to do absolutely nothing about it.
The Christmas Truce documentary’s conclusion that Smith-Dorrien could take no
punitive measures against the officers and soldiers involved because there were too many to
prosecute, however, shows little understanding of the military mind. Soldiers were often
court-martialed to provide an example to others who might have committed or were
contemplating the same offenses: a court-martial was often as important for promoting
military discipline amongst the ranks as it was for punishing a specific offender. Even if the
general had not wanted to lose an experienced officer from the front-lines, he could surely
have found an inept one to stand in for the others who had also allowed truces. In fact, the
famous Smith-Dorrien order asking for the names of officers that joined in the cease-fire
which is referenced by so many who wish to prove that all truce participants faced, as the
Christmas Truce documentary alleges, severe punishment for defiance of orders on 25
December 1914, was addressed to II Corps and therefore only applied to seven out of the fiftyfour battalions that had participated in truces. Further, Smith-Dorrien’s directive did not
relate solely to the Christmas truce, but was in fact a much longer critique about the general
state of the trenches and the army after the debilitating conditions of the winter campaign. 279
The III Corps leadership, which saw 60 percent of its front line troops in the 4th and 6th
Divisions participating in the truce, had even less interest in punishing those involved. The 4th
277
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much time bemoaning the lack of boards for soldiers to stand upon to keep them clear of the mud as he
did chastising officers for involvement in the truce – hardly the attitude of someone who was
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Division diary reported the cease-fire without any apparent censure, describing the episode as
“a sort of truce” which it admitted was “absolutely unauthorized” but clearly took no action
against. 280 The diary further noted that many reports of a quiet day and night had been
received, and that a “certain amount of information” had been acquired through contact with
the enemy, but did not report that any brigades or divisions had been ordered to cease truce
activities. The 6th Division records noted only that, on 25 December, there was an “(u)nofficial
truce” with no firing. 281 The divisional diary entries for the rest of the week reported “no
change” in this situation (probably a euphemism for an ongoing cease-fire) and recorded
without comment on 1 January 1915 that the “Commander 2nd Army orders that informal
understandings with the enemy are not to take place,” while acknowledging that general
conditions remained “unchanged.”282
In spite of the superficiality of the information noted about the truce in the 6th
Division diaries, however, its records contained further details received from III Corps
Headquarters about the armistice. Summaries of information gathered on 25 December were
provided by the 4th Division, including reports from the 10th and 12th Brigades, the 1st Royal
Warwickshires, the 2nd Essex, and the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, which identified the German
troops opposite them in line, as well as providing details about their attitudes. The presence of
these reports, unaccompanied by any apparent censure of the activities, demonstrates that,
although fraternization was eventually discouraged by III Corps, the armistices on Christmas
Day appeared to be primarily viewed as intelligence-gathering opportunities by its leadership.
The information gleaned on 25 December by the various battalions and brigades in that corps
were then shared among the divisions without any effort to disguise the fact that these details
were collected during, for example, the 2nd Seaforth Highlander’s “unofficial armistice” or a
“sort of armistice” reported by the 10th Brigade. 283
The leadership of IV Corps’ 7th Division was even more tolerant towards the truces in
which its battalions engaged. 75 percent of its battalions participated in the truce, and the
majority of those involved recorded the fact, some in great detail, in their battalion diaries. A
review of the diary for the 7th Division, which encompassed the 20th, 21st and 22nd Brigades,
explains why the brigades and battalions involved generally felt able to report their truces so
openly. The divisional diary recorded quiet days on 23 and 24 December, and noted that
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Christmas Day “passed without any hostilities on either side.” 284 In fact, “(b)y mutual consent
an informal armistice appears to have existed from 9 a.m. till 4 p.m. and parties from both
sides went out of the trenches and buried the dead.” The 7th Division also reported that, after a
quiet night with no firing, another armistice occurred on 26 December “for the purpose of
burying the dead,” after which “both sides went back to the trenches but very little sniping
took place.”
In fact, the 7th Division leadership, although it had not directed its battalions to initiate
any holiday cease-fire, quickly recognized the use which the truce could be put: as its diary
noted, “(i)nstructions were issued that no further unauthorized communication with the
enemy was to take place and that the men were to keep in the trenches: the troops however
might refrain from firing unless the enemy fired upon them, in order to allow working
parties…to continue their work undisturbed.” On 27 December, the divisional diary did
observe that orders had been “received from Corps Head Quarters that nothing in the shape of
an armistice was to be arranged without reference to the Corps and that Artillery fire would be
continued tomorrow on selected targets, while sniping would be vigorously maintained.”
However, these orders were “afterwards modified as regards the sniping, in order that the
clearance of the drains in the immediate rear of the firing line might be completed.” In any
case, as the 7th Division records make clear, the front lines remained quiet for the rest of the
week, “probably owing to the attention of both sides being absorbed in drainage operations.”
The divisional diary continued to record the “lack of aggression” on the part of the Germans,
indicating that peaceful conditions persisted in their part of the line for a few weeks after
Christmas; no doubt the “modification” of the orders from corps headquarters contributed to
the continued cease-fires in the 7th Division’s area of the front. 285
In spite of the disinclination of the 7th Division leadership to punish troops
participating in the truce, its diary demonstrates that it was able to collect more useful
information than the 5th Division was able to summon up in response to Smith-Dorrien’s
ultimatums. A captain with the 2nd Gordon Highlanders provided a detailed report about the
soldiers in the German regiment opposite their battalion, and the names of British officers
whom they had recently taken prisoner, while a German-speaking soldier was able to record
the views of the enemy troops in the 69th and 139th Regiment. The commander of the 21st
Brigade provided a complete report of the cease-fire on his section of the front, including
descriptions of the placement of the German trenches and how strongly they were held. A
major with the 22nd Brigade was able to pass on information about recently arrived German
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reinforcements, and the combined reports enabled the division to produce a map identifying
all the German troops facing them in the line. (See figure 6) By allowing the armistices to
continue, the 7th Division was able to collect more intelligence about the Germans, their
positions in the line, and the defences opposite than those divisions, such as the 5th, that tried
to shut their truces down rapidly.
The soldiers in the 8th Division of IV Corps were also enthusiastic truce participants
and reporters, with nine of the eleven battalions that joined in the armistice recording the
event in their diaries. The 8th Division diary registered the existence of agreements not to fire,
arrangements that were clearly sanctioned by the divisional leadership: the entry for 25
December noted that “(n)egotiations took place with Germans at some points along our front
regarding burial of dead between the lines,” during which it “was mutually agreed to bury the
dead and not to fire during the day except in case of necessity.” 286 On 26 December, the 8th
Division noted the “arrangement made between 7th Div. and Germans to bury dead to-day,” as
a result of which “no firing took place along our front.”287 The 8th Division diary for the rest of
week focused on the wet conditions in the line rather than any fighting.
The Indian Corps’ attitude to the truce, in which three of its battalions participated,
was clearly more disapproving; as a result, only the 2/39th Garhwals admitted in their diary
that during the afternoon, the enemy had advanced towards them and offered a truce. The
Germans spoke “with officers and men, they gave our men tobacco cigarettes and newspapers,
and for about an hour both sides walked about freely outside their trenches and in the open
space between the two lines.” 288 (See figure 7) The rest of the night passed quietly, but during
the evening, orders were received “that such mutual armistices were not to take place in
future.” The Garhwal Brigade and Meerut Division diaries also both acknowledged the truce,
which the divisional diary referred to as “unauthorized,” although no punishments were
recorded for those who took part. 289
There can be no doubt that the disapproval that General Smith-Dorrien, the
commander of II Corps at the time of the truce, displayed towards any friendly contact
between the Germans and the soldiers under his command was at least partially responsible
for the relatively low participation of the II Corps battalions in the holiday armistice and the
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Figure 6. Map drawn by a 7th Division soldier showing the location and identity of German
troops along British front lines at Christmas 1914. (Used by permission of the National
Archives, London.)
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reluctance of the few battalions that did join in the cease-fire to admit to it in their official
records. Equally, the relaxed attitudes of the leadership of III and IV Corps towards the
episode were reflected in the willingness of the battalions under their command to both
engage in an armistice and acknowledge it in their official diaries. Although some battalion or
brigade diaries eventually recorded orders forbidding further participation in the truce, most
did not reference any orders issued to cease fraternization or commands to resume shelling or

Figure 7. British and German soldiers fighting on Christmas Eve 1914 and fraternizing on
Christmas Day 1914. (Drawing by E.R.P. Berryman, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles. Used by permission
of Tamsin Baccus.)
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sniping. 290 For example, the diaries of the 1st North Staffordshires and the 2nd Borders, whose
cease-fires continued at least until New Year’s Day, never noted any injunctions to resume
firing; this was also true for the majority of the battalions participating in the truce. Generally,
the diaries of battalions in the line at this time reported that fraternization came to an end by
the evening of Christmas or Boxing Day, cease-fires generally persisted for a few days
afterwards, firing began to pick up again just before or on New Year’s Day, and that the war
was restarted in earnest sometime during January 1915, but often did not record any orders
that battalions were to resume fighting.
In addition, the many reports, most of them voluntarily produced, provided by frontline British officers demonstrate that they generally considered the truce an opportunity to
increase their knowledge of the German numbers in the line and the layout of their trenches.
The intelligence gained during the armistices, including the detailed information about the
identity of the troops in the opposite trenches, must surely have been welcomed by the
military leadership, even though the knowledge gained did benefit both sides. The fact that
the divisions and brigades who were most relaxed about the truce were able to collect the best
information about the Germans contradicts the current narrative of the truce, which argues
that the officers in the front line would have been careful to keep the armistices which they
had condoned a secret; instead, the diaries reveal that in fact those officers acknowledged the
existence of the truces by providing their headquarters with military intelligence collected
during fraternization.
As demonstrated by the official records of the units involved, the attitudes of military
leadership towards the truce defy the myths that have since been asserted about the event. Of
the four army corps whose battalions were involved in the armistice, only General SmithDorrien of II Corps threatened the officers of those battalions with any punishment for
allowing the truce – and he backed down within forty-eight hours of receiving those officers’
reports. 291 The commanders of the 7th and 8th Divisions, on the other hand, without necessarily
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encouraging contact with the enemy, issued orders in response to reports of a general ceasefire at the front that there was to be no firing from the British lines on Christmas Day as long
as the Germans did not fire (and, by doing so, obviously turned a blind eye to the extensive
fraternization in IV Corps battalions). The leadership of the 4th and 6th Divisions clearly had no
serious objection to a temporary truce in the lines, and took no steps to censure the front-line
officers involved. On the brigade level, there was no unified response to the armistice: some
leaders, such as Brigadier-General Gleichen of the 15th Brigade, were apparently quite satisfied
for the truce to go ahead, while the leadership of the 19th Brigade, which ignored the event
altogether in their diary, were probably none too pleased to hear about it.
In short, the Christmas truce as reported in the battalion, brigade and divisional
diaries of the B.E.F. bears little resemblance to the episode described by the Days That Shook
the World documentary as “mass treason.” The soldiers who took part in the impromptu
armistices, and the officers who recorded their participation in their battalion’s official
military records, clearly did not believe that they were violating military code, but rather
celebrating Christmas with a brief armistice for the day, after which, as the 2nd Scots Guards’
diary noted, “hostilities would continue.” 292 The acknowledgement by front-line officers of the
truce in their battalion diaries constituted a form of notice to army authorities about an event
that they were likely to hear about in any case, even without official reports.
The official military reaction to the Christmas truce, therefore, was hardly the unified
disapproval accompanied by threats of punishment so central to the conventional narrative of
the armistice. Additionally, the more relaxed attitude of ‘acknowledgement without censure’
that most commanders took towards the truce later carried over into the official British
military history of the First World War. The 1927 installment of this work, which dealt with
the winter 1914-1915 campaign, was written by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and
Captain G. C. Wynne, and was surprisingly frank about the grim situation facing the B.E.F.
early in the war. 293 The authors admitted that the year following the battles in October and
November 1914 “brought little but disillusionment and disappointment,” and that French had
erred in concurring with Joffre’s plans for offensive action during the first months of 1915. 294 In
this authorized history, Edmonds and Wynne devoted an entire paragraph to the truce, noting
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that “there was an informal suspension of arms during daylight on a few parts of the front, and
a certain amount of fraternization.” 295 They referred to the joint burials of the dead in NoMan’s-Land, and added that “in some places there was an exchange of small gifts and a little
talk, the Germans expressing themselves confident of early victory.” 296
Edmonds and Wynne further mentioned that “both parties sang Christmas carols and
soldier songs,” and concluded with a reference to some minor truces that took place on 25
December of the following year, which they described as “an attempt to repeat this custom of
old time warfare on Christmas 1915.” 297 More surprising, however, is what the official
historians of the war did not report: there is no allusion to any disapproval of either the ceasefire or fraternizations. While it can be argued that one paragraph in a twenty-nine volume
work hardly constitutes excessive notice of an event, the fact that the truce, which cannot be
said to have had any impact on the course of the war, received a place at all in the officially
authorized history, and that no displeasure on the part of the military leadership was
recorded, certainly puts paid to the idea that the holiday cease-fire was the object of
censorship from the military leadership both during and after the war.
This is further borne out by the First World War histories of the regiments that served
in the conflict, many of which were written by either high-ranking officers or professional
military historians. These works served two purposes: creating a cohesive record of the actions
of a regiment during the war, and acting as a group memoir for those who had served in its
ranks. While the diaries kept daily in the field were the official record of a unit’s activities,
regimental histories functioned as a tribute to the regiment’s achievements, as well as a
testimonial to those who had served in one of the regiment’s battalions and remembered their
service with pride. These histories rarely sold in large quantities, but were instead intended for
a select audience, mainly veterans of the regiments in question, whose memories would be
reinforced by an account of the battles and campaigns in which the regiment had fought.
For the authors of the chronicles of those regiments who had participated in the
Christmas cease-fire, the truce posed a certain difficulty: featuring an event of which some
military leaders had disapproved might be less than tactful, but ignoring it entirely would
mean skipping over an episode which was no doubt remembered fondly by the soldiers
involved. For the most part, however, the authors of these histories included the truce in their
books, demonstrating that while a few senior military leaders were probably not delighted to
be reminded of the event, the impromptu armistice was not the cause of censure and
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repression that many have since alleged. The presence of the truce in these works also
demonstrates that the soldiers of the regiments involved wanted their memories of the war to
be complete, with no meaningful episodes expediently ignored.
Information about the impromptu truce available through the regimental histories,
however, is often incomplete or misleading, which possibly has contributed to a number of
later misconceptions about the event. A number of these chronicles assert, for example, that
the cease-fires lasted only a day or two when, in fact, as noted in battalion diaries, many
persisted throughout the holiday week. Foreshadowing the later myth that the truce was
brought to an abrupt halt by disapproving officers, these histories often claim that the truces
were stopped by orders from military leadership, although this only appears to have occurred
in a minority of cases. At the same time, football matches are rarely mentioned in regimental
histories, but references to burial of the dead in No-Man’s-Land are much more common. 298 In
one sense, however, these histories present the truce accurately: it is credited, variously, to the
regiments’ professionalism, historical precedent, the terrible weather, close contact with the
enemy and the Christmas holidays, but, albeit not surprisingly, never to rebellion against
military leadership. The regimental histories of the battalions involved in the cease-fire
therefore simultaneously propagated and contradicted the conventional narrative of the truce,
while demonstrating by inclusion of the event that it was part of the military’s overall
narrative of the war.
While the discrepancies between the various versions of the truce featured in these
regimental histories pose a problem for cohesive military remembrance of the event, an
examination of these sources does clarify one point: that the armistice remained a vital
memory for the soldiers who had either participated in it or heard about it from their
comrades. Thirty-one out of forty regimental histories which contained battalions that had
joined in the Christmas truce mention the cease-fire, whether briefly or at length. 299 In
addition, a few divisional histories also reference the truce. These chronicles also featured a
surprising level of detail about the miseries of the trenches, particularly during the first year of
the war, and the tremendous losses suffered by those regiments during this period. The
inclusion of these vital but horrific elements of the war, together with accounts of the truce,
demonstrates that these books were designed as remembrances for the veterans of the
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regiments rather than as glossy public relations exercises meant to please the army leadership.
The presence of the truce, an episode that was not crucial to the progress of the war, in these
works was therefore clearly on the basis of its interest to those who had participated in it.
The History of the London Rifle Brigade 1859-1919, written by Maj.-Gen. Sir Frederick
Maurice, provides vivid descriptions of the horrible conditions under which its soldiers served
in the Flanders trenches, which “generally had two feet or more of icy cold water in them,” and
posits a connection between those conditions and the truce. 300 Noting that the time in the line
at the end of the year was very quiet, because both sides were “worn out,” Maurice wrote that
a truce was arranged with the Saxons opposite “in order that burying parties might carry out
their necessary duties, and this led to meetings in No Man’s Land and an exchange of
courtesies, which ignorance at that time of German methods and intentions in the matter of
poison-gas and other horrors made possible.” 301 There were even “rumours of a proposed
football match, but the authorities frowned upon ideas of this sort and stopped them,” not
because of disapproval of fraternization with the enemy, but “quite rightly, because it would
have been most unwise to allow the Germans to know how weakly the British trenches were
held.” 302
In Crown and Company, The Historical Records of the 2nd Batt. Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
Colonel H.C. Wylly skirted around the subject of the armistice, noting only that there “was
quiet in the front line during the last few days of the first year of the Great War, and the
battalion diary under date of December 31st, 1914, contains two words only – ‘No Sniping!’” 303 In
The Border Regiment in the Great War, published the following year, however, Wylly not only
discussed the event openly, but admitted it continued until well into 1915. 304 On Christmas
morning, he wrote, the Germans proposed an armistice, which was “arranged until 4 in the
afternoon, for the purposes of burying the dead who had been lying between the trenches
since the 18th October.” 305 A cease-fire to bury fallen comrades was certainly within military
tradition, so it would hardly have been surprising if Wylly had left the subject alone after that
disclosure, but instead he returned to it later in the history, noting that “(t)he truce which had
been mutually and unofficially established during Christmas between the British and the
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Germans endured, so far as concerned any operations on the front of the 2nd Battalion The
Border Regiment, until the end of the first week of the New Year.” He further observed that it
was not until 8 January that “the troops fired volleys over the German trenches to indicate that
fighting was about to recommence, while this somewhat broad hint was accompanied by a
message to the same effect which was sent across.” The war, with its “usual sniping,” then
started up again, “and both the Gordon Highlanders and the Border Regiment suffered some
few casualties before the men could understand that it was no longer safe to walk about ‘on
the top.’” 306
F. Loraine Peter, in The History of the Norfolk Regiment 1685-1918, discussed some of
the mild controversy that had surrounded the truce for the 1st Norfolks, which were part of II
Corps. “On Christmas Day occurred the famous meeting with the Germans in ‘No Man’s Land’
which drew down the wrath of G.H.Q. and a demand for the names of officers, who, it was
held, should have prevented it,” Petre wrote, observing that in the end no punishments were
imposed. 307 “The matter was eventually dropped, and no harm was, as a matter of fact, done,
seeing that our men managed to have a good look at the German defences, and took good care
that the fraternization did not spread over to their own trenches.”308
The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-1918, by Reginald Berkeley (M.C.),
made much of the holiday armistice. As the Rifles had three battalions in the line on
Christmas Day, all of whom participated enthusiastically in the event, such notice was hardly
surprising. 309 Berkeley even excused the brevity of his 300-word account with the observation
that, as “Christmas 1914 and the truce that it brought along the front, with its flavour of the
medieval prohibition of fighting on Sunday, have formed the subject of many a writer,” there
was not much “to add from the experiences of the Rifle Brigade.”310 After describing the Rifles’
truces, Berkeley further noted that one of the battalion’s diaries recorded that a German
juggler entertained both sides in No-Man’s-Land on Christmas Day. “In the dumbfounding
unexpectedness of the truce,” Berkeley observed, “it would not have surprised anyone very
greatly if the German juggler had turned out to be a modern Pied Piper and had led away a
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hypnotized crowd of friends and enemies into the blue, determining the war for want of
troops.” 311
Berkeley’s lively account of the truce demonstrates one of the main purposes of a
regimental history: to reinforce the memories of those who served in it and who looked back
on their service with pride and satisfaction. For the veterans of the Rifle Brigade, as this work
establishes, the truce was obviously an important part of their remembrance of the war. In
fact, several regiments that had no battalions participating in the truce, such as the Irish
Guards and the Royal West Kents, even worked a reference to the armistice into their
histories, proving that the event had long since passed into the collective military memory of
the war and enjoyed a communal ownership that went far beyond the original members of the
B.E.F. who had fraternized with the Germans at Christmas 1914. 312
As the constant references throughout these regimental histories to the “famous” or
“well-known” truce illustrate, the story of the armistice was very much part of the
recollections of the war for the soldiers who had been involved in it, and the military
historians and officers who wrote these chronicles respected the memories of the veterans of
these regiments by including this vital event in their works on the war. In fact, the lack of
censure with which the event was reported in many regimental histories, together with the
fact that it was even included in chronicles that did not participate in the truce, refutes many
of the myths that were to later overtake the holiday armistice.
As demonstrated by the diaries of the battalions, brigades and divisions involved, there
were a few military leaders who opposed the truce, but there were also many who either
shrugged it off or tacitly condoned it. What is clear, however, is that while some front-line
officers may have had to produce reports explaining their battalions’ involvement in the truce,
this was the most serious consequence they had to face for their actions: no punishments were
handed out for participation in the cease-fire. Contrary to the conventional narrative, the war
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diaries of the army units involved not only contain a wealth of detail about the event, but
manage to convey some of the delight the soldiers involved experienced during their
unexpected holiday in the trenches. This narrative carried over into their regimental histories,
which produced surprisingly candid accounts of the event. The military world, however, is a
relatively small and enclosed one, even during a war. The attitudes of the front-line officers
towards the truce, as recorded in their battalion diaries, constituted a form of notice to army
authorities about an event that they were likely to hear about in any case, even without official
reports. Although the information that was conveyed as part of internal army records proved
to be, for a number of regiments and brigades, surprisingly forthright, the censorship
prevailing in the British press would certainly influence the way the story of the Christmas
truce was presented. An examination of major British newspapers in the weeks following the
holiday cease-fire will reveal the way the truce was reported to the British public.
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Chapter Five
“One day of peace at the front”:
The Christmas Truce and the British Press

NO CHRISTMAS TRUCE
FIGHTING IN FRANCE AS FIERCE AS EVER
A DETERMINED ADVANCE
(PRESS ASSOCIATION WAR SPECIAL)
At the front Christmas had to be postponed. The materials of good cheer were there in
abundance, but the army was too engaged with the Germans to be able to enjoy them.
-Manchester Guardian, 28 December 1914
A CHRISTMAS TRUCE AT THE FRONT
ENEMIES AT FOOTBALL
GERMAN GETS A FRIENDLY HAIRCUT
That there was an unofficial truce along sections, at least, of the trenches in France on
Christmas Day, and that advantage was taken of it for some remarkable fraternizing among
enemies, is shown in convincing detail in the following extracts from letters just arrived from
the front. The first was received in Manchester yesterday from a British officer.
-Manchester Guardian, 31 December 1914

In Death’s Men: Soldiers of the Great War, Denis Winter argues that during the First
World War those on the home front “drew arrows on maps and talked of battles and
campaigns, but what it felt like to be in the front line or in a base hospital they did not know.
Civilians did not ask and soldiers did not write.” 313 Winter credits this reticence to soldiers’
desire to protect their families, but additionally blames the “news media” for their failure to
communicate the truth about the war. 314 In fact, as he notes in his 1978 work on the conflict,
“if newspapers of the first year are a guide, the war was as marginal to people’s lives as the
Napoleonic wars had been to the generation of Jane Austen.” 315 According to Winter, this lack
of information, coupled with “rigorous censorship,” extended to news of the Christmas truce.
Although hde claims that the weekly news magazine The Sphere “had broken the story of the
first Christmas” truce in January 1915, Winter insists that “the censor had intervened” to
prevent publication of information about the holiday cease-fire and the true facts about what
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happened on the Western front on 25 December 1914 “only really came out when Captain
Chudleigh in the Telegraph wrote after the war.” 316
Winter’s contention that news of the Christmas truce was suppressed by the British
press forms part of his larger argument that the voices of the individuals who fought the war
were lost among the battles and campaigns generally featured in histories of the First World
War, in which, he notes, the “soldiers’ war is at best relegated to a single chapter with
colourful accounts of mud and vermin, bully beef and particular deaths in battle.”317 Winter
sees the impromptu cease-fires that occurred in the line, whether at Christmas 1914 or other
times, as the ultimate expression of the soldiers’ respect for their enemies, which “could
sometimes turn into an even warmer feeling” resulting in occasional “fraternization, truces,
[and] the cessation of violence by mutual consent.” 318 By emphasizing the gap between men
serving in the front line and civilians at home, the solidarity that soldiers felt with their
enemies, and the refusal of the newspapers to tell the truth about the war, even to the extent
of refusing to continue to publish soldiers’ letters after October 1914, Winter endorses the
conventional narrative of the Christmas truce and maintains that news of the holiday ceasefire was kept from the home-front.
Winter’s argument seems reasonable. After all, the mainstream British newspapers,
which generally supported the war and were in the habit of printing whatever stories the
government fed them, were likely to be reluctant to broadcast the news of the truce. Although
forthright accounts about life in the trenches may have been readily available to the public
through publication of soldiers’ letters in newspapers (which practice, contrary to Winter’s
claim, did not stop by November 1914), those reports came from soldiers who believed that
fighting the war was necessary, even if they were willing to be candid about its horrors and
discomforts. The holiday truce posed an altogether different issue for the British press, and
one that presented them with an interesting quandary: would the news that soldiers had
abandoned fighting, albeit temporarily, be subject to censorship? To what extent would
newspapers admit to knowledge of the armistice? Would they acknowledge the cease-fire and
try to define it as an outlying event, or would they situate it within the larger pro-war
narrative?
The approach taken towards the existence of the Christmas truce by the mainstream
British press reveals a conflicted discourse that simultaneously supports and challenges the

316

Winter, Death’s Men, pg. 220. The weekly journal’s full title was The Sphere: An Illustrated Newspaper
for the Home.
317
Winter, Death’s Men, pg. 16.
318
Winter, Death’s Men, pp. 212-213.

93

conventional narratives of the war and the truce. While many accounts of the cease-fire did
appear in the national newspapers, and were even featured prominently, news about the
impromptu holiday truce was confined almost entirely to letters reprinted from soldiers. The
1914 armistice, therefore, was dealt with by the press in the same way as it handled accurate
information about the conditions at the front and the attitudes of the British front-line troops:
these controversial truths could only be safely expressed by the soldiers themselves. Obviously
ambivalent about how to treat an event that so clearly contradicted the contemporaneous
narrative of the war and portrayed the Germans as human beings rather than a faceless
enemy, British newspapers limited themselves to presenting the truce through their soldiers’
own words, and did not report on it in any conventional sense. However, the length of time
the newspapers continued to print letters about the truce – three weeks, which in press terms
is an eon – provides a strong indication of the reaction to the cease-fire. If the public response
had not been positive, and interest in the cease-fire not overwhelming, the major British
newspapers would surely not have continued to print letters describing the truce for such a
long period.
Although letters featuring the holiday armistice appeared almost daily in the British
press from the end of December 1914 through the middle of January 1915, the only articles on
the subject that could be characterized as conventional journalism consisted of stories about
how the French and German military authorities responded to the truce. In a three-week
period, from 31 December 1914 through 20 January 1915, the Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph,
Morning Post, Manchester Guardian and The Times combined published over sixty letters
referencing the truce, but only a few articles about any official responses to the event – and
those responses only concerned non-British reactions. 319 Additionally, after numerous truce
reports had appeared in their respective papers, the Daily Telegraph and the Manchester
Guardian each offered editorials that attempted to situate the Christmas truce within the
accepted discourse of the war. Aside from those two efforts to reconcile the unofficial
armistice with the overarching narrative of the war, coverage of the truce otherwise remained
under the jurisdiction of the “Letters from the Front” columns, and ceased altogether by the
end of the third week of January 1915. It should be noted, however, that while the letters from
the front discussing the truce contained ample contradictions to the usual war reporting, both
through the details of life at the front they provided and the story of the truce itself, this had
no effect on other war news published during this time. In fact, the standard journalistic
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representations of the conflict continued unabated in British newspapers during the period
that soldiers’ letters about the unofficial armistice were featured so prominently in the same
publications.
The Christmas truce was not mentioned in the British press until nearly a week after it
occurred. As there were no press representatives at the front in the early part of the war and
no official communiques were ever offered on the subject, the newspapers probably did not
even hear of the event until, at minimum, a few days after Christmas. 320 In the meantime, the
reporting of the conflict in the newspapers between Christmas and New Year’s Eve consisted
of stories that fit comfortably into the contemporaneous narrative of the war. The Times, for
example, published an article on 26 December entitled “A Carol Sung by Both Sides.” This
account began with the observation that the correspondent had “always been struck, and
never more so than during this Christmastide, with the large-hearted, tolerant attitude our
men have unconsciously adopted towards the individual German solder.” As the unnamed
journalist declared, “(m)alice finds no place at all in the British military equipment, and that is
why a season consecrated to goodwill and fellowship finds the hand and heart of the British
soldier in sympathy with the Christmas spirit.”
To demonstrate the goodness of the generic British soldier’s heart, the article noted
that carols were sung in the British trenches on Christmas Eve, and that in one case the
Germans even sang along. Unfortunately, the harmonizing finished unhappily, as “no sooner
had the carol ended than the cynical Teutonic touch was introduced by a shower of bullets
from the enemy’s trenches.” 321 Similarly, the Daily Mail’s post-Christmas reporting also started
with an account of the stereotypical Hun at his fiendish worst: “Troops Feast While Belgians
Fast,” read the headline of a 26 December article that discussed how the Germans celebrated
Christmas by “bleeding” the Belgian peasantry of wine and cigars, noting that “the Belgian
people were even asked to make Christmas cakes for the German soldiers.” 322 To further
demonize the enemy, the Daily Mail’s readers were informed that such selfish celebrations
were “in obedience to the military order, for notices were issued several days ago that the
troops must do their best to enjoy Yuletide.”
On 28 December the Daily Mail published an account of the war purporting to come
from a correspondent in Flanders. “Christmas Day,” he wrote, “was a day of strife – in these
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northern regions at least. The Germans came down upon the countryside east of Nieuport in a
fury of hate. Their fiercest onslaught of the week they reserved for Christmas Day.” The public,
however, was not to worry, as for “the whole of the afternoon the Allies were busy beating
them off. The guns thumped, the machine guns tapped, and rifles cracked. That was the music
of Christmas about Nieuport.” 323 The Daily Telegraph had similar news on 26 December,
noting that the official communiqué issued in Paris on 25 December reported fighting on the
front, with headway made in the form of some slight advances against the enemy. “North of
Roye at Lihu near Lihons,” the article claimed, “we also made some progress. These different
attacks were carried out with much dash. Everywhere we retained the ground which we had
won.” 324 As these various accounts demonstrate, the official reports of the war showed the
situation unchanged over the Christmas holiday, and there was no mention of any cease-fires
in these articules, which were no doubt based upon official army briefings.
Amidst the reports of fierce fighting and German atrocities, the news of the Christmas
truce, when it began trickling through, must certainly have perplexed the editors of these
papers. There was no communication about the episode from any official source, yet the
letters being passed on to the papers from soldiers’ friends and families would have confirmed
the existence of the impromptu armistice beyond any reasonable doubt. Whether by prearrangement or coincidence, the newspapers all took the same approach towards the truce,
which was to offer the soldiers’ accounts of it rather than report upon it. The first descriptions
of the holiday cease-fire began to appear in the British press on 31 December 1914, when three
newspapers simultaneously published letters referring to the event.
A typical account in the Daily Telegraph, “Christmastide in the Trenches/Greeting the
Enemy/Unaccepted Challenges,” was credited to a “rifleman in the Queen’s Westminsters,
writing home on Boxing Day to friends in London,” who “describes how certain members of
the regiment and the German troops spent a merry Christmas together.” 325 The soldier
recounted how his unit shelled the German trenches until it became dark on Christmas Eve,
when the British began to sing carols, and the Germans joined in. The British carried on “a
sort of ‘matey’ conversation with the enemy,” after which the two sides held “a concert and a
dance,” followed by a meeting in No-Man’s-Land, with cigarettes exchanged. The rifleman
pronounced the Germans “jolly good sports” and was disappointed when a proposed football
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match on Christmas Day did not come off. He closed the letter by assuring the recipient of its
veracity: “I expect you think this a bit of a yarn. In fact, the Regulars, who were in reserve here,
would not believe it, and some of them came up to see for themselves.”
The Telegraph printed two other letters from soldiers in the Queen’s Westminster
Rifles; one reported that it was the Germans who initiated the carol-singing and fire-lighting,
but the British troops who shouted “‘(w)on’t you come half-way and meet us and shake
hands?’” When the Germans agreed, “we downed all arms and I went over with ----- and met
four of them (they weren’t taking any risks), and we had a chat, exchanged cigarettes for
coffee and sweets, &c.” 326 Another rifleman provided a similar description, with firing dying
down on Christmas Eve, carols sung in both lines of trenches, and “compliments of the
season” shouted across. 327 On Christmas Day itself, he continued, the Germans walked about
“‘on top,’ and some of our fellows went out to meet them, and there, between the two firing
lines, the English were shaking hands with the Germans, changing smokes, buttons and hats.”
As the British troops discovered, many of the Germans spoke English, and a “great number of
them had come from London. One man said he had lived in London for ten years, and he was
going back. If the Kaiser did not take him he was going back on his own.” The day was
concluded by an arrangement with the Germans “that they would not fire until we did,” which
held “until five o’clock, when we were relieved by Regulars.”
The first soldiers’ accounts in the Manchester Guardian, which appeared on 31
December, followed a similar pattern. The newspaper quoted a letter from a British officer
that told how “at 11 p.m. on 24 December there was absolute peace, bar a little sniping and a
few rounds from a machine gun, and then no more. ‘The King’ was sung, then you heard ‘Tomorrow is Christmas; if you don’t fight, we won’t’; and the answer came back ‘All right!’” 328
This report contained an account of a football match “with a bully beef tin,” and, for a
crowning touch of absurdity, “and one man went over and cut a German’s hair!” The Morning
Post also published letters about the truce on 31 December, including one from a British army
captain who noted that the British trenches “in some cases are so near those of the enemy that
communication is quite easy,” and reported that “an informal compact was arranged – at least
at one point of our line, where our people were faced by a Saxon regiment – to the effect that
no sniping was to take place for a day.” 329 After coming out of their trenches, the English and
Germans began, rather domestically, “to hang out their washing and mend their wire
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entanglements.” Unfortunately, the captain wrote, “this happy scene was suddenly upset by
the bursting of a big shell, fired from a position many miles in the rear, and everyone scuttled
back to his hole in double quick time.” The Captain reported singing on Christmas evening,
courtesy of an “Irish captain with a turn for music,” and closed his account with the
observation that it was “a pity the German Press vilify us so much, for here the British soldiers
and their adversaries mutually respect each other. And our officers certainly admire the
Germans for putting up such a great fight, and this is quite the common opinion.”
As demonstrated by the initial accounts published in these three papers, aside from
choosing the letters published, the sole input that the newspapers provided about the
Christmas truce was headlines and very brief explanations prefacing the letters. Except for the
short introductions, there was no analysis of the event and no official information provided. In
addition, the extent to which these published letters echo the type of information already
shown to have been sent privately by soldiers to their friends and family demonstrates that the
letters printed were probably not censored in any way by the newspapers, beyond the
selection of the specific letters from the many that must have been received. The unexpected
overtures for a cease-fire, the mutual respect – aggravated by some suspicion – between the
two lines, the attribution of enthusiasm for the war to the Prussian regiments and the pleasure
in an unexpected holiday all echo the themes already noted in soldiers’ letters about the truce.
Although by the end of the year the news of the holiday cease-fire was obviously
starting to reach the British public, it appears that the press as a whole was unwilling to
extrapolate any conclusions from the truce and certainly had no intention, as yet, of
committing itself to any approval or interpretation of the event by straight-forwardly
reporting on it. In addition, the existence of the truce had no discernible impact on the
normal newspaper reports about the war. This pattern continued with further letters about
the truce that appearing in the next few days. On New Year’s Day, the British newspapers
increased the column space they devoted to the Christmas truce, with The Times, the Daily
Telegraph, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Mail all publishing soldiers’ accounts of the
event, while still refraining from commenting or reporting upon it.
The Times printed multiple letters about the truce on that day, one of which came
from a major in the Royal Field Artillery who reported how, on Christmas Eve, “things went
positively dead; there was not a sound. Even our own pet sniper went off duty.” After a quiet
evening around a fire, at “about 11 o’clock a very excited Infantry officer came along and told
us that all fighting was off, and the men were fraternizing in between the trenches.” The major
then walked up to the front and discovered that “(i)t had been agreed between the soldiers on
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both sides that there should be no firing until midnight Christmas Day.” In fact, the two sides
also arranged terms for the cease-fire, agreeing “that if by any mischance a single shot was
fired it was not to be taken as an act of war, and an apology would be accepted; also that firing
would not be opened without due warning on both sides.” The officer further reported that
the German appetite for an armistice seemed greater than that of the British; the Germans, he
claimed, “were all for the truce lasting for 48 hours, but we stuck out for midnight on
Christmas.” 330
The Times then offered two more accounts of the truce as “interesting corroborative
evidence of the letter printed above.” One of those letters, from a major in the Leicestershire
Regiment, discussed the impact of the event on soldiers’ attitudes towards the war. “Even out
here,” the officer wrote, “there is a time of peace and good will. I’ve just spent an hour talking
to German officers and men, who have drawn a line half-way between our left trenches and
theirs and have met all our men and officers there. We exchanged cigars, cigarettes, and
papers.” The major noted that the German soldiers “are jolly, cheery fellows for the most part,”
and concluded that, at least for that moment, it seemed “so silly under the circumstances to be
fighting them.” 331 Another account from a major in the Royal Army Medical Corps reported
that a different regiment “actually had a football match with the Saxons, who beat them 3-2!!!”
He then offered the less cheerful tale of another regiment who “went out of their trenches just
as the others had done, but the enemy – now thought to be Prussians – told them to go back
and fired on them before they regained their trenches.” 332
Additionally, the Times reprinted a letter from a member of the London Rifles, who
wrote, with fine understatement, that his unit “had rather an interesting time in the trenches
on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.” The British and Germans had handled the negotiations
before coming out of their trenches, and agreed on Christmas Eve that “in our part of the
firing line that there should be no firing and no thought of war on Christmas Day.” The two
sides visited each other on Christmas Day, and exchanged gifts and addresses. Everyone, the
writer claimed, “friend and foe, were real good pals….and on Christmas Day a football match
was played between them and us in front of the trench.” The letter related how the opposing
troops “even allowed us to bury all our dead lying in front, and some of them, with hats in
hand, brought in one of our dead officers from behind their trench, so that we could bury him
decently.” Because of this, the author confided, “I now have a very different opinion of the
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Germans.” However, by the time the letter was written, “(b)oth sides have already started the
firing, and are already enemies again. Strange it all seems, doesn’t it?” 333
As more soldiers’ accounts of the event appeared, the letters the newspapers published
from truce participants recounting their experiences, as well as the themes expressed in those
letters, continued to resemble those already presented as private correspondence. The
proximity of the trenches, the individual arrangements for cease-fires, the meetings between
trenches and exchange of gifts, the joint burial parties and even the occasional football match
were all common truce elements which continued to be printed alongside the more customary
reporting about the war. The Daily Mail, for example, published two letters about the
Christmas Truce on 1 January 1915, but unwittingly demonstrated the dichotomy between the
reports of the truce and the standard war narrative by choosing first to summarize, in an
editorial entitled “The New Year,” the reasons that the British had gone to war. The editorial
asserted Britain was fighting to maintain its liberty, restore Belgian sovereignty, preserve
French independence, and prevent Germany from “plotting and preparing our destruction.”
However, the Daily Mail declared, there was still more at stake: “(l)et Germany win, and the
whole gospel of despotism, based on the anarchic doctrine that nothing counts in this world
except the sheer mass of organized strength, receives a new and indefinite lease.” If the Allies
prevailed, on the other hand, “liberty steps into the sun once more, and there will at length be
a chance not only of striking off the burden of armaments but also of redrawing the map along
the lasting lines of race, nationality and justice.” It was therefore, the editorial concluded,
Britain’s “glorious privilege to-day, as it has been many times in the past, to turn the scale
against a jack-booted Colossus seeking to stamp out the liberties of Europe.” 334
After clearly stating Britain’s war aims and pointing out the differences between the
two sides, the Daily Mail may have felt more at ease about printing its first soldiers’ accounts
of the impromptu armistice. Under a banner headline, “One Day of Peace at the Front,” the
Mail provided a version of the truce that focused mainly on a joint funeral service. 335 The
account began with the burial of a Scottish solider, at which troops from both sides began
venturing out of their respective trenches. The British chaplain went forward to meet with the
German commander when a rabbit suddenly appeared. The Germans and British both ran out
into No Man’s Land, “and a marvelous thing happened. It was like a football match, the hare
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being the football, and gray tunicked Germans the one side, and the kilted ‘Jocks’ the other.
The game was won by the Germans, who captured the prize.”
As a result of the chase, the officer wrote, “a sudden friendship had been struck up, the
truce of God had been called, and for the rest of Christmas Day not a shot was fired along our
section.” The two sides proceeded to remove the dead soldiers lying out in No Man’s Land, as
“over the sixty yards separating the trenches were scores and scores of dead soldiers, and soon
spades were flung up by comrades on guard in both trenches, and by instinct each side set to
to dig graves for their dead.” The British padre reached an agreement with the German
commander to have a truce for the day, with a joint burial service. The officer noted that the
“whole German staff showed a fine spirit of respect during the service for the dead.” Prayers
were said by both sides, first by the Chaplain in English, then translated by a German divinity
student, and the officer observed that “(i)t was a memorable sight to see officers and men who
had been fighting and as I write are fighting against one another as fiercely as ever,
bareheaded, reverent, and keeping sacred truce as they did homage to the memory of the dead
on Christmas Day, 1914.” 336
Whether the Daily Mail felt that an editorial reminding its readers of the reasons that
Britain was fighting the war nullified the surprising reports of the apparent lack of enmity on
the Western front, or whether it saw relatively little harm in recounting events that all the
other papers were featuring, the stories about the armistice certainly ran counter to its normal
reports of the conflict. The Daily Telegraph and the Manchester Guardian also printed soldiers’
accounts of the truce on 1 January 1915, although the letters that ran in those papers did
introduce some elements that were new to the public truce narrative. The Telegraph, for
example, featured an account from a rifleman in the Queen’s Westminster Rifles who noted
the possible risks of the cease-fire when he reported that, while his unit was fraternizing in
No-Man’s-Land, “(t)wo of our men went too far, and went into their trenches, and haven’t
since returned, so I suppose they are prisoners.” 337 Another letter discussed a twenty-four hour
truce arranged by an infantryman who went into the German trenches to negotiate it, the first
time a British soldier was reported to have been invited into a German trench. The soldier
noted that the cease-fires “happened along most of the British front except where the
Prussians opposed them.” On the following day, however, “all was changed, and where they
had been at peace they were again at war, with the guns roaring and the rifles firing.” 338 The
Telegraph’s coverage of the event clearly underlined the expectation that the truce was to be
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for a specific time only and not a precursor for any more enduring cease-fire. This last point
was borne out by the headlines in the Telegraph on that same day reporting the ‘real’ news of
the war: “German Atrocities in Belgium/Maltreatment of Wounded/Firing on the Red Cross.”
The Manchester Guardian also continued to provide letters about the truce, including
one from a Manchester soldier who wrote to his wife that the Germans had displayed lit
Christmas trees on their parapets before beckoning the British out into No-Man’s-Land.
Champagne was drunk by the officers, and they were then joined by the men. The Germans,
“having occupied a brewery,” presented the British with two barrels of beer. 339 The truce lasted
only twenty-four hours, according to the soldier, after which “they are at it again this
morning.” The soldier also reported that the Germans had told the British that “their officers
fire on them if they don’t fire on us every time they see an English soldier.” 340 Another letter,
from Private Lydall of the London Rifle Brigade, noted that “some understanding was arrived
at with the Germans and not a shot was fired,” after which the two sides met in No-Man’sLand, “exchanged souvenirs and chatted.” Looking back on the experience, the private
remarked that the Germans “weren’t a half bad lot, really. You would never think we were
flying at one another’s throats a few hours previously.”
During the week following New Year’s Day, the Christmas truce continued to be
featured in the major British papers, although none of the newspapers printed letters about
the event on a daily basis. As noted in relation to the soldiers’ letters received privately, these
soldiers’ accounts continued not only to challenge the contemporaneous narrative of the war,
but also provided details that contest the modern orthodoxies of the armistice. A letter
published in the Daily Telegraph on 2 January, for example, demonstrated that higher-ranking
officers did not always oppose the truce. A colonel of an infantry regiment, who went up the
trenches on Christmas Day to wish his soldiers a happy Christmas, observed that as he was
leaving “there was a sudden hurrah and rush, and our men and the Germans both started
running to one another, and met half-way and shook hands.” The colonel expressed some
reservations, ordering his men back, but “was told they wanted a truce for the day to bury
their dead, so I agreed to that.”
Leaving half the men in the trenches to “keep a smart look-out,” the colonel went
forward and “joined the crowd.” An obliging Saxon interpreted for the officer while he spoke
to the German soldiers. Catching the Christmas spirit, the colonel agreed that “if they would
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have an armistice on New Year’s Day we would play them at football between our lines.” After
noting the details of a joint burial service, the colonel observed, in closing, that the Germans
seemed keen on the idea of playing the British at football, which, due to the burials, might
actually be practicable, as “there won’t be any obstacles like dead Germans lying about unless
they try another attack before then.” 341 The Telegraph also printed a letter from a soldier in the
3rd Rifles that discussed the truce, and closed with the rifleman reporting no expectation that
the cease-fire would become more permanent; as he remarked resignedly, “I don’t expect we
shall shake hands with the enemy again for a long time to come.” 342
Demonstrating that the published accounts of the event encompassed the holiday
armistice in all its diverse manifestations, the Morning Post produced an instance of official
interference in the truce, printing a letter from an officer who noted that the British and
German soldiers had arranged “to have a two hours’ interval on Boxing Day from 2 p.m. to 4
p.m. for a football match. This, however, was prevented by our superiors at Headquarters.”
The author accepted this restriction philosophically while reflecting that “(i)t is terrible to
think that on one day we can be at such peace, with such good feeling, and on the others we
must occupy our minds inventing diabolical methods of destroying one another.” 343 Ironically,
in light of this account, an editorial published in the Morning Post on the same day argued
that “(w)ar in itself is a thing indifferent, being either good or bad, according to its use and
services. In the present case,” the editorial continued, “peace for this country would have been
a far greater evil than war, not only because it would have meant an evil day only deferred, but
because it would have been enjoyed at the expense of a national moral surrender.” 344 With its
customary disregard of any dissonance engendered by the continued information on the truce
and the stance that the newspaper was taking towards the war, coverage in the Morning Post
epitomized the contradictions inherent in the simultaneous reports of the holiday cease-fire
and the ongoing conflict.
Continued first-hand accounts of the Christmas truce in the Times in early January 1915
showed that the cease-fire took as many forms as the soldiers who participated in it. A letter
from an officer in a Highland regiment, for example, demonstrated his increasing frustration
with the German troops who refused to fight on Christmas. The officer described himself as
initially “horrified at discovering that some of our men actually had gone out, imbued more
with the idea of seeing the German trenches than anything else; they met half-way, and there
341

Daily Telegraph, “Christmas Truce in the Trenches/Colonel’s Challenge/A New Year’s Day Match,” 2
January 1915.
342
Daily Telegraph, “Sorry to Fight Us,” 2 January 1915.
343
Morning Post, “German Football Enthusiast,” 2 January 1915
344
Morning Post, “The Day of Intercession,” 2 January 1915.

103

ensued the giving of cigarettes and receiving of cigars, and they arranged (the private soldiers
of one army and the private soldiers of the other) a 48 hours’ armistice.” At this point,
however, the officer recalled the lessons of history, and while noting that “(i)t was all most
irregular,” consoled himself with the reflection that “the Peninsular and other wars will furnish
many such examples; eventually both sides were induced to return to their respective
trenches, but the enemy sang all night.”
The officer’s irritation recurred the next day, when once again “out came those
Germans to wish us ‘A Happy Day’.” He told the Germans that “we were at war with them, and
that really they must play the game and pretend to fight; they went back, but again attempted
to come towards us.” Tiring of appeals to their enemies’ sporting instincts, the British troops
“fired over their heads, they fired a shot back to show they understood, and the rest of the day
passed quietly in this part of the line, but in others a great deal of fraternizing went on.” In
spite of his impatience with the Germans’ refusal to fight on Christmas, the officer finished his
account with the reflection that it was “a great hope for future peace when two great nations,
hating each other as foes have seldom hated, one side vowing eternal hate and vengeance and
setting their venom to music, should on Christmas Day, and for all that the word implies, lay
down their arms, exchange smokes, and wish each other happiness!” 345 It is clear from some
of the letters published in the press that it was not just the editors of the newspapers who
found the truce difficult to reconcile with their attitudes towards the war; evidently, some
soldiers also were perplexed by the contradictions inherent in the event.
Another hesitant truce participant was an officer in a Rifle Brigade, who observed lit
Christmas trees on the German parapets on Christmas Eve. The officer, who noted that “(n)o
truce had been proclaimed,” was strongly against “allowing the blighters to enjoy themselves,
especially as they had killed one of our men that afternoon.” His less experienced captain
“(who hadn’t seen our wounded going mad and slowly dying outside the German trenches on
the Aisne) wouldn’t let me shoot; however, I soon had an excuse, as one of the Germans fired
at us, so I quickly lined up my platoon and had those Christmas-trees down and out.” The
officer later heard that two officers from another trench met two German officers in NoMan’s-Land, which the writer thought “an awfully stupid thing to do, as it might easily have
had different results; but our captains are new and, not having seen the Germans in their true
light yet, apparently won’t believe the stories of their treachery and brutality.”
On Christmas, however, the two sides had a “sort of mutual truce; nothing on paper or
even in words, but a sort of mutual understanding.” The officer reported that some of his
345
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suspicions were allayed when he saw that the Germans opposite were Saxons, “because they’re
good fellows on the whole and play the game as far as they know it.” The German dead in
between the lines were buried, and the Germans told the British that they would not shoot at
them for now, but warned them that, when their Eastern army returned on 1 January, “they
were going to wipe us off the face of the earth.” In response, the officer wrote that the British
“roared with laughter, but (the Germans) were quite serious about it and evidently believed it
all.” In the evening, the officer “took good care to double my sentries, as I trust these fellows
devil an inch,” but in spite of his caution, he still thought it possible that the “politicians will
be wrong now, and that the war will come to an end because every one will get fed up and
refuse to go on shooting.”346
This officer’s letter demonstrates once again that the newspapers found horrific details
about life at the front acceptable to print when they came directly from British soldiers:
reports of wounded “going mad and slowly dying” were certainly not featured in any of the
conventional newspaper reports on the war, and neither was speculation that soldiers could
just quit fighting if they felt “fed up” with the war. The Times also printed a letter from a
Belgian soldier describing a truce that appeared much tamer than those experienced by the
British: he reported singing from both trenches, a brief meeting in No Man’s Land, and
Christmas passing without hearing one shot fired the whole day. 347 These letters in The Times,
including the first report from a truce participant who was neither British nor German, added
a level of complexity to the information previously provided about the truce, and the
continued coverage of the holiday cease-fire demonstrated how popular the story was proving
to be with British readers.
During the first week of January 1915, the reprinted accounts of the truce expanded to
reflect reports that demonstrated its intermittent nature, showing just how different soldiers’
experiences in the front line on Christmas Day could be. Two letters in the Guardian on 6
January from different companies of the 2nd East Lancashires provide an example of this: in the
first, from a private in B Company, the German troops requested a cease-fire for the British to
collect and bury two bodies of British soldiers that were near the German trenches. “Not a
shot was fired between us after that up to the time of our relief on Christmas night,” the
soldier wrote. “The scene was very dramatic, and I don’t suppose will be witnessed again on a
battlefield.” 348 It certainly was not witnessed by the same battalion’s D Company, who, while
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they heard the Germans singing, did not participate in any truce. “Oh, by the way, they have a
novel way of wishing one a happy Christmas – namely, shouting out ‘A happy Christmas to
you!’ and then firing a number of shots at us, only they couldn’t hit us, as we were out of sight
of them,” a soldier in that company reported. “Of course we returned the salute with
interest.” 349
The Guardian also published an account from a subaltern at the front who participated
in a truce that was arranged with the Germans for the purposes of burying both the British
and German dead “who had been lying out in the open since the fierce night-fighting a week
earlier.” The subaltern, arriving at the site, found the bodies already laid out in rows, and he
“went along those dreadful ranks and scanned the faces, fearing at every step to recognize one
I knew. It was a ghastly sight. They lay stiffly in contorted attitudes, dirty with frozen mud and
powdered with rime.” Two common graves were dug, but because the burials could not be
completed on Christmas Day, the truce was extended to 26 December. As a result, the
Germans “left us alone that night to enjoy a peaceful Christmas.” The next day, a service was
read over the graves, and the subaltern confessed himself moved by the occasion, writing that
it “was one of the most impressive things I have ever witnessed. Friend and foe stood side by
side, bare-headed, watching the tall, grave figure of the padre outlined against the frosty
landscape as he blessed the poor broken bodies at his feet,” the soldier reported. “Then, with
more formal salutes, we turned and made our way back to our respective ruts.” 350 In spite of
the cheerful tone of most of the letters published about the holiday cease-fire, they still
contained reminders of the horrors of war and the “poor broken bodies” of dead comrades.
As the first week of January 1915 drew to a close, the number of letters referencing the
Christmas truce published in the newspapers began to dwindle. 351 The papers also began to
feature accounts by soldiers in the front line at times other than Christmas, or by soldiers who
were in the front line at Christmas but did not participate in the truce, reminding their readers
that the armistice was not a universal experience. The Daily Mail, for example, reprinted a
letter from a gunner in the Royal Field Artillery who described going into the trenches on
Christmas morning. “We got into action about eleven o’clock on Christmas morning by the
side of a road,” he recounted, “and after we had got the guns into position and covered them
with trees we had about half an hour’s football.” After this interlude, they “got the order ‘Eyes
front’ (which means every man to his post), and then we started sending the ‘Germs’ over
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Christmas boxes which went into their trenches, so I guess there are a few there who would
not have any Christmas pudding.”352
While the quantity of letters about the truce tapered off, the newspapers began to
report, in the form of short articles, on the responses of the French and German military
authorities to the unofficial cease-fire. On 6 January, the Manchester Guardian featured an
article headlined “A Sequel to the Truce/French and Germans Refuse to Fight Afterwards,”
which was purported to be based on a conversation that the correspondent had with a French
soldier in a Parisian hospital. The soldier related that “on the night of December 24 the French
and Germans at a particular place came out of their respective trenches and met half-way
between them.” The sequel to this event, the reporter wrote, “was more interesting than the
event itself,” for the “French and German soldiers who had thus fraternized subsequently
refused to fire on one another, and had to be removed from the trenches and replaced by
other men.” 353 The Guardian featured another article on 14 January, discussing truces between
the French and Germans, which “alarmed” the French government, who had since “forbidden
the French papers to publish them, and have even suppressed stories of fraternization
between English and German soldiers in an English paper published in Paris.” 354 The paper
also reported reactions from the German government disapproving of the truce. The
appearance of these articles could be credited to either public interest in the truce generally,
or the desire to show the Germans had no taste for further fighting, which was certainly a
moral that some British soldiers had deduced from the cease-fire. 355
The Times also featured a similar article, sent by a correspondent in Amsterdam,
entitled “The Christmas Truce/Stringent German Army Order.” It noted that the German
newspapers had “recently published numerous descriptions of attempted friendly overtures
between the trenches of the Germans and the French.” The article quoted the German paper
Tagliche Rundschau, which observed that “‘(e)very one will recognize that this fraternizing has
its serious side, for war is no sport, and one must affirm with regret that those who made or
countenanced these overtures evidently mistook the seriousness of the situation.’” As a result,
the newspaper reported, an Army order had been issued on 29 December forbidding
fraternization, and warning the troops that “every approach to the enemy…will be punished as
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treason.”356 On 9 January, the Daily Mail also picked up this article for its own pages,
illustrating the newspapers’ willingness to discuss official reaction to the holiday armistice, as
long as it wasn’t British official reaction.
The Illustrated London News, a weekly journal which turned the news of the day into
simple stories accompanied by photographs and drawings, featured the Christmas Truce on
the front page of its 9 January edition, under the headline “The Light of Peace in the Trenches
on Christmas Eve: a German Soldier Opens the Spontaneous Truce by Approaching the British
Lines with a Small Christmas Tree.” 357 The journal clearly assumed its readers would be
already familiar with the event, and the brief caption on the drawing contained the
information that in some sections of the front the Germans, on Christmas Eve, “decorated
their trenches with Christmas-trees and paper lanterns, and invited our troops to stop
shooting and come over to smoke and have a palaver.” Both sides, the journal reported,
continued the cessation of hostilities the next day, and “spent a happy Christmas.”
Charles Lowe, an Illustrated London News’ weekly columnist, poetically noted in the
same edition that “Christmastide brought with it to our trenches in Flanders a sort of ‘truce of
God’ by mutual consent, accompanied by such fraternizing between opposing foes as had
never been seen, perhaps, since Peninsular days or the siege of Sebastopol.”358 Of course, he
observed, “afterwards the fighting went on as briskly as ever – with results on the whole, as
unfavourable to the ‘Boches’ in Belgium as it has been to them in South-West Africa, where we
have re-occupied Walfinch Bay.” The rest of the journal contained further drawings
representing different aspects of the truce, with titles such as “British and German Soldiers
Arm-in-Arm and Exchanging Headgear,” and “Saxons and Anglo-Saxons Fraternizing on the
Field of Battle.” The captions under these drawings described the truce as “informal and
spontaneous,” and noted that there was “‘peace on earth and goodwill towards men’ among
those who a few hours before had been seeking each other’s blood, and were bound to do so
again after the truce was over.” The journal reminded its readers that the German troops
participating in the truce were, of course, Saxons, while in other areas of the front, “where
Prussian troops were said to be stationed, there was a certain amount of fighting.” The weekly
paper described some fairly standard elements of the truce, including the exchange of
cigarettes, and noted that “(s)ome of the British, it is said, visited the German trenches, and an
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Anglo-German football match was even played.” 359 The Christmas truce, it appears, was
considered an acceptable subject for coverage by all manifestations of the British press, as long
as it was made clear that the armistice was both spontaneous and temporary, and would
shortly be followed by renewed combat.
Up until this time, the British newspapers had refrained from either reporting or
providing substantial comments upon the truce. 360 More than two weeks after the event, and a
week after coverage of it had begun to appear in the press, the Daily Telegraph apparently felt
ready – or perhaps compelled - to tackle the subject. In an editorial published on 7 January, it
acknowledged that “(p)robably no news since the war began has made a greater sensation, and
certainly none has made better reading than the accounts which have come through from the
trenches of the unofficial armistice established between certain sections of the German line
and our own on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.” 361 The newspaper noted that the stories of
the truce seemed incredible “in view of the ferocity of the combatants during months past and
of the authenticated tales of German atrocities and trickery”; in fact, the Telegraph feared, on
the basis of the truce people might believe that the German soldier, once “outside the
influence of the Prussian military machine,” was a “good-hearted peace loving individual.”
This interpretation of the event was inaccurate, the editorial asserted. Truces were
traditional, had always occurred between troops facing one another in war, and arose “from a
growing feeling of respect for your adversary” with whom soldiers shared “common hardships
and common dangers.” In those circumstances, “the national feeling gives way before the
fellow-feeling for the man opposite, who, after all, is not responsible for the war and is only
obeying orders.” Having established that, as it had preached all along, the German leadership
and not the unfortunately deluded common German soldier bore the blame for the war, the
Daily Telegraph then tried to put the best face possible on the truce. Since it could not ignore
the cease-fire, it instead enjoined its readers to remember that it was the Kaiser who had
started the war and that, on Christmas Day, “the brave Bavarians and Saxons exchanged
greetings and gifts and the dead whilst the author of all Europe’s miseries was publically
announcing ‘that to the enemy I send bullets and bayonets.’” While the Telegraph editorial
actually tried to place the truce in the context of the standard war narrative by reminding its
readers that a day of goodwill on the part of the troops did not absolve the Kaiser of
responsibility for starting the war, most of the other newspapers made no analogous effort,
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confining themselves to further letters about the truce and articles on the effects of
fraternization in the German and French armies.
The Manchester Guardian, however, in a similar attempt to reconcile the
inconsistencies between the Christmas truce and the continuing fighting on the Western
Front, featured an editorial about the event in its 9 January edition. In its endeavor to situate
the truce within the narrative of the war, the Guardian tried to characterize it as proof that,
while battles destroyed the bodies of soldiers, their souls survived intact. 362 The editorial noted
that the message of the truce, which some wanted to explain as “a truce of God,” was in fact
something altogether more complex. The Guardian presented the cease-fire as “the simple and
unexamined impulse of human souls, drawn together in face of a common and desperate
plight.” To the skeptics who observed that the soldiers involved went immediately back to the
business of killing each other, the Guardian pointed out that the reasons for the war still
existed – that Belgium still had to be liberated and the Germans “taught that Culture cannot
be carried by the sword”, and that the soldiers, therefore, had good reasons to continue
fighting.
The editorial argued that the real lesson to be gained from the truce was that the
British soldier, while remaining capable, both physically and morally, of defeating the
Germans (with their “insufficient insight into the better way”), would return from the war not
brutalized or scarred by his experiences. The fact that the British troops were able to put aside
their arms for one day, the Guardian theorized, proved that “the soul of man” was greater than
the guns that the armies used and that the British soldier had been briefly granted a vision of
an ideal “that things seen can have no power at all over the things which are not seen.” While
this editorial contained some simplistic and contradictory elements, it was at least an attempt
to reconcile the armistice with the continuation of the war by providing a reasoned argument
(although skewed in favor of the superior moral character of the British) about the
motivations of the soldiers involved, in contrast to the Daily Telegraph editorial that was
satisfied with continuing to blame the Kaiser for the conflict. 363
These two editorials, which appeared over two weeks after the truce took place,
constituted the only contemporaneous journalistic attempts to explain the event and find a
place for it within the contemporaneous narrative of the war. The approaches that were taken
by the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian differed greatly: while the Daily Telegraph merely
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maintained its pre-truce stance, the Guardian attempted to assign greater meaning to the
event within the context of the eventual end of the war, and the emotional effects of the
conflict on the men involved. After the publication of these two editorials, coverage of the
truce tapered off dramatically, with most newspapers only printing the occasional letter on the
subject until about the third week in January 1915, when accounts of the truce disappeared
from British newspaper columns altogether.
The Christmas truce, as presented in the pages of the British press, resembled in
complexity the event as viewed by individual soldiers in their private letters, demonstrating
that the newspapers did not make any effort to emphasize or ignore letters that presented any
specific narrative of the truce. During the three weeks that the Christmas truce was featured
prominently in the British newspapers, however, the ambivalence of the press towards the
event was apparent. While it was clear that the story of the truce was tremendously popular –
after all, twenty-one days would be far too long to feature an episode that bored the public – it
was equally clear that British newspaper editors were unwilling to commit themselves to an
opinion on the subject. By confining the reports of the truce to the “Letters from the Front”
columns, the British press segregated the episode from the rest of its war coverage, allowing
its normal representations of the conflict to remain unaltered by the news of the unofficial
cease-fire. The only attempts at reporting on the truce covered French and German sanctions
towards it, and British official reaction to the episode was not recorded in any newspaper.
In addition, the rather feeble attempt on the part of the Daily Telegraph and the more
robust opinion from the Manchester Guardian, both attempting to ‘explain’ the truce within
the context of the overarching war narrative, shows how the temporary armistice and the
soldiers’ attitudes towards the conflict and their enemies confounded the newspapers’
endeavors to present the First World War as a seamless narrative of triumphant good against
easily vanquished evil. In spite of the ambivalence toward the event, however, the story of the
truce in all its complexity was openly published, and the British public as a whole was
therefore able to understand the event and the emotions of the soldiers involved through their
own words, which the papers printed without apparent censorship. In addition, the popularity
of the story shows that, whatever reservations the British press may have had about the truce,
the British public were able to absorb and accept it without loss of faith in their soldiers or the
cause for which the nation fought. In fact, it probably comforted many of them to know that
their soldiers had, at least in part, enjoyed their Christmas in the trenches, if only for its
novelty value. It now remains to be seen whether the knowledge of the Christmas truce would
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sink without a trace during the remaining years of war, or whether, having received so much
attention, it would continue to remain part of the collective memory of the conflict.
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Chapter Six
“That unique and weird Christmas”:
The Christmas Truce during the War
And then, to all intents, the story was forgotten. It disappeared under the gas clouds of Ypres
and the colossal casualty lists of the Somme and Passchendaele.
-Malcolm Brown
“When Peace Broke Out”
Manchester Guardian, 23 December 2001
The fraternizing of the British and Germans at their first Christmas under arms, in 1914, will,
perhaps, always be accounted as the most curious episode of the war.
-Stephen Stapleton
“The Relations between the Trenches”
Contemporary Review, 1917

“One of the strangest and most significant events of the war,” was how George Perris
described the Christmas truce in The Campaign of 1914 in France and Belgium, his 1915 book
about the initial months of fighting. 364 In this work, which tried to present an even-handed
view of the war and the events leading up the conflict, Perris, a journalist and political writer,
predicted that, as the great wave of violence would only slow Europe’s progress towards the
goal of a more civilized and morally advanced world, no nation could actually “win” the war. 365
At the same time, he envisaged the possibility of a hopeful ending to the conflict: if it resulted
in a “real European partnership” then “the blood offering of the great war will not have been
all in vain.” 366 It was within this discourse that Perris situated the truce. He described the
scene on Christmas Eve, with British troops opposite the Saxons, and observed that when
carol singing came from the German trenches, the British snipers simply ceased shooting and
thereafter fraternization began in earnest, including an agreement for the truce to continue
until midnight on Christmas Day. 367
Perris included joint burial services and a football match, as well as officers who came
out “to see ‘the fun,’” in his account of the truce. 368 From these scenes he drew a hopeful
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lesson, namely that “(s)uch acts, such men, give us back our faith in the virtue of life and the
common human heart.” 369 As the temporary cease-fire had not been sanctioned by the
countries’ leaders, nor suggested to the troops by any idealists, but rather came from the
hearts of the men involved, it was a vision “of reconciliation” that would sustain the soldiers
“when many a day of dear-bought but necessary victory has sunk into oblivion. The men who
went back to their guns, if they survive, will recall it as the day when Christmas became real
for them.” 370 Perris took the 1914 armistice as a sign that there was still hope for a better world
to rise from the ashes of the battlefield, seeing the episode as proof that “(o)ur sons’ ways will
not be as ours. They will make a new Europe.” 371 Perris believed that the truce reflected the
possibility that the war could engender a better world than the one Europe had left behind on
4 August 1914, and his attempts to shape the cease-fire into a myth that underlined the general
themes of his work illustrates how little time it took for the holiday armistice to be pressed
into the service of a more over-reaching discourse.
The inclusion of the Christmas truce in Perris’ history also contradicts one the most
persistent myths of the truce: the belief that, once it was over, the cease-fire sank immediately
from sight. Malcolm Brown is one of the most fervent advocates of this theory; in Meetings in
No-Man’s-Land, for example, he notes that long before 1916, subsequent events “had almost
wiped the story from the collective memory. To all intents and purposes, it was forgotten.” 372
This is far from the only inaccurate idea that is now firmly embedded in the truce’s modern
narrative, stubbornly resistant to the available evidence. As befitting an event that, even for
those involved, had a slight air of unreality about it, the end of the Christmas truce proved to
be only the beginning of the myths that would eventually to be constructed around it. A
headline for the “Letters from the Front” column in the Daily Mail on 1 January 1915, “One Day
of Peace at the Front,” illustrates one of the main beliefs about the truce: that the cease-fire
lasted for only Christmas Day (after which, of course, it was ruthlessly suppressed by the
authorities). 373 Another subsequent truce myth, the theory that soldiers who participated in
the holiday armistice later had to be transferred to other parts of the line because they then
refused to fight the enemies whom they had befriended, which can be traced back to
newspaper accounts published shortly after the truce, was further propagated by soldiers in
the line.
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An additional misconception that remains part of the conventional narrative of the
truce is that there were no further holiday cease-fires in any of the subsequent years of the
war, a “fact” underlined in the 2004 Timewatch documentary which stated that, while on
Christmas 1914 “half of the British army took part in the greatest act of spontaneous peace in
any war,” the following year, on 25 December 1915, “there will be no repeat,” due to the
continuing brutal war breaking the “common bond of soldiers,” as well as “threats to courtmartial fraternizers and shoot deserters.” 374 Interestingly, another legend about the truce –
which, while contradicting the idea that no further cease-fires occurred, appears to run
concurrently with it - concerns Iain Colquhoun, a captain with the Scots Guards, who
participated in a 1915 truce and according to numerous sources, was court-martialed and
severely punished for disobeying orders. 375
Demonstrating that cease-fires (if not actual truces) continued on the Western front
long past Christmas or even New Year’s Day, war diaries for a number of regiments continued
to report peaceful spells in the line and a lack of aggression from both sides well into January
1915. The diary for 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers for 2 through 5 January, for example, records “very
quiet practically no sniping.” 376 The 2nd Yorkshires noted on 3 January 1915 that the battalion
“(g)ot on well with improvements to the trenches as there was no firing.” 377 The 1st Rifle
Brigade’s diary reflects diminished activity over the course of January 1915, beginning with the
observation that on 1 January that the front remained “very quiet, very little sniping or shelling
by either side.” Thereafter, the line remained “fairly quiet but began slowly to increase in
activity as regards sniping,” and the battalion closed out January’s entries with the sly
observation that “(t)his has been a very quiet month and we have got through a lot of work
owing to the enemy’s disinclination to annoy us.” 378 Other war diaries, including those of the
2nd Borders and the 2nd Rile Brigade, also reported continuing cease-fires or extremely inactive
fronts during this time.
The 1st Somerset Light Infantry went even further in reporting a continued truce, albeit
without fraternization, throughout the first week of January, and the implicit knowledge about
this cease-fire by the military leadership. On 1 January, its diary recorded that “(p)eaceable
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conditions still continue,” with good progress subsequently being made on all front-line
construction. The battalion’s 2 January entry is even more unambiguous, noting that the
“unofficial truce still continues,” with only a few shell exchanges on 3 January. The next day,
the diary reported that conditions were, “(a)s usual, very quiet,” and that “the General” had
come up to the lines to inspect the new construction. Similar entries continued for another six
days, during which time various senior leaders, including “Lt. Colonel Prowse” and “Gen.
Hunter Weston,” visited the lines and must have detected, without apparent censure, the lack
of fighting on this part of the front. The 1st Somersets seem, throughout this month, to have
been quite content not to disturb the equilibrium at the front, particularly in view of the
persistent rain that constantly undermined their efforts to construct new breastworks. On 11
January, however, their diary recorded that the “truce came to an abrupt end today and
sniping started again in earnest.” 379
The willingness of leadership to condone continued inactivity in the front line, as
evidenced by the lack of reserve with which some units reported prolonged periods of quiet
during January 1915, stands in sharp contrast to the conventional narrative of the cease-fire,
which suggests that army leaders ordered an immediate resumption of the war shortly after
the (one-day) Christmas truce ended. Instead, the presence of senior officers in the 1st
Somerset trenches in early January, during a time when a truce not only remained in effect but
its existence was recorded openly in the battalion diary, indicates that front-line officers did
not fear reprisals for reporting on-going armistices, and that under the right circumstances,
such as horrific weather preventing any chance of successful aggression against the enemy,
high-ranking leadership were certainly prepared to overlook continuing peaceful conditions in
the trenches.
Even after it ended, the holiday armistice continued to be featured in diary entries and
letters written home from the Western front, demonstrating that the episode had certainly not
been forgotten by the soldiers who taken part in it. Although after Christmas most truce
participants quickly reverted to discussing the war in the same manner as they did before the
cease-fire, as the memory of the armistice was presumably overridden by new events, a few
continued to refer to the episode in their letters home, and even discussed the theory, which
would later be accepted as fact, that troops would be moved to different places in the line in
order to reinvigorate the war. On 27 December 1914, Harold Atkins told his father that his
battalion hoped “to have another truce on New Years’ Day, and have fixed up a footer match.”
Wondering how “this business will end,” Atkins speculated that “(p)erhaps they will change
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the battalions.”380 Dillon wrote home on 17 January that this in fact had happened, noting that
the Germany authorities were “very angry” about the Christmas fraternization, and as a result
“changed the Saxon Regt. for a Prussian Jaeger Regt. and we fight them continuously.” 381
W.A.F. Foxx-Pitt, a junior officer with the 2nd Cheshires, which rotated into the
trenches right after Christmas, wrote his mother at the end of December that his time in the
line was very quiet, as “luckily we have got a very peaceful lot of Germans in front of us and we
have come to a sort of agreement that if one side doesn’t shoot the other won’t so we walk
about fairly safely, but you never know who will start shooting. You can see them walking
about the top of their trenches.” 382 These tales of continued quiet periods in the front lines
even appeared in some newspapers, with the Manchester Guardian publishing a letter on 22
January 1915 from a corporal who noted that his battalion was serving opposite some
Bavarians, who since Christmas “have been turning friendly and speaking to the British from
the trenches.” 383 Another letter printed on the same day reported renewed firing “just before
the New Year came in,” but when it stopped “one of the Germans started to sing over to our
trenches, and when he’d finished his song he shouted, ‘Good night boys. We’re going to bed,
and I wish you all a happy New Year.’”384
Although these brief allusions to the Christmas armistice and further friendliness from
the enemy were not as common as the initial reports of the truce itself, the fact that these
anecdotes were published in the British press demonstrates that military censorship remained
relaxed even after the cease-fire and did not prevent soldiers referencing the event in their
letters. In fact, when writing home on 7 January 1915, Cuthbert Lawson, an officer with the 3rd
Royal Horse Artillery, made light of the military leadership’s reaction to the truce. “I suppose
you saw in the papers about the English and Germans fraternizing on Christmas day – most of
it is quite true,” he told his mother, adding that “Sir John French has sent round an awful
stinker saying how reprehensible it is, or words to that effect, and expressing his great surprise
that such a thing should have happened! Rather amusing isn’t it?” 385 French’s disapproval of
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the event, obviously, did not carry a great deal of weight with at least one soldier in the front
lines.
Although it is true that no truce on the same scale as the 1914 one took place in the
following year, smaller armistices did occur in parts of the line on Christmas in 1915, and news
of these cease-fires got around quickly. 2nd Lieutenant H. Ridsdale of the Royal Engineers
recorded in his diary on 25 December 1915 that, although the Artillery did not participate in a
truce, “the Scots and Coldstreams appear to have met the Germans halfway between the
lines.”386 W. Tate, with the 2nd Coldstream Guards, pronounced his first Christmas in the lines
“very good indeed,” as early on “Dec. 25th (Xmas Day) the German Infantry (14th Prussians)
came out of their trenches and walked towards our line. We did not fire on them, as they had
no equipment or arms of any sort; some of our fellows went over to meet them. They shook
hands and exchanged greetings, they also exchanged money and cigarettes, etc.” 387 Although
specific orders against fraternization over the holiday period were issued in 1915 by British
military leaders, they do not appear to have prevented at least a few small truces, and no
doubt there were also some cases of cease-fires (without fraternization) in the lines on that
day, although the troops involved probably made no efforts to publicize them.
The most famous case of fraternization in 1915 took place on 25 December between the
st

1 Scots Guards and the Germans stationed in the trenches opposite them. Captain Iain
Colquhoun, a company commander, wrote extensively about the episode in his diary, in which
he noted that on Christmas morning, at about 9 a.m., the Germans advanced into No-Man’sLand, and he went out to meet a German officer, who asked for a truce for Christmas.
Colquhoun “replied that this was impossible. He then asked for ¾ hr. to bury his dead. I
agreed.” The two sides took half hour to bury their respective dead, and spent the remaining
fifteen minutes talking and exchanging cigars and cigarettes. “When the time was up, I blew a
whistle, and both sides returned to their trenches,” Colquhoun wrote. “For the rest of the day
the Germans walked about and sat on their parapets. Our men did much the same, but
remained in their trenches. Not a shot was fired.” That night, the Germans lit up their
trenches with lights, which, together with the full moon, caused Colquhoun to declare it was
“the prettiest sight I have ever seen.” After that, the shelling resumed. 388
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The next day, Colquhoun was called to “explain to (a) Court of Inquiry my conduct on
Christmas Day.” He reported that the Brigadier “doesn’t mind a bit,” but that Major-General
Cavan was “furious about it.” The 2nd Scots Guards and the Coldstream Guards “are also
implicated.” On 30 December, Colquhoun wrote that “(t)he row about the Xmas truce is still
going on” – as presumably the irate Major-General was not prepared to let the matter go - and
that he “had to write my account of the thing about 8 times.” On 4 January 1915 Colquhoun
“received note from the Colonel telling me that I was under close arrest for my share in the
Xmas Day truce, also Miles Barne. The others implicated are not being prosecuted against.”
His status was then changed to open arrest, and on 5 January he was “ordered to attend a
‘Summary of Evidence’ at H.Q.” Evidence was given on that day against both Colquhoun and
Barne, and they were both charged.” 389
On the same day as the Summary of Evidence, Colquhoun received word that his wife
had gone into labour. Although under arrest, he was granted leave to go back to England for
the birth of his child. 390 He returned to France afterwards, and attended the court-martial
which was held on 17 January, at which the two officers were represented by Raymond
Asquith, a noted barrister and the son of the Prime Minister. Barne’s case went first; he was
tried for “Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline for not giving definite
enough orders for the procedure on Christmas day when in Command of the Batt.” Barne’s
trial ended at 2:00 p.m., and a verdict of “not guilty” was given at 2:10, leaving him “exonerated
from all blame,” a judgment Asquith had predicted in a 12 January letter to his wife. 391
Colquhoun’s trial, at which he was “accused of Conduct to the Prejudice of good order and
military discipline in that on the 25th Dec. I (1) agreed to a truce with the enemy (2) permitted
a cessation of hostilities,” then commenced. Colquhoun was questioned by Raymond Asquith
“with the object of proving that when I went up to the trenches on Xmas morning, I found a
very advanced situation which I did my best to regularize by having a definite agreement as to
how long the situation was to last.” After others presented evidence, character witnesses for
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Colquhoun, among them a brigadier general and a colonel, were called, and then speeches for
both the prosecution and accused were given. 392
After five hours of deliberation, he court found Colquhoun guilty and “then closed to
consider its sentence.”393 Three days later Colquhoun heard that the verdict, a reprimand, was
“quashed by G.H.Q.” which really, Colquhoun wrote, “means that the whole thing is washed
out.” 394 Brown and Seaton report that, in fact, General Haig himself remitted the sentence
because of Colquhoun’s “distinguished record in the field.” 395 As Asquith observed, “there was
no doubt that he committed a technical offense, but in reality he showed a good deal of
decision and common sense, and his military character is so first rate that they ought to take a
lenient view of the case,” which apparently is how Haig also viewed the matter. 396
At first glance, these two courts-martial, which represented the only times officers
were prosecuted during the First World War for allowing fraternization at Christmas, appear
to fit the standard narrative of both the truce and the war. In fact, however, not only was one
officer entirely exonerated – a sentence which took the court just ten minutes to reach – but
the second officer charged, who was represented by the son of the Prime Minister, had his
sentence quashed by General Haig within three days of the verdict. However, this episode
involving Captain Colquhoun, which ended with the judicial equivalent of a whimper rather
than a bang, is one that has been since blown out of all proportion. In their work on the truce,
Brown and Seaton, for example, call the reaction to the fraternization “a considerable fracas,”
noting that it became “a minor scandal.” 397 Weintraub characterizes Colquhoun’s courtmartial as the inevitable reaction of a callous leadership, insisting that “(f)rom the command
standpoint, conspicuous examples had to be made” - however big a stretch it may be to call a
quashed reprimand a “conspicuous example.” 398 Colquhoun’s clan website even featured an
interesting myth about the event, noting that the “late chief, Sir Iain Colquhoun 31st of
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Luss…was condemned to death by a court martial but pardoned by King George V for
fraternising on Christmas Day with the Germans in No Man's Land.” 399
In the end, however, this was really quite a simple affair. Two officers were charged
with conduct prejudicial to good order; one was found not guilty and the other had his very
mild sentence quashed. Had the military leadership wished to make an example of these two
officers for daring to allow their troops to fraternize with the enemy, it would have ensured
that they were punished, and punished severely, for their actions. Instead, the British Army’s
Commander-in-Chief took the time and trouble to make sure the sentence was entirely
dismissed, and as Colquhoun later wrote, the “whole Guards division and everyone who knows
the facts of the case all say it was a monstrous thing that the Court martial even took place.” 400
In addition, it should be noted that Colquhoun, who remained in service throughout the war,
eventually rose to the rank of Brigadier-General, demonstrating that the episode did nothing
to impede his career. 401 There is no report that any officers from other battalions were
prosecuted for allowing holiday cease-fires, even though Tate’s diary entry verifies that the 2nd
Coldstreams did participate in a truce, as did the 1st Scots Guards, and Ridsdale’s diary makes
it clear that these armistices were well-known throughout the front lines. 402 Once again, the
evidence from Christmas 1915 confirms that, contrary to the conventional narrative of the
truce, the military leadership really had no vested interest in punishing soldiers for brief ceasefires in the front lines, and in spite of having caught some officers in the act of allowing their
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men to fraternize after orders were implicitly issued to prevent it, were prepared to overlook
the matter even after a court-martial and a guilty verdict.
As illustrated by some references in battalion diaries to the lack of a Christmas truce
on the Western front in subsequent years, the 1914 armistice remained part of the general
military memory of the war. 403 However, the lack of further information in the newspapers
about the truce after January 1915 did not prevent the home front from remembering the 1914
cease-fire even long after it had ended. It remained a vital presence in books written about the
war and in the soldiers’ memoirs that began to appear between 1915 and 1919, illustrating how,
aided by the memories of those who had participated in the event, the “wonderful Christmas
outburst” had become part of the general narrative of the war. 404 The truce was featured, for
example, in a number of multi-volume accounts about the war that were written between 1915
and 1919. In these serials, such as The Times’ History of the War, published in a weekly journal
format, and Nelson’s History of the War, which was written by John Buchan in twenty-four
volumes over the course of the conflict, the war was parceled up and presented to the British
home front as a coherent narrative, and the truce found its place as part of the general
chronicle in these accounts. In addition, authors such as Arthur Conan Doyle and George
Perris tried to write about the war more reflectively, endeavoring to examine its overall
meaning rather than its day-to-day events; here, too, the Christmas cease-fire had a role in the
overall discourse. During this period, the armistice was also featured in published collections
of letters (generally from officers killed in battle) and memoirs written by soldiers invalided
home, including the autobiographical account of Bruce Bairnsfather, the famous cartoonist of
trench life, who provided one of the most memorable descriptions of the event. Additionally,
the guns had barely stopped firing when Field Marshall French, who headed the B.E.F. in the
first year of the war, rushed into print with the self-justifying volume 1914, in which he
reconsidered his disapproval of the unofficial cease-fire. From 1915 through 1919, the truce
remained an accepted part of the narrative of the war, kept alive in the public memory
through works written about the conflict.
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While Nelson’s History of the War was later criticized for not being nearly hard enough
on the British military and political leadership, John Buchan’s serial was not strictly
propaganda; he was forthright, for example, about such matters as the conditions under which
the soldiers served. 405 To write, at that time, about “the misery of standing for hours up to the
waist in icy water, of having every pore of the skin impregnated with mud, of finding the walls
of a trench dissolving in slimy torrents, while rifles jammed, clothes rotted, and feet were
frost-bitten,” may not, in light of information from soldiers already published in the British
press, have been particularly novel, but certainly Buchan pulled no punches when it came to
letting the public know what their troops had to endure. 406 Buchan’s attitude towards the
Christmas truce similarly refused to romanticize the episode, even if his view of the average
Tommy was somewhat rose-coloured. Introducing the holiday cease-fire with the observation
that the British soldier, “nothing if not a good sportsman” exhibited “none of that childish
venom of hate which seems to have been officially regarded in Germany as the proper spirit in
which to fight battles,” Buchan attributed the willingness of the British to participate in the
truce to their professionalism, although of course he did not give the German soldiers similar
credit. 407 He also observed that the truce had historical precedents, as “(o)utposts have always
fraternized to some extent, - they did it in the Peninsula and in the Crimea,” and further noted
that propinquity also played a part in the armistice, noting that “the close contact of the lines
led to the extraordinary truce of Christmas Day.” 408 Additional confirmation of Buchan’s
realistic attitude towards the cease-fire is demonstrated by his admission that the episode was
probably “connived at by the commanders on both sides, for some of our trenches were nearly
flooded out, and the Germans had much timbering to do.”409 In Buchan’s view, the truce was a
very natural event: grounded in historical precedent and British good sportsmanship, abetted
by bad weather and the need to relieve boredom, and providing an opportunity to carry out
repairs to trenches, it appeared to him neither surprising nor a symptom of rebellion by fed-up
troops.
Part 45 of the The London Times’ History of the War, published in the same year, took a
rather more moralistic tone towards the truce, although it did generally get its facts right. In
the 29 June 1915 edition of the series, entitled “The Winter Campaign in France,” the Times
noted that Christmas Eve was “an appropriate time for the slackening of hostile activities,” but
405
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admitted that “no one was prepared for the extraordinary outbursts of good-will and good
feelings towards enemies which actually took place on this strange Christmas Day.” The Times
credited the truce to “the psychology exhibited by soldiers facing each other in combat on the
field, and engaged for months past in constant fighting” who commenced fraternization “on
this great anniversary simply on account of its Christian significance.” It then described the
episode as “the most interesting, certainly the most moving, feature of this winter campaign,”
and noted that although the British public approved of the event, the German leadership
certainly did not,” demonstrating the tolerance of the British in contrast to the Prussian
rigidity of their enemy. 410
With some slight variations on these themes, the Times provided a fairly
straightforward account of the events leading up and contributing to the truce, including the
terrible conditions in Flanders, the exhaustion of the troops after the fall campaign and the
familiarity of the soldiers on both sides of the line with each other, and further acknowledged
that the home front had been fully aware of - and enjoyed - the news of the cease-fire. The
report went on to remark upon the extent of the truce – “over a very considerable part of the
line” - and observed, most surprisingly, “that it is worth remarking that in the British lines
orders were received on Christmas morning not to shoot unless it was absolutely necessary.” 411
This, incidentally, was the first time that such orders had been acknowledged in print;
Buchan’s belief that “commanders on both sides” had “connived” at the truce because it was
convenient to have a breathing space in which to effect trench repairs was as far as anyone had
gone previously in implicating senior leadership in the cease-fire’s continuance. The Times’
account went on to relate many already-familiar truce elements while acknowledging the
approval of fraternization from ‘higher ups’, such as the report that “the Colonel of a British
Infantry regiment met enemy officers (again apparently Saxons) and told them that if they
would have an armistice on New Year’s Day the British would play them at football.”412 The
Times also observed that there were “traces of suspicion” on each side, wrote about a burial
service for some German dead and noted requests from Germans who had lived in London to
forward letters and photos to friends in England. 413
So far, so relatively realistic, but the Times now decided to impose a narrative upon the
holiday cease-fire. Noting that the truce was “a text from which many morals may be
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preached,” the Times could not resist pointing out their favorite one. The account observed
that “from the German side, this exhibition of goodwill consorted badly with the enemy’s
avowed policy of ‘frightfulness,’” and therefore received, “as may easily be imagined, no
support from the German Higher Command,” which in fact issued orders prohibiting further
fraternization. 414 The Times then went on to remind its readers that fraternization had taken
place during the Peninsular Wars, and that such impromptu truces were more likely to result
from the proximity of two opposing sides rather than war-weariness – at least as far as the
British were concerned. However, the truce might lead German soldiers, who “had been led to
expect a short and glorious campaign” to believe that “the fury of the war had spent itself.” Of
course, there was no fear expressed that British soldiers, who never had “any real hate of the
Germans” and who could therefore forget enmity and respond to the “exhibition of German
sentiment” during the Christmas season, would believe that the truce betokened the end of
the war. 415 For the Times, therefore, the truce proved that the Germans were in fact completely
fed up with the war, while simultaneously demonstrating that the British soldier was a true
sportsman who just wanted to celebrate Christmas.
The report, now turned editorial, incorrectly noted that all truces had taken place
against Saxon troops, and reminded readers that the “frightful” Prussian behaviour that had
caused the war also required its continuation, in spite of the generous feelings that the
Christmas season and German “sentiment” aroused in the equable, sporting and always fair
British soldier. 416 The Times, apparently, had saved its polemic on the truce for a less transient
medium than its daily newspaper, but had no trouble reaching the same conclusion as the
Daily Telegraph had months earlier: truces may be traditional, and this one therefore
understandable, particularly in light of the well-known British sense of fair play, but no matter
what had happened on Christmas 1914, the frightful Prussian-influenced German state still had
to be defeated. The only surprising part of the account was the admission that British soldiers
had been instructed not to fire upon the Germans unless they fired first, but this fact was
buried, without comment, in the long passage devoted to the truce. Although the Times got
many of the details about the armistice correct, its decision to cast the episode in these
414
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dramatic terms imposed a moral upon the narrative of the cease-fire that had not been drawn
by those who had participated in it.
Bruce Bairnsfather, the cartoonist who served with the 1st Royal Warwicks from 1914 to
1915 before he was invalided home with hearing damage and shell shock, provided a less
didactic take on the truce in his 1916 memoir of life in the trenches, Bullets and Billets. 417
Interspersed with many of the drawings for which he was famous, the memoir tried to give an
accurate and sardonic account of life in the front lines. His war cartoons were well appreciated
by other soldiers; as Cyril Falls, the military historian who also served in the trenches, said of
Bairnsfather’s work, “(h)e did as much as most people to help us to endure what we had to
endure.” 418 Early in the memoir, Bairnsfather advised his audience to try a small experiment to
gain an understanding of what life in the trenches was like:
Select a flat ten-acre ploughed field, so sited that all the surface water of the
surrounding country drains into it. Now cut a zig-zag slot about four feet deep
and three feet wide diagonally across, dam off as much water as you can so as
to leave about a hundred yards of squelchy mud; delve out a hole at one side of
the slot, then endeavour to live there for a month on bully beef and damp
biscuits, whilst a friend has instructions to fire at you with his Winchester
every time you put your head above the surface.
Bairnsfather wrote about his initial disappointment at finding his battalion assigned to
the trenches on Christmas Day, but conceded that “looking back on it all, I wouldn’t have
missed that unique and weird Christmas for anything.” He recalled how the Germans began
singing on Christmas Eve, then called out to the British, who sent an emissary across NoMan’s-Land in the form of a sergeant (at first suspicious and reluctant), who returned with a
gift of German cigars. This episode, Bairnsfather noted, came as “a welcome relief to the daily
monotony of antagonism,” although it “did not lessen our ardour or determination.” The next
morning, German soldiers appeared in No-Man’s-Land and the British also started to show
themselves, leading to a day of fraternization. In spite of the friendly relations, however,
Bairnsfather claimed that he and his fellow soldiers could not forget that the Germans, “these
sausage-eating wretches, who had elected to start this infernal European fracas, and in so
doing had brought us all into the same muddy pickle as themselves,” were the enemy. He
reported that the British soldiers, “superior, broadminded, more frank, and lovable beings,”
regarded “these faded, unimaginative products of perverted kulture as a set of objectionable
but amusing lunatics whose heads had got to be eventually smacked.”
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Bairnsfather’s Christmas day ended peacefully with a photograph being taken of the
two sides which, he imagined, would repose “on some Hun mantelpieces, showing clearly and
unmistakably to admiring strafers how a group of perfidious English surrendered
unconditionally on Christmas Day to the brave Deutschers.” (Figure 8) After the photo
session, the two groups “began to disperse,” as a general “feeling that the authorities on both
sides were not very enthusiastic about this fraternizing seemed to creep across the gathering,”
although “there was a distinct and friendly understanding that Christmas Day would be left to
finish in tranquillity.” Bairnsfather summed up the episode by noting that, although “(t)here
was not an atom of hate on either side that day; and yet, on our side, not for a moment was
the will to war and the will to beat them relaxed.” Absent the sermonizing that seemed to
accompany other references to the Christmas cease-fire during this period, Bairnsfather’s
retrospective view of the event mirrored that of truce participants who wrote about it more
contemporaneously: he saw it as a welcome break from the monotony of life in the trenches in
a war which had to be won.

Figure 10. German and British soldiers fraternizing on Christmas Day 1914. (Cartoon by Bruce
Bairnsfather.)
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In the same year as Bairnsfather’s memoir, Arthur Conan Doyle also published the first
instalment of his six volume series, The British Campaign in France and Flanders. 419 In it, Doyle
analysed the causes of the war, fixing the blame firmly on Germany. “Looking at the matter
from the German point of view, there were some root-causes out of which this monstrous
growth had come, and it is only fair that these should be acknowledged and recorded,” Doyle
wrote. However his fairness stopped abruptly at the edge of the English Channel: “(t)hese
causes can all be traced to the fact that Britain stood between Germany and that world-empire
of which she dreamed.” 420 Having placed the British firmly on the side of the angels, Doyle was
prepared to look charitably upon the truce, when “Christmas brought about something like
fraternization” between the two armies.” 421 However, this “amazing spectacle” – and here
Doyle arrived at the moral of his lesson – “must arouse bitter thoughts concerning those highborn conspirators against the peace of the world, who in their mad ambition had hounded
those men on to take each other by the throat rather than by the hand.” 422 The truce, which
remained “one human episode amid all the atrocities which have stained the memory of the
war,” had to end, as the Germans, bent on world domination, resumed their aggression. 423 For
Doyle, therefore, the armistice proved to be merely a brief Christmas celebration and a respite
from battle before the goal of beating the ‘frightful’ Germans was renewed.
The letters to his mother written from the Western front by Edward Hulse, an officer
with the 2nd Scots Guards who participated in the 1914 truce, which were published privately in
1916, include one of the most thorough contemporaneous accounts of the truce available. 424 Sir
Edward, who had enlisted well before the war, displayed many of the characteristics of the
professional British officer class: he despised liberals, thought all Germans greatly inferior
creatures, and appeared to swallow whole any propaganda he encountered. 425 He spoke, in his
letters home, about “bagging” Germans and hoped that “some strong unscrupulous fellow with
an iron hand to run things” would take over in Britain, observing that everything would work
much better “if we could put the whole country under martial law, Government included.”426
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Considering his views, it may seem surprising that Hulse was willing to participate in
the truce, but his letter about the cease-fire shows that he had no trouble fitting the event into
his general outlook on the war and the enemy. He reported that, on Christmas morning, four
unarmed Germans came out of the trenches and advanced towards the British lines, while
Hulse and another British soldier went out to meet them. Cigarettes and cigars were
exchanged, and Hulse instructed the Germans not to come out past the half-way line between
the trenches. He then went to Headquarters to report the incident. When he returned to the
front line, the British and German troops were out in No-Man’s-Land, happily fraternizing.
Hulse called for the German officers and arranged with them that no soldiers should advance
more than half-way between the trenches, that everyone should be unarmed, and that neither
side would fire unless the other did. 427 The fraternization continued, with souvenirs and
addresses exchanged, and both sides sang boisterously. 428
At this point, Captain George Paynter, also of the 2nd Scots Guards, arrived at the front
lines (presumably from headquarters), producing a large bottle of rum which was shared out
with the Germans. 429 Both sides then repaired to their respective trenches to eat their
Christmas meal, but in the afternoon returned again to No-Man’s-Land for continued
fraternization. Even after the armistice ended by mutual agreement at 4:30, the Germans
continued to protest that they would not fire, and, as Hulse noted, Captain Paynter “had told
us not to, unless they did, we prepared for a quiet night, but warned all sentries to be doubly
on the alert.” The next day, the 2nd Scots Guards participated in a ceremony at which 29 British
dead were buried, which Hulse referred to in a second letter as “the sadder side of Xmas Day,”
while noting that “it was a great thing being able to collect them, and their relations, to whom
of course they had been reported missing, will be put out of suspense and hoping that they are
prisoners.” 430
The general cease-fire continued throughout Boxing Day, and the Scots Guards used
the time to build up their defences; Hulse noted that the Germans “came out and sat on their
parapet, and watched us doing it, although we had informed them that the truce was ended.”
Hulse wrote, however, that he still “had instructions not to fire till the enemy did.” 431 After the
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2nd Scots Guards had returned to the trenches on New Year’s Eve, Hulse reiterated that “the
158th German regiment have not yet fired a shot since Christmas,” which he believed proved
that they “are genuinely sick of the whole thing.” 432 Hulse, not surprisingly, saw the Christmas
truce as confirmation of the enemy’s lack of enthusiasm for war on the Western front rather
than a symptom of rebellion on the part of the British. In fact, rather than inspiring Hulse with
good-will towards the enemy, the truce only confirmed his poor opinion of the Germans and
provided his battalion with a good opportunity of shoring up their defences. 433
Hulse’s letter has, in the years since it was published, been featured in a number of
accounts about the truce. The BBC program, Days that Shook the World: The Christmas Truce,
for example, based much of its dramatization of the holiday armistice on Hulse’s description
of the experiences of the 2nd Scots Guards on 25 December 1914. However, the documentary
consolidates Hulse’s two trips into No-Man’s-Land into one, leaving out the crucial fact that
he reported the German offer of a truce back to Headquarters after the first meeting, and that
he obviously received permission to continue the cease-fire. “Taking the most pragmatic
course, Hulse decides that his men deserve a day off,” the documentary reports.
He chooses to ignore the fact that they’re sharing it with the enemy – until his
commanding officer arrives. Captain George Paynter is the last word in
authority for Hulse and his men – and the last chance to call a halt before word
reaches HQ. But instead of stopping the party, he fuels it with Fortnum and
Mason’s rum.
Not only does the episode avoid revealing that Paynter was hardly the “last chance” to stop the
truce before “word reaches HQ” – impossible because Hulse has already told Headquarters
himself, and Paynter arrived from there bearing his bottle of rum – but it also omits any
mention of Paynter’s orders not to fire upon the enemy. The Christmas Truce documentary is
far from the only occasion that this account of the truce has been employed to emphasize a
certain view of the war, but at the time it was published, Hulse’s report was merely considered
an excellent description of what the introduction to the volume of his letters described as “the
most extraordinary event of the war - the Christmas Truce of 1914.” 434
Another view of the holiday armistice was provided by Brigadier-General Gleichen,
who on 28 December 1914 had supplied one of the responses to Smith-Dorrien’s demand for
reports on the truce. In 1917, Gleichen published an account of the “doings” of the Fifteenth
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Infantry Brigade, based upon “a very scrappy diary” he had kept in France from 1914 through
1915. The work contained the usual frank descriptions of life in the trenches, with Gleichen
proving to be particularly effusive on the subject of Belgian mud. “O that mud!,” he wrote.
“We have heard lots about Flanders mud, but the reality transcends imagination, especially in
winter. Greasy, slippery, holding clay, over your toes in most places and over your ankles in all
the rest--where it is not over your knees,--it is the most horrible ‘going’ I know anywhere.” 435
The book also included a reference to the truce, in which three out of five of the brigade’s
battalions participated. Gleichen wrote that the Germans came out of their trenches unarmed,
“with boxes of cigars and seasonable remarks.” In the face of these overtures, Gliechen asked
rhetorically, what were the British to do? “Shoot? You could not shoot unarmed men. Let
them come? You could not let them come into your trenches; so the only thing feasible at the
moment was done--and some of our men met them halfway and began talking to them.”
While noting that the brigade “got into trouble for doing it,” he justified the fraternization
with the observation that it was “difficult to see what we could otherwise have done,” and
besides, the officers involved got “excellent close views of the German trenches.” Although
obviously annoyed, even two years later, by Smith-Dorrien’s orders regarding the incident,
Gleichen still had no hesitation about discussing his brigade’s part in the truce in a memoir
published during the war. 436
In a 1917 Contemporary Review article, Stephen Stapleton, writing about “The Relations
Between the Trenches,” examined the “common brotherhood of man” that existed between
the opposing sides. 437 While asserting that the British thought the Germans soldiers were
“treacherous fighters,” he still admitted that the historical practice of fraternizing between
even bitter enemies (Stapleton mentioned the customary armistices between the Greeks and
Trojans, and French and British truces during the Napoleonic Wars) had been followed during
the first year of fighting. 438 He credited the truce to “a common feeling of inquisitiveness,”
claiming that the two sides were just curious about their enemy. 439 In spite of the exchange of
souvenirs, however, Stapleton maintained that, once in No-Man’s-Land, “for the most part,
British and Germans stood with arms folded across their breasts and stared at each other with
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a kind of dread fascination.” 440 He believed that the truce was never repeated not because the
British high command gave orders preventing a recurrence, but rather because of the
introduction into the conflict by the Germans “of the barbaric elements of ‘frightfulness,’
hitherto confined to savage tribes at war; their use of such devilish inventions as poison gas
and liquid fire; (and) their belief only in brute strength.” 441 The British troops, according to
Stapleton, felt no personal rancor towards the Germans during the first part of the war; in fact,
he argued that “British feeling is extraordinarily devoid of the vindictiveness that springs from
revenge,” as proven by the generous way the British treated German prisoners. 442 Once more,
the Christmas truce, in which both sides participated equally, and which was generally
initiated by the Germans, was used to prove the lack of vindictiveness on the part of the
British, while Stapleton blamed the fact that it never re-occurred on the same scale on German
‘frightfulness.’
Later in 1917, the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, who were apparently still nostalgic about
the 1914 truce, noted in their war diary that “(i)t was Xmas Day, but there was no
fraternizing.”443 As this was the last Christmas of the war, there would be no opportunity for
another holiday armistice, but it is clear that at least some battalions continued to mourn its
absence. Sir John French also reflected on the truce a few years after the event, writing in his
1919 memoir of the first year of the war, 1914, that, upon hearing about the holiday cease-fire,
he had issued “immediate orders to prevent any recurrence of such conduct,” adding that his
response to the news was to call “the local commanders to strict account, which resulted in a
good deal of trouble.” 444 This single sentence from his memoir has been quoted in many
descriptions of the Christmas truce, and provided as proof of the “severe” military reaction to
it, but as already noted, there was neither much accounting nor any real trouble. In fact, as
demonstrated, the cease-fires continued happily and without interference in many parts of the
line well beyond Christmas Day. Clearly, French believed (or at least pretended to believe)
that his displeasure had prompted definitive action and that all truces had therefore been
stopped immediately.
In retrospect, however, French was “not sure that, had the question of the agreement
upon an armistice for the day been submitted to me, I should have dissented from it.” 445 After
all, he had “always attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of that chivalry in war
440
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which has almost invariably characterized every campaign of modern times in which this
country has been engaged,” an attitude that was not held by the Germans, who had “glaringly
and wantonly set all such sentiments at defiance by their ruthless conduct of the present war;
even from its very commencement.” 446 French then recalled a similar circumstance in the Boer
War, when a cease-fire for the purposes of burying the dead had been proposed on Christmas,
and he had sent a box of cigars and a bottle of whiskey to his counterpart in the South African
army to seal the deal, after which the South African general obligingly freed two British
prisoners.
“Soldiers should have no politics,” French declared in conclusion, “but should cultivate
a free-masonry of their own and, emulating the knights of old, should honour a brave enemy
only second to a comrade, and like them rejoice to split a friendly lance to-day and ride boot
to boot in the charge to-morrow.” 447 This change of heart on French’s part is, unsurprisingly,
not included in the many accounts of the truce that prominently feature his “immediate
orders” to prevent the fraternization. Murphy, in Truce, equates the displeasure expressed in
French’s memoir, five years after the 1914 armistice, with Smith-Dorrien’s directive issued on
26 December 1914, implying that both date from immediately after the truce and were direct
orders. “Because Smith-Dorrien had also heard that some officers were actually encouraging
the truce, he issued an ominous warning…The commander of all British troops, Field Marshall
John French, was just as angry,” Murphy writes, before quoting from 1914 about French’s
“immediate” orders. 448 In fact, if French issued any written orders regarding the truce, they
have never come to light, so it can be safely assumed that French in fact confined himself to
reprimands of the senior leadership, which resulted in precisely one order not to fraternize,
issued by Smith-Dorrien.
Having thus proven that he was on the soldiers’ side all along, French spent most of
the rest of his book criticizing the War Office for undermining his efforts by “failing to speed
up the manufacture of munitions of war and…the derailment of troops and war material to the
Dardanelles” which “was undoubtedly the chief cause” of the “lack of success of our
endeavours.”449 By establishing that he could not be held responsible for the failure of the
British army to defeat the Germans in the first winter of the war, and claiming that, had he
been asked in advance, he might well have approved of the still very popular truce, French’s
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memoir, which Brian Bond characterizes as “a belt of ammunition fired at French’s enemies in
general,” presumably helped him to wash his hands of the entire 1914-1915 debacle. 450
As illustrated by French’s retrospective approval of the event, the Christmas truce was
firmly entrenched in the British collective memory by the end of the war, and frequent
references to it from 1915 through 1919 demonstrate that it was an accepted part of the
narrative of the conflict. The fact that it continued to be mentioned in soldiers’ letters and war
diaries shows that the supposed censure of the event from the military leadership did little to
prevent the soldiers who joined in from reporting their participation. In fact, the rather
mocking tone taken by one soldier towards French’s orders bringing the truce to a halt, as well
as the continued cease-fires in the lines in the beginning of January 1915 and the willingness to
report them in the diaries of the battalions involved, reveal that soldiers certainly felt free to
speak about the episodes. Although a brief truce the following year did attract some
unwelcome attention from an unhappy Colonel, the results of the ensuing court-martial shows
how little interest the leadership had in disciplining those involved. In addition, histories,
memoirs and serial accounts of the war published throughout the conflict frequently featured
the truce, and although some writers could not resist turning the event into a morality tale
that highlighted their view of the war and the enemy, the basic facts of the cease-fire
continued to be reported relatively realistically during this period.
With the arrival of peace, however, views on the war would begin to undergo a
metamorphosis, and the truce, now part of the general narrative of the conflict, would also
experience a certain amount of revisionist treatment as the soldiers involved, and those
writing about the war more generally, began to reconsider the conflict in light of the peace
that followed it.
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Chapter Seven
“The Curious Christmas Truce”:
The First World War and the Christmas Truce, 1920-1959

The earliest fraternizations, at Christmas 1914, could also be seen as such a formless outcry,
but they carried a very different message. Essentially, they were a way to stop thinking about
the war, to humanize it for these few moments when enemies met each other as brothers.
-Marc Ferro
Meetings in No Man’s Land (2007)
I did not leave the trench myself, feeling too sick at what had happened to Collins, and
thinking some of us had better be ready in case of any other treacherous act. One short
bearded German N.C.O. approached near to our wire, and upon being warned away, spat and
snarled “English swine – wait until tonight.”
-F.A. Brown
nd
2 Monmouthshires, 1939 memoir

On 31 March 1930 Parliament considered the issue of whether the Labour government
should overturn a 1920 undertaking which prevented the years that conscientious objectors
had remained in the civil service during the war being counted towards their pensions, and
proscribed their promotion over war veterans. 451 The question aroused strong feelings on both
sides of the House, with the Conservatives bitterly opposing the action on the grounds that
“the man who has served his country deserves more consideration than the man who has
refused to do so.” 452 The government, however, argued that since conscientious objectors were
allowed by law to refuse service in the armed forces, even if conscripted, it could not “punish
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people for doing something which the State has said they have a right to do.” 453 The
Parliamentary debate on this issue encompassed widely diverse views about the First World
War, particularly from M.P.s who had served in the conflict. Kingsley Griffith, a Liberal, noted
that he “was in the front-line trenches, in 1914” and “that we had a feeling of irritation against
the conscientious objectors.” 454 The Conservative Bertie Leighton admitted that he could
“understand a man disliking war and I can understand men doing all that they can to prevent
war, but I cannot understand men who, when the country is in danger, refuse to lift one finger
to help it.” 455 George Benson, a Labour M.P., announced that he spoke “as one who was a
conscientious objector during the War, and I only hope that hon. Members opposite are as
proud of their War record as I am of mine.” 456
In the midst of this controversy, one M.P. argued that dying in battle was the “greatest
and most glorious service” a man could give to his country. Benson vehemently pointed out
“that men were not sent into the Army for the definite purpose of dying, but to kill,” and that
he “was not prepared to admit that killing another man was the highest form of service to
one's country.”457 At this point, Major McKenzie Wood, a Liberal who had served with the
Gordon Highlanders during the war, joined the debate, passionately asserting that when he
had volunteered for service, he did so not to kill, but “to prevent killing,” and further stating
that “(d)uring the whole time I was in the Army, or during the whole of the War, I can
honestly say that I never had the slightest degree of animosity against anyone, even against
those who were opposed to us in the War.” 458
To emphasize the nature of his convictions, Major Wood declared that “at Christmas,
1914, I was in the front trenches, and took part in what was well known at the time as a truce,”
when his unit “went over in front of the trenches, and shook hands with many of our German
enemies.” He observed that a “great number of people think we did something that was
degrading,” but that as a result of that experience, “I then came to the conclusion that I have
held very firmly ever since, that if we had been left to ourselves there would never have been
another shot fired.” 459 Major Wood argued that “the fact that we were being controlled by
others…made it necessary for us to start trying to shoot one another again,” and that it was
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only because “we were all in the grip of a political system which was bad” that the war had
continued. 460 This view, he noted, had prompted his entry into politics, and certainly
influenced his belief that “it required, in many cases at any rate, an extraordinary amount of
moral courage to be a conscientious objector during the War, and, for my part, I think we
ought to see that people who had that strong moral courage to do what they did ought not to
be penalised further.” 461
Since in 1930 there were 148,000 First World War veterans in the Civil Service and only
230 conscientious objectors, the fervor aroused by a subject that would affect so few men
reveals that not only did the British still feel passionately about the war twelve years after it
had ended, but also that their attitudes towards it continued to vary widely. There was
certainly no political consensus on the war at this time: Benson, a conscientious objector, had
been elected to Parliament, but so had Captain Austin Hudson, who declared in the same
debate that if conscientious objectors “would not undertake the unpleasant part of their
obligation of citizenship, they should not later on participate in the advantages which would
accrue to them from being citizens.” 462 While by 1930, according to the conventional narrative
of the war, those who had refused to fight in it out of moral conviction should have received
credit for their resistance to a senseless and futile war, this Parliamentary debate illustrates
how that belief was just one view of the conflict, and that support for those who fought in
what was still perceived by many as a worthy cause also held its own among public opinion.
For Major Woods, memories of the truce provided an inspiration that guided his postwar behavior, and prompted him in 1930 to argue that the British soldiers had been in the grip
of a “bad” political system which had involved them in a senseless war. In the same year,
Charles Edmund Carrington, also a veteran of the conflict, strongly opposed the idea that
veterans looked back on the war with abhorrence. “A legend has grown up, propagated not by
soldiers but by journalists,” Carrington declared in his 1930 memoir A subaltern’s war, “that
these men who went gaily to fight in the mood of Rupert Brooke and Julian Grenfell, lost their
faith amid the horrors of the trenches and returned in a mood of anger and despair.” 463
According to Carrington, these attitudes did not reflect the feelings of the vast majority of the
soldiers that fought in the war, who never became “‘disenchanted,’ for war had never offered
them an enchanting prospect.” The average British soldier, he maintained, “had not wanted
460
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war, but he had engaged in it; he liked it even less than he expected, but he proposed to see it
through; and if, which God forbid, similar circumstances arose in 1929, he would do the same
again.” 464
The current popular narrative of the First World War, which stresses the supposed
bitterness of veterans of the conflict as well as the failure of the peace that followed it,
emphasizes general disillusionment as the dominant outlook on the war during the 1920s and
193os. As Ludovic Kennedy wrote in the introduction to Alan Lloyd’s The War in the Trenches,
(f)or many of England’s young men the outbreak of the 1914 war seemed a romantic adventure,
an opportunity for winning honour and glory – ‘as swimmers,’ Rupert Brooke saw them, ‘into
cleaness leaping.’ Four years later, after millions of young Englishmen, Frenchmen and
Germans had perished on the muddy battlefields of the Somme and the Aisne and
Passchendaele, the war was recognized for what it was: one of the bloodiest and most futile
conflicts in history. 465
Kennedy’s 1976 assumption that, in 1919, everyone thought the war had been
completely pointless was far from accurate. During the interwar years, as journalists and
historians picked over the carcass of the conflict, writers produced fictional accounts of the
war, and soldiers began to write their memoirs, many views about the First World War
competed for ascendancy in British public discourse. What various works produced from 1920
through 1939 mainly demonstrate is the multiplicity of narratives presented during those two
decades. Some minor unifying themes do emerge from these diverse works, among them the
idealization of the soldiers who fought in the conflict and the surprisingly stark depiction of
conditions on the Western front, but a consensus on the war itself was notably absent.
Throughout the interwar period, the Christmas truce was not forgotten, but continued to be
an accepted part of the history of the First World War even as it became increasingly utilized
by writers in pursuit of a cohesive narrative to impose upon the conflict.
In contrast to the soldier-poets who wrote of their embitterment long before the war
ended and then later made it a central theme of their memoirs, there were many veterans,
such as Carrington, who continued to view their service on the Western front and their part in
helping to defeat the Central Powers as worthwhile. There were historians and journalists who
reviewed the conflict and concluded that, on balance, the rationale upon which the war had
been fought was valid, and that its results, including the peace treaty, may not have been
ideal, but were overall as satisfactory as could be expected under difficult circumstances.
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There were others who reached the opposite conclusion, and upon reconsidering the conflict
saw nothing but waste and horror. This diversity of views produced a fragmented discourse of
the war during the first two decades after it ended, and the Christmas truce remained part of
that narrative battleground, credited with meanings as varied as the attitudes of those who
wrote about it.
Disillusionment with the war was well represented long before the famous memoirs of
Graves, Sassoon, and Blundon appeared in the late 1920s. This theme was thoroughly explored
by Philip Gibbs, a war correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, in his 1920 memoir Realities of
War. Planting himself firmly on the futile-and-wasteful side of the argument, Gibbs used this
work to vent his frustrations with four years of “official briefings” from the army. Realities of
War therefore served as a fierce polemic against the War Office, Kitchener, the generals and
officers (“who had the brains of canaries”), the politicians, other journalists and British
civilians – against everyone, in fact, except British soldiers serving in the front lines, whom
Gibbs romanticized beyond all reality. Although protesting that, as he was “not a soldier nor a
military expert,” he had no right to blame French for his actions, Gibbs’ mock-innocent
assertion that “(o)ur High Command had to learn by mistakes, by ghastly mistakes, repeated
often, until they became visible to the military mind, and were paid for again by the slaughter
of British youth” demonstrated that his sympathies lay entirely with the “other ranks.”’ 466
British soldiers, Gibbs claimed, were motivated to fight largely by an unspoken love of
their country and not “because they hated the Germans, because, after a few turns in the
trenches, they had a fellow-feeling for the poor devils over the way.” 467 The Christmas truce,
for Gibbs, was proof of this sense of camaraderie: British troops at the front “(b)ut for
stringent regulations…would have fraternized with the enemy at the slightest excuse, and did
so in the winter of 1914, to the great scandal of G.H.Q.” 468 Although he blamed Germany for
starting the war, Gibbs declared that the troops on both sides of the line had “‘no real quarrel
with each other.” 469 In Realities of War, he praised the good-will and simple hearts of the
front-line soldiers, who in the post-war period were still “inspired by the humble belief that
humanity may be cured of its cruelty and stupidity,” and claimed that the truce exemplified
their sense of brotherhood with their enemies. 470
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C.E. Montague, who enlisted in the war in 1914 in spite of the fact that he was well over
the age allowed, was similarly forthright about his attitude towards the conflict, as is clear
from the title of his 1922 work. When the war broke out, he wrote in Disenchantment,
(a)ll the air was ringing with rousing assurances. France to be saved, Belgium
righted, freedom and civilization re-won, a sour, soiled, crooked old world to
be rid of bullies and crooks and reclaimed for straightness, decency, goodnature, the ways of common men dealing with common men. What a
chance! 471
Montague, like Gibbs, idealized British soldiers, who were “simply and happily friendly,
trustful, and keen.”472 Unfortunately, Montague maintained, these men imagined that those
who led them were of equal good will, and “(t)hat was the paradise that the bottom fell out
of.” 473 Montague contended that soldiers joined up for honourable reasons, but the war
debased their souls, which were annihilated by it even when their bodies survived. The
Christmas truce, he maintained, was proof that the soldiers had started the war with good
principles. “Even on the dull earth it takes time and pains to get a clean-run boy or young man
into a mean frame of mind,” Montague argued, providing as an example a “fine N.C.O. of the
Grenadier Guards (who) was killed near Laventie – no one knows how – while going over to
shake hands with the Germans on Christmas morning. ‘What! not shake hands on Christmas
Day?’ He would have thought it poor, sulky fighting.” 474
Disenchantment features a ‘typical’ truce that began when two British officers
approached the German trenches (lit with Christmas trees) on Christmas Eve, and proposed a
cease-fire to the surprised inhabitants. As a result, “on Christmas Day the two sides exchanged
cigarettes and played football together. The English intended the truce to end with the day, as
agreed, but decided not to shoot next day till the enemy did.” 475 Since the Germans remained
peaceful, the British did as well, even sending a subaltern across to explain away a rifle shot off
by accident while cleaning, which the enemy excused, although one German who was not so
forgiving shot the unlucky messenger in the knee. The British, however, sportingly “took it
that some German sentry had misunderstood our fluke shot. They did not impute
dishonour.” 476 This, Montague claimed, was because the soldiers at this point of the war still
retained their “trustful” and “friendly” pre-war values. For Gibbs, the truce demonstrated the
good-will and camaraderie that British soldiers felt towards their German counterparts, while
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for Montague the cease-fire symbolized the principles in which British soldiers believed before
they were betrayed by the callous actions of their politicians and generals. For both men,
however, the 1914 armistice had become a symbol rather than an event, a moment of truth in a
hated war and one that had little to do with the motivations of the men who had actually
participated in it.
These books, written soon after the end of the war, foreshadowed the emergence in
the late 1920s of the many fictional and autobiographical works that were to re-cast the
narrative of the war for the next eighty-five years, including R.C. Sherriff’s Journey’s End,
Blunden’s Undertones of War and the opening book of Sassoon’s Sherston Trilogy, Memoirs of
a Fox-Hunting Gentleman. What the authors of all these works had in common was their
service in the trenches on the Western front and their collective view of the war as futile and
unnecessary. 477 Following the 1929 publication of All Quiet on the Western Front, Hew
Strachan observes, “there had been many interpretations of the war; thereafter one
increasingly dominated over the others.” 478 Also contributing to the shift of the war’s narrative
was Lord Posonby’s Falsehood in Wartime, which was published during the same period.
Posonby’s work, which purported to debunk anti-German propaganda, also promoted the
belief that the war had been instigated by both sides equally. 479 Lessening German
responsibility for the war also removed its justification, and this, combined with endorsement
of the idea that “the war had been an identical and equally disastrous experience for all
soldiers and all armies,” contributed to the changing attitude towards the conflict that began
to take effect at the end of this decade, one which shared the blame for the war among all the
combatant countries. 480
Even within this narrative of disillusionment, however, the implicit view of the
Christmas truce as the soldiers’ rebellion against a hated war received some surprising
resistance. In Goodbye to All That, Robert Graves, who because of his opposition to the conflict
might have been expected to take the line that the Christmas truce was an act of defiance on
the part of the soldiers involved, demonstrated instead his loyalty to his regiment and
admiration for their professionalism by describing the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers 1914 armistice
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with the enemy as no “emotional hiatus” but rather “a commonplace of military tradition – an
exchange of courtesies between officers of opposing armies.” 481 As it clear from this example,
even by the end of the 1920s the war’s discourse had not yet hardened into the set parameters
that would define it much later in the century.
In addition, while the school of disillusionment had many supporters, it was a simple
task to find as many dissenters. 1928, the year that the quintessential anti-war novel All Quiet
on the Western Front was issued, also saw the publication of H.W. Wilson’s The War Guilt,
which advanced the theory that the Allies had no choice but to form a coalition against the
Central Powers, because when “a preponderant state arises and shows aggressive purposes by
its armaments or its actions, other states will be forced to group themselves into ententes or
alliances against it, as the alternative to surrendering their liberty and submitting to
injustice.” 482 In his 1927 work, Lions Led by Donkeys, P.A. Thompson attributed the cause of
the conflict to Germany’s “fatal error,” which was “that they did not ‘play the game,’” and
complained that “in forcing the actual outbreak of war, and in their conduct of the war itself,
they transgressed every law of civilization and humanity.”483 Thompson believed that once
Germany had conquered Europe, it would then turn its attention to England, who “must soon
have dropped to second place.” He therefore criticized British military leadership not for their
incompetence, as Alan Clark was later to do in a similarly titled history, but rather for their
willingness to undertake offensives on the Western front in the early part of the war to please
the French, when it would have been better for the British to wait until their numbers
increased before commencing large battles. 484
In his work, Thompson described the horrors of the front line, where the men “lived in
bitter, biting cold, soaked to the skin; with mud in their nails, their hair, their eyes – mud
everywhere,” but noted that in spite of the terrible conditions of the war, British soldiers felt
“no personal animosity for the fellows in the trench on the other side, fifty yards away.” 485 This
led him to the subject of the truce, “the only time during the War when both sides
fraternized.” 486 He wrote about the singing in the trenches on Christmas Eve and how the two
sides met in No-Man’s-Land the next day, when the British were surprised to see “that ‘Jerry’
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was spic and span, well shaven, and possessing an abundance of cigars and champagne.”
Thompson noted that the cease-fire “prevailed for some days afterwards,” with a spirit of
cooperation between the two sides, exemplified by a British engineer who, while “putting up
barbed wire borrowed a mallet from a neighbouring ‘Jerry’ who was similarly employed.” 487
For Thompson, however, the truce served as a distraction from his main theme: Germany’s
sole responsibility for the war, and Britain’s delay in giving it the beating it deserved by
allowing political motivations to influence battlefield strategies.
In the introduction to their survey of the conflict, the authors of An Outline History of
the Great War declared that understanding “what the war felt like is even more important
than to know its events in outline.”488 To this end, G.V. Carey and H.S. Scott noted that “the
false glamour which is apt to be shed on war, when viewed from a distance, finds no place in
this narrative.” 489 To assert in 1928 that a history of the First World War must avoid idealizing
the conflict certainly contradicts current ideas about the war’s orthodox narrative, which
suggests that by the end of the 1920s, the war was generally seen as an exercise in senseless
destruction. In spite of their determination not to romanticize the war, however, Carey and
Scott still venerated the British soldiers, particularly during the first winter of the war, when
they opposed “the splendid bravery of the Germans” with “the patient and stubborn resistance
of perfect fitness and great skill.” 490 It is in this vein that Carey and Scott acknowledged the
Christmas truce, but with a twist: it was because of their inability to “reach the Channel ports
and Paris,” and their distractions in Poland, “that, when Christmas came, the German troops
fraternized freely with their enemies wherever they could.” 491 In this account, which
emphasized the bravery of the B.E.F., the cease-fire was a sign that the Germans were
disheartened by their lack of success in the war, while the British, referred to only as “their
enemies,” were reduced to passive actors, relieved of their responsibility for the truce.
It is impossible to review these varied pre-1930 books, treatises and histories and find
any universal attitudes denoting an overarching view of the war. Some condemned it while
others defended it, and few common themes were to be found, besides the emphasis on the
patience, fortitude and good-will of the British soldier - whether those qualities had been,
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alternatively, drawn upon to fight a war worth winning, or manipulated and betrayed in order
to prevail in a senseless conflict. The following decade saw little change in this dichotomy of
opinion, with disillusionment with the 1914-1918 conflict continuing to compete with the view
that it had been a worthwhile war, and the truce still used to support both sides equally. In
1930, the same year that Major Woods was declaring in Parliament that the holiday cease-fire
would have signaled the end of fighting if the soldiers had been left to themselves, the
historian Liddell Hart, who had also served in the trenches of Flanders, drew a rather different
conclusion from the impromptu armistice.
Liddell Hart’s survey of the war presented a more even-handed approach to the
conflict than many written during the previous decade, and although he laid the largest
responsibility for the war on the Kaiser, whose “bellicose utterances and attitude…filled
Europe with gunpowder,” he also believed that, in the summer of 1914, the “rush to the abyss”
had been “driven by the motor of ‘military necessity.’” 492 In The Real War, Liddell Hart
promoted the concept of inevitability, the idea that the war had happened because no one
knew how to stop it, which later became an important element in the conflict’s orthodox
narrative. He further observed that Europe welcomed the war with “an immeasurable sigh of
relief,” as “a revolt of the spirit against the monotony and triviality of the everyday round.”
This initial enthusiasm, Liddell Hart argued, was followed by passion, “the natural ferocity of
war.” As the war continued past its first months, he identified a third phase, the “momentary
growth of a spirit of tolerance, symbolized by the fraternization which took place on
Christmas Day,” although “this in turn was to wane as the strain of the war became felt and
the reality of the struggle for existence came home to the warring sides.” 493
For Liddell Hart, the truce was a stage in the front-line soldiers’ eventual acceptance of
the lengthy deadlock on the Western front. Absent a quick victory, neither side could
maintain their early enthusiasm for the war, nor sustain the passion that succeeded their
initial emotions. The cease-fire, according to Liddell Hart, was a symptom of the process
through which both sides accustomed themselves to the idea of trench warfare, an acceptance
which was eventually replaced by the determined resignation that characterized soldiers’
attitudes for the rest of the war. The holiday armistice, in other words, was merely one step in
the progression towards the attitude eventually adopted by the British army, which enabled it
to win a war that neither side had known how to prevent.
The contradictions inherent in the 1914 armistice being cited in the same year by one
veterans of the conflict as proof of the soldiers’ rebellion against the war and by another as
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evidence of the troops’ acceptance of the long and necessary battle ahead of them
demonstrate how little consensus could be found, even twelve years after the First World War
had ended, on either its meaning or that of the Christmas truce. Additionally, Major Wood
and Liddell Hart were not the only veterans that used the cease-fire to illustrate their
assumptions about the war during the 1930s. Like Carrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Graham
Seton Hutchinson, who served with the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, obviously
intended his memoir to counter the waste and futility narrative expressed in certain anti-war
works. “The reader has been led to believe,” Hutchinson asserted in 1932’s Warrior, “unless
indeed he knew the whole or half the truth before, that every attack was a costly failure, that
assault followed assault until each man and every man died, his body hideously torn and
mangled.” 494 The war, Hutchinson claimed, was terrible, but it also “raised the qualities of
honour, patriotism, and devotion to an ideal, to an eminence never previously attained in all
the history of mankind.” 495
Having staked out his position on the “purity of motive” with which the British had
entered the war, Hutchinson then turned to the continuing cease-fire in his battalion’s part of
the line in early January 1915. 496 Admitting that “the fires of patriotism were soon damped by
the unequal struggle with the elements,” he described the conditions that led to an on-going
armistice, when the troops “were so preoccupied with the task of keeping the water at a
sufficiently low level…that a rifle was seldom fired from our line.” 497 Not only was fighting
impossible under these circumstances, but the shared misery resulted in intermittent
fraternizing that was part of “an unwritten armistice covering a front of some miles.” 498 The
two sides occasionally met while crossing No-Man’s-Land, exchanged the odd souvenir, and
even shared working tools: as Hutchinson observed, “(h)ammers and mallets became mutual
property.” 499
Hutchinson then noted that plans were on for a joint football match when the “High
Command” issued orders, “about which there could be no equivocation, that warlike measures
against the enemy must be adopted forthwith.” 500 The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
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bowed to the inevitable, but first warned the Germans that the war would resume the next
day. The enemy, however, continued to send out working parties, which placed the British in a
quandary, as it “went wholly against tradition to open fire on apparently peaceful, and
certainly unarmed German soldiers.” Eventually a small bomb was thrown which wounded a
German in the leg, the enemy quickly retaliated (proving that their previous peaceful attitude
had been merely a “ruse to test the British aggressive intentions”), and the two sides returned
to “the warfare of sniping, bombing, patrols, and walking in a crouched position.”501
Hutchinson’s version of the cease-fire, which continued on certain parts of the front
during early January, not only conforms to the diaries of various battalions, but was also an
event that the self-proclaimed “warrior” had no problem fitting into his view of his fellow
soldiers, which was that they were sportsmen who would lay down their arms to allow both
sides to cope undisturbed with the terrible conditions at the front. His belief that his views on
the war were shared by many veterans, however, was contradicted by Frank Richards’ memoir,
Old Soldiers Never Die, which was published a year later. 502 Richards, who served with the 2nd
Royal Welch Fusiliers, reportedly received assistance from Robert Graves when writing his
memoir, which is unsurprising: Richards was the sort of cheerful soldier, impervious to
discipline and with a healthy scepticism about army leadership, whom Graves admired. On
Christmas morning, Richards reported, both sides stuck up boards that said ‘Merry Christmas,’
and a few soldiers ventured out in No-Man’s-Land, where they were soon followed by the rest
of the troops. 503
A Welch Fusiliers officer, who according to Richards was already generally
unpopular, tried to stop the exodus, “but he was too late: the whole of the Company was now
out, and so were the Germans. He had to accept the situation, so soon he and the other
company officers climbed out, too.” 504 The two sides “mucked in all day with one another,”
exchanged complaints about how “fed up” they all were with the war, and drank the beer the
Germans offered. 505 “The officers came to an understanding that the unofficial truce would
end at midnight,” but the British soldiers, who returned to their trenches at dusk, decided not
to start shooting before the Germans did, and the cease-fire lasted through Boxing Day. 506

501

Hutchinson, Warrior, pp. 62-62, all remaining quotes in paragraph.
Private Frank Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (1933, reprinted by The Naval and Military Press Ltd,
East Sussex, England). On the other hand, Richards (real name Francis Woodruff) may not have been as
indifferent to the attitudes of his superiors as he professed, as his memoir, although issued fifteen years
after the end of the war, was published under a pseudonym.
503
Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die, pg. 65.
504
Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die, pg. 65.
505
Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die, pg. 66.
506
Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die, pp. 66-67.
502

146

That evening, the Welch Fusiliers were “surprised” to find themselves relieved by another
battalion, who told them that the truce had been general in the front line. Apart from
Richards’ broad hint that the relief of the 2nd Welch Fusiliers was unexpected and therefore
somehow related to the truce, an assertion not borne out by the battalion’s war diary, his
account is fairly routine, giving a quick wink to the soldiers’ defiance of a particularly disliked
officer whose orders to return to the trenches were ignored. 507
On the other hand, Captain J.C. Dunn, also of the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers,
believed that the truce displayed his regiment to advantage. In The War the Infantry Knew:
1914-1919, Dunn obviously felt obliged to counter some of the anti-war literature so prevalent
in the decade before 1938, the year this memoir was published. 508 Explaining his divergence
with the anti-war school of disillusionment, Dunn observed that most of the enormous
number of books written about the war “have come from writers whose emotions have been
quickened by the penitential mood that follows all great wars.” 509 For Dunn, in spite of
remembering the conflict as “a time of trench warfare with eruptions of great violence, of
waning morale, of increasing vexation and heartache,” the memories of the war that remained
with him were encapsulated in
the gay self-sacrifice of junior officers and of non-commissioned officers; by the
resource and cheerfulness in discomfort of the men of our Old Army, and their
prompt answer to every call, confident in themselves and in each other: beside
them the Territorial and New Army personnel had the native virtues common
to all, good nature and endurance. 510
Although the reports of the Christmas truce that appear in The War the Infantry Knew were
drawn from accounts provided by members of the battalion, making it unclear whether Dunn
participated in the event, the selections chosen underline his themes of the professionalism
and good humor of the B.E.F., although both versions minimized any fraternization between
the two sides.
In the first account, a screen with “Merry Christmas” painted upon it is put up in the
morning, and both sides walked about in the open behind their lines. Later, the Germans
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came into No-Man’s-Land, but the British, who “were forbidden to leave” their trenches, threw
them “tins of food with plenty of sympathy in the shape of, ‘Here you are, you poor hungry
bastards,’ and other such-like endearments.” A Welch Fusiliers’ captain went out to meet the
Germans when they rolled over two barrels of beer, and the officers “agreed to recall all men
to the trenches and have no more fraternizing.” A cease-fire was negotiated, and “the Germans
were allowed to bury their dead.” 511 The second account, written by the captain who met with
the Germans, maintained that “(s)trict orders had been issued that there was to be no
fraternizing on Christmas Day,” and reported that he told the German officers that they
should get their men back behind the parapets, as it was dangerous for them to be “running
about in the open like this,” in case someone fired. A mutual cease-fire was agreed, and the
Germans, the officer recorded, “played the game, not a shot all night.” The truce ended when
the two captains appeared on their respective parapets: “both bowed and saluted and got
down into our respective trenches…and the War was on again.” 512 For Dunn, as for Robert
Graves of the same regiment, the truce demonstrated that the professionalism of the Royal
Welch Fusiliers overrode the personal animosities of war, and that, as long as the Germans
“played the game,” the regiment could be counted on to do the same.
Later during the same decade, the truce made another appearance in a history from
one more veteran of the conflict, who was concerned not “with its causes remote or
immediate, nor with the so-called settlement which followed,” but instead focused on the
conduct of the war itself. 513 In A History of the Great War, Charles Cruttwell advanced the
theory, later embraced by A.J.P. Taylor, that the combat plans of the countries involved, which
focused on the offensive, made mobilization the equivalent of war. As “any improvisation,
except in detail” was rendered impossible by the complexity of those plans, the order to
mobilize was the equivalent of a declaration of war. 514 Cruttwell’s argument that “universal
insecurity” made every country nervous and therefore more inclined to fight spread the blame
for the conflict among all the “continental belligerents,” excepting Britain, who “entered the
war in defense of her treaty obligations toward Belgium and not under the terms of any
general alliance.” 515
After arguing that, Britain’s hands were relatively clean in the general debacle,
Cruttwell then examined the 1914 fighting closely. He pointed out that although trenches
served to protect the men within them, they had their psychological pitfalls: “Stationary
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warfare,” he observed, bred “a sense of isolation and of disproportionate risk between the
troops in the line and the staff.” 516 The French approach to trench fighting, which was to
remain relatively inactive unless an attack was expected, enabled them to hold their front line
with few men, while the “British were very thick on the ground, and the troops were enjoined
to harass the enemy by every possible pinprick, such as fighting patrols, and burst of fire on
his nightly working parties.” 517 In spite of this, Cruttwell observed, “it was the British and not
the French soldiers who were the actors in the curious ‘Christmas Truce’ of 1914, when
fraternizing between the lines, even games of football and mutual trench visits were common,
and in some sectors lasted for nearly a week.” 518
Towards the end of the 1930s, with Britain on the brink of another war against
Germany, veterans throughout the country must have reflected upon their service in the last
one. 519 Frederick Brown, who fought with the 2nd Monmouthshires on the Western Front
during the first year of the war, and later served in Mesopotamia, began his 1939 unpublished
memoir reflecting that he never imagined “after the Great War of 1914-1918, that our country
would be called upon to once again fight the battle ‘for civilization’ during my lifetime.” 520
However, as “the impossible” had happened, he wanted “to place on record as far as my
memory will permit” an account of his experiences in the previous war.
Brown, a corporal in the 2nd Monmouths at the start of the conflict, embarked for
France on 5 November. The Monmouths were in the trenches for Christmas 1914, and Brown
recalled the bitter cold of Christmas Eve and waking at dawn. He contrasted the thoughts of
home with “our bleak surroundings,” looking at “where a German soldier had been buried, and
his foot had actually been sticking out in our trench until we covered it up with earth.” Then,
“a strange happening occurred, which is generally not accepted, but well known to those who
were present in this part of the line.” A rumour began to spread that there would be an
armistice for Christmas so the Germans could bury their dead. Brown then described how
“German heads appeared” over the parapets of the trenches opposite, which were only 35
yards apart, and a Monmouths sergeant looked over the top of the British trench, waving a box
of cigarettes. However, “a shot rang out, and the poor Sergt. staggered back into the trench,
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shot through the chest. I can still hear his cries ‘Oh my God, they have shot me’, and he died
immediately.” 521
Of course, Brown wrote, the Monmouths got back in their trenches, “with very bitter
feelings on our part.” Fraternization did occur later that afternoon, although Brown explained
that the British soldiers went out “mostly to collect souvenirs in the shape of helmets etc.”
The Germans apologized for the shooting of the sergeant, but Brown remained in his trench
throughout the day, still angry about the killing of the unarmed soldier. “After this,” he noted,
“all fraternizing was strictly forbidden.” Although he later received wounds in Mesopotamia
which left him permanently disabled and forced him to relinquish his chosen career, Brown
did not seem to feel either the anger towards the war that prompted many veterans to write
memoirs condemning it, or the defensiveness that pervaded aggressively militaristic memoirs
such as Hutchinson’s Warrior. Instead, he accepted the necessity of the war in which he had
fought and been so severely wounded, just as he was resigned to the thought of the next one,
which Brown also recognized as a battle “for civilization.”
From Gibbs’ over-wrought Realities of War through Brown’s matter-of-fact account of
the same conflict nearly twenty years later, the narrative of the First World War in the interwar years embraced a multiplicity of viewpoints. The two decades saw a great deal written
about the truce from soldiers who had participated in it and writers who wished to use it to
underline their view of the conflict, such as Montague’s disillusionment with the war or
Liddell Hart’s theories about attitudes of the combatant countries during the early stages of
the conflict. Based upon an overview of books written about the war during the 1920s and
1930s, it can certainly be argued that Carey and Scott were correct in their assertion that it
would be “foolish to pretend that the war had no redeeming features.” 522 While some veterans
could not, even years after it ended, forget the horrors of the war, for many the victory they
had won in the field and “the recollection of a comfortable billet, a cheerful mess, the smokeladen atmosphere of an estaminet, the unexpected encounter of a friend,” or the Christmas
Day they fraternized with the Germans, remained as strong a reality as the “months of
stagnation and sordid horror.” 523
In addition, it is worth noting that the most famous anti-war work of the inter-war
years, All Quiet on the Western Front, ignored the truce entirely, and that some disillusioned
veterans, such as Graves, who characterized the conflict as “wicked nonsense,” did not cite the
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1914 cease-fire in support of their views. 524 During this time, the truce, whether recalled fondly
in a memoir or used as a moral in an anti-war treatise, remained both a well-remembered
event and an accepted feature within the narrative of the war. Competing strands of the war’s
narrative, including vivid descriptions of the horrors of the fr0nt line and the remembrance of
the camaraderie found in the trenches, were characteristic of the diverse views of the conflict
held during this period. The attitudes expressed in various works written during the first two
decades after the war’s end demonstrated that no all-encompassing view of the conflict
dominated either its discourse, or that of the Christmas truce. However, after memories of the
old world war were, at least temporarily, subsumed during the new global conflict, the postSecond World War narrative of the First World War would begin to undergo a decided shift in
perspective - and drag the truce along behind it.
Two works about the First World War, published between 1939 and 1945, exemplified
the continued varied discourse of the conflict that struggled to take into account the new and
even larger war that had overtaken the world. The titles of these histories, E. Lipson’s Europe
1914-1939 and A Sketch-Map History of the Great War and After, 1914-1935, by I. Richards, J.B.
Goodson and J.A. Morris, illustrated an increasing awareness that the inter-war years formed
as much a part of the narrative as the war itself. 525 Defending the Treaty of Versailles, for
example, against charges that it had caused the German sense of grievance that prompted the
rise of Nazism and the onset of the Second World War, Lipson maintained that, while it had
become fashionable to condemn it “as a bad treaty,” and assert that if the Allies had been more
lenient, Germany would have “reconciled herself more readily,” this could not be certain. 526 “It
is at least doubtful whether the military caste, shorn of its prestige and smarting under the
stigma of defeat,” Lipson argued, “would not have repudiated even a lenient treaty, and
endeavoured sooner or later to recover for Germany the dominant position she had formerly
enjoyed in Europe.” 527 Characterizing Germany, in 1944, as “the country which alone could
have averted the conflagration,” Lipson assigned to it the major responsibility for the war. 528
Richards, Goodson and Morris similarly contended that German attitudes and actions,
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particularly its demand for “‘a place in the sun’” and its rivalry with France, Russia and Britain,
had been the main impetus for the First World War, demonstrating that, even in the 1940s,
many historians continued to support this view of the conflict. 529
Aylmer Haldane, the general in charge of the 3rd Division in 1914, also concurred with
this analysis. In his autobiography, A Soldier’s Saga, published in 1948, he argued that
Germany, by doing nothing “to prevent what must inevitably lead to a general conflagration in
Europe,” and instead encouraging the conflict for its own ends, bore responsibility for the
war. 530 In his chronicle of the war, Haldane included his orders to the 3rd Division forbidding a
truce at Christmas 1914, and noted that, while his division did not participate in an armistice,
in other commands, “(a)dvances made by the Germans were not repelled, and in consequence
certain commanders got into hot water with higher authority.” 531 Haldane also repeated a
quite astonishing and uncredited tale about how in one section
the enemy tried to repeat a truce – unauthorized, of course – which had taken
place earlier and was warned what would happen. One of the German officers
then came forward and asked that the gun-fire might be opened on his men
between the lines, on which they sat down close to our parapets and some time
elapsed before they could be made to return to their own defences. 532
It seems incredible to believe that a German officer would have asked the British to fire upon
his own men to get them to stop fraternizing, but Haldane apparently found this story
sufficiently plausible to include in his work as further evidence that officers on both sides
imposed harsh punishments on soldiers who participated in the truce.
Haldane’s endorsement of the myth that retribution followed the 1914 truce was part of
the continuing alteration that the narrative of the armistice underwent in the post-war period.
Whereas previously the idea that soldiers involved suffered retribution from their
commanders for their participation in the armistice had been a minority view, at this time it
began to creep into the dominant discourse of the truce. Mary Renault’s 1953 novel, The
Charioteer, also featured a new interpretation of the cease-fire. 533 In the book, which was set
during the Second World War, Laurie O’Dell, the main character, discusses the moral
implications of the war with a conscientious objector who is performing alternative service at
the home where O’Dell is convalescing. The C.O. explains that, while he believes that there
529
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may be times when it was right to kill, he is not prepared to be commanded to do so, as he
could not surrender “my moral choice to men I’d never met, about whose moral standards I
knew nothing whatever.” 534 O’Dell responds that there was no way to defeat Nazi Germany,
except by fighting them:
‘in Napoleon’s day if you wanted to cross the Channel in the middle of the war
and talk sensibly to the enemy there was almost nothing to stop you. Even in
1914 they had the Christmas Truce and it very nearly worked. Nowadays we’re
all sealed off in airtight cans and there’s nothing between war and surrender.
You can’t convert a propaganda machine.’ 535
In the view presented in Renault’s novel, therefore, the truce had been transformed from an
unexpected holiday for the soldiers involved into something that had “very nearly worked,”
that is, had almost ended the war. The accounts of the truce, one factual and one fictional, put
forward by Haldane and Renault during the 1950s, are two sides of the same coin, underlining
the myth that the armistice was frowned upon by the authorities, who saw it as a threat to the
fighting spirit of the troops, but was initiated by front-line soldiers out of a desire to stop a
senseless war.
In Fox under my Cloak, a semi-autobiographical account of his war-time experiences in
the “London Highlanders,” Henry Williamson, the author of the well-known children’s book
Tarka the Otter, also discussed the holiday armistice. 536 For Williamson, who joined the 1/5th
London Rifles in January 1914, and was with the battalion on the Western front on the first
Christmas of the war, “the fraternisation on Christmas Eve 1914 made a deep and lasting
impression upon his life, in which he saw that war was created by greed, misplaced zeal and
bigotry.” 537 These attitudes are reflected in his account of the truce, which was published forty
years after the event had taken place. In Williamson’s version, Phillip Maddison, his alter-ego,
takes advantage of the peaceful conditions on 25 December 1914 to visit his cousin Willie in
the London Rifles. Arriving at their trenches, Maddison locates his relative, who was “full of
the strangeness of Christmas Day” and excitedly tells Phillip that
‘(i)t’s most extraordinary, but the Germans think exactly about the war as we
do! They can’t lose, they say, because God is on their side. And they say they
are fighting for civilization, just as we are! Surely, if all the Germans and all the
English knew this, at home, then this ghastly war would end. If we started to
walk back, and they did, too, it would be over!’ 538
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The only reason the war continued, Willie argues, is that “‘the people at home do not know
the whole truth,’” and that, if the British public realized that the Germans were “‘just the
same’” and “‘fighting with identical ideas to drive them on,’” they would see that the whole
conflict was pointless, and it would end immediately. 539 In the novel, the truce lasts until New
Year’s Eve, when the Saxons send over a note stating “that a staff-inspection was taking place
at midnight along the Corps front; the ‘automatic pistolen’ would be fired in accordance with
orders; but they would be fired high.” 540 The Germans keep their word, and the truce only
ends, according to Williamson, when the “Saxon Corps left; Prussians took over the front,” and
sniping and shelling resumes. 541
In Williamson’s account, the truce ended by German instigation, when Prussians were
put in the line and the enemy was ordered to fire, rather than by orders from the British
generals, but otherwise this version of events presaged the story of the truce that would later
dominate the anti-war narrative in the 1960s and afterwards. Oddly, Williamson, who in the
1930s became a passionate fascist who believed that “Hitler was essentially a good man who
wanted only to build a new and better Germany,” and in 1969 described the Second World
War as “a war of the moneylenders’ revenge,” has been accepted as reliable on the subject of
the Christmas truce and the senselessness of the war, and his version of events has been
assumed, in the years since Fox under my Cloak was published, to embody a representative
view. 542
The truce described in Arthur Cook’s A Soldier’s War, which appeared two years after
the Williamson account, is one that would be much more recognizable to the men involved. 543
Cook, who served with the 1st Somerset Light Infantry, kept a diary of his time as an N.C.O.
during the war, which was published shortly after his death. 544 While Cook’s unit appeared to
have been out of the line on Christmas Day itself, his entry for 28 December indicated that,
when relieving another company at the front on that day, they discovered that “during the last
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few days our men and the enemy have been fraternizing and exchanging souvenirs,” and that
socializing with the Germans continued to occur. 545 The Somersets, Cook wrote, were “making
the most of this fantastic situation while it lasts, for it enables us to bring in our dead who
have been lying about since December 19 and give them a proper burial.” 546 As Cook made
very clear in his diary, the truce was never expected to be anything but temporary, as
demonstrated by the way the Somersets were “making the most” of the armistice while it
lasted.
Echoing Cook’s general attitudes towards the conflict, two histories of the First World
War, also published during the 1950s, revealed that for many historians the interpretations of
the inter-war years still persisted. Arthur Booth, in The True Book about the First World War,
placed the blame for the war firmly on the Germans, particularly the Kaiser, whom he
characterized as a cowardly bully. 547 Booth believed that the Germans had hoped the French
would reject their pre-war conditions, as “France’s abject compliance with the demand would
have been the last thing the German generals wanted; what they really wanted was war,” and
defended the British decision to go to war over the violation of Belgian neutrality. 548 A year
later, in The Great War, Cyril Falls scornfully dismissed the German theory “that their superior
skill, endurance, and bravery” had only been overcome by the superior equipment and arms of
the Allied Forces, “as if there were something unfair, even treacherous and contemptible, in
waging a war of materiel.” 549 In fact, he maintained, it was the “easy armistice terms” that had
largely contributed to the myth that the German army was never defeated. 550 The war, Falls
claimed, while “looked on with particular abhorrence by many people because it seems to
them to have been waged with unexampled clumsiness and to stand for a picture of slaughter
and misery,” was, in his opinion, the inspiration for “an enthusiasm for ideals, of
determination and bravery in face of death and suffering, of generosity of spirit.” 551
As these examples demonstrate, even in the late 1950s, when fictional representations
of the truce underscored an altered narrative of the war, some historians still argued that the
First World War had been justified and defended the generals who had led the fight and the
treaty that had ended it. However, this narrative tide was about to turn: whereas previously,
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the argument that the war had been futile and senseless had been left mainly to novelists,
poets, journalists and polemicists, it was now about to be taken up wholesale by historians.
An examination of memoirs, fiction, histories and polemics published between 1920 and 1959
demonstrate that no single view dominated the narrative of the First World War. Veterans
and non-veterans alike maintained diverse opinions on the conflict, and works published
during this four-decade period are mainly notable for the way they contributed to the
fragmentation of the public discourse of the war. The 1960s, however, would soon put an end
to this diversity, and establish a narrative of the war that would drive out the dissenting voices
that had contributed to and enriched the debate from the end of the conflict through its
fiftieth anniversary.
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Chapter Eight
“The famous Christmas truce”:
The Christmas Truce from 1960-1969

And after that the story went underground for many years. The play and film Oh! What A
Lovely War revived it - to some disbelief - in the 60s.
Malcolm Brown
“When Peace Broke Out”
The Guardian, 23 December 2001
The whole world knew that on Christmas Day, 1914, there was some fraternizing at one part of
the line, and even an attempt at a game of football.
George Coppard
With a machine gun to Cambrai: the tale of a young
Tommy in Kitchener’s army 1914-1918 (1969)

“Prisoners of national pride, shackled together by treaty obligations,” was how the
warring powers were described in 1964’s The Great War, a 26-part documentary created by the
BBC to mark the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the First World War. 552
Described by Emma Hanna, author of The Great War on the Small Screen, as “a televised
monument to the dead of 1914-18,” the program reinforced many now-familiar elements of the
conflict’s discourse: the “accidental” war, the mud, the horror, the shell-shocked soldiers and
the ignorant home front. 553 The producers of the series were not above manipulating images –
and the audience – in an attempt to increase the impact of their interpretation of the conflict:
the photograph of a war-weary soldier, sitting among a pile of corpses the audience assumes
he will soon join, which was used during the opening credits to every episode, was in fact a
composite of two photographs, one of the soldier and another of dead bodies in a trench. 554
The series argued that in 1914 the nations of Europe, while all fearful of war, were also
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suffering from the tensions of various internal and external conflicts, including class war at
home, mistrust between nations, competition for colonies and resentment over previous wars.
The assassinations at Sarajevo were the spark that ignited this volatile mix, and with the
deaths of Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the “peace of Europe died with them.” 555
The title of the second episode, “for such a stupid reason, too,” sums up the series’
approach towards the entire war. 556 The documentary seized upon the theme of the conflict’s
inevitability, an increasingly prevalent historiographical theory, noting that France, as well as
Germany and Russia, had been trapped into war by their respective mobilization plans. By
establishing that all the combatant nations could now be considered victims of the strategies
of their own hide-bound military leadership, the series furthered the idea that Europe
inadvertently became entangled in a conflict that none of those involved had wanted. The
third episode, for example, asserted that the “invasion of Belgium was demanded by the
Schlieffen plan,” but failed to observe that the strategy had been endorsed and set into motion
by German leaders who had chosen to follow it, instead presenting the offensive against
Belgium as a course of action which the passive (and presumably unwilling) Germans had no
choice but to follow. 557 The fifth instalment in the series, entitled “this business may last a long
time,” which dealt with the winter of 1914 and the stalemate on the Western front, featured
the Christmas armistice at the end of the episode. The truce participant selected to discuss the
event was Henry Williamson, whose 1955 novel Fox Under my Cloak had contained such a long
and detailed description of the cease-fire. 558
The 1964 interview with Williamson, from which documentary footage was chosen,
repeated many of the elements that he earlier featured in his fictional work, but on this
occasion it was Williamson himself, rather than his fictitious cousin Willie, who made the
supposedly momentous discovery that the Germans also believed that their cause was sacred.
When the dead soldiers between the lines were buried on Christmas Day, Williamson
professed to be astonished that the Germans wrote the words “for Vaderland and Vriehied, for
fatherland and freedom” on the crosses marking the graves of their comrades. “I said to a
German,” Williamson recalled, “excuse me, but how can you be fighting for freedom, you
555
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started the war, and we are fighting for freedom. And he said, excuse me, English comrade, but
we are fighting for freedom, for our country.” Williamson claimed that he followed this
exchange with the question of how the German could write “Here rest in God,” on the grave of
a dead soldier, and the German replied, “Oh, yes, God is on our side,” which Williamson stated
he countered with the assertion that “he is on our side.” Williamson maintained that the
declaration made by the German “was a tremendous shock, to think that these chaps, who
were like ourselves, whom we liked and who felt about the war as we did,” actually believed, as
did the British, that God supported their cause, and further claimed that, following this
exchange, the German genially said “well, English comrade, do not let us quarrel on Christmas
Day,” providing a final footnote of absurdity to a frankly incredible account of the truce.
The 1964 documentary featured Williamson as the only veteran discussing the
Christmas cease-fire and thereby tacitly endorsed his account of it, but in fact Williamson’s
version of the event was contradicted by a letter he wrote home to his mother on 26 December
1914, which was re-printed in the Daily Express shortly afterwards. 559 In it, he briefly described
the truce, noting that it took place in a limited area, “only for about a mile or two on either
side of us (so far as we know),” demonstrating that the event Williamson would later claim
exposed the universal feelings of both sides was perceived the time to be quite constricted.
Williamson had also recorded the reluctance of both sides to venture forth into No-Man’sLand, noting that, despite the Germans and British soldiers calling to each other to come out,
everyone stayed put “for some time, neither fully trusting the other, until, after much
promising to ‘play the game’ a bold Tommy crept out & stood between the trenches, &
immediately a Saxon came to meet him.” Fraternization then ensued, and cigars and cigarettes
were exchanged and smoked. Williamson then wrote that there was a joint burial service,
“over the dead Germans who perished in the ‘last attack that was repulsed’ against us. The
Germans put ‘For Fatherland & Freedom’ on the cross. They obviously think their cause is a
just one.” 560
Williamson’s contemporaneous account illustrates that he was making an assumption
about the enemy troops’ motives rather than reporting their statements, and makes it unlikely
that Williamson engaged in the conversation with a German soldier that he would describe
fifty years later at such length in Fox Under My Cloak and the interview for The Great War. In
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fact, G. Selby Grigg, from the same battalion as Williamson, also reported in a letter home the
burial of a German solder on 25 December 1914 in No-Man’s-Land, but without Williamson’s
embellishments, instead noting that a German officer read a short prayer service over the
unknown soldier’s gave before the Germans “stuck a bit of wood over the grave – no name on
it only ‘Fur Vaterland and Freheit’ (for Fatherland and Freedom).” 561 Grigg’s version of events
makes it seem even unlikelier that Williamson would have, under those solemn
circumstances, started an argument with a German soldier about their respective motivations
for fighting the war. It seems likely, therefore, that Williamson invented these details long
after the fact to underscore his contention that the Christmas truce had been a turning point
in his attitude towards the First World War. As his daughter-in-law Anne dutifully observed
years later in A Patriot’s Progress: Henry Williamson and the First World War, the
“fraternization over Christmas 1914 made a deep and lasting impression” on Williamson, who
“could never forget what he learned that day - that the German soldiers thought as deeply and
sincerely as the English that they were fighting for God and their country.” 562
However, even if Williamson had indeed had the epiphany on 25 December 1914 that
he later described, even without the benefit of a conversation with a sympathetic German
soldier, it had no immediate impact on his view of the war. On 10 January 1915, for example, he
wrote to his father that while it would take a long time to “drive (the Germans) across
Belgium,” he hoped that “when the floods and ooze had subsided somewhat, we can, by
superior numbers, drive their flanks right back and so force their whole line to withdraw.” 563
However, Williamson added more optimistically, while the British line was temporarily stalemated, “the French are doing splendidly in Alsace” - hardly the views of someone who, two
weeks earlier, had suddenly seen the war as a farce and exercise in futility.
This attitude was not confined to the immediate post-truce period. On 19 May 1917,
Williamson, now a transport officer and safely out of the front line, wrote his mother that
“(t)hey say our dead out there are being stripped by him (the enemy), he wants the clothes for
making paper!!! Still when we do finally get in those trenches – we will call it even!!” 564 In fact,
the only reference he made in later correspondence to the eye-opening events of 25 December
was in a 9 January 1915 letter, again to his mother, when he noted that “my letter of Xmas Day
has appeared in the Daily Express” and suggesting that another letter about the war that he
was sending, of “general” rather than “personal” interest, be instead submitted to the Daily
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Mail, which Williamson thought “a better paper.” 565 Additionally, although Williamson
credited the fraternization itself with enabling the two sides to understand that the soldiers
opposite them were men like themselves, with the same feelings for their country and as little
enjoyment of mud, cold, rats and trenches as they had, this opinion ran counter to the
attitudes of many of the other soldiers involved in the truce, who cited this realization as a
reason for fraternization rather than a result of it.
A letter written by Williamson later in the decade to a fellow veteran reveals his
attitude towards the truce in an even more troubling context. “I was also in the Xmas Day
truce,” Williams observed, “and spoke to many Germans, marveling (I was only a little older
than you) that they believed in the righteousness of their cause, that God was on their side,
and they could not lose the war.” 566 In fact, Williamson added that he had always found the
Germans to be “chivalrous opponents,” who helped the British wounded on the Somme and at
Passchendaele, “while the lying papers and Home Front Fireside Lancers kept up the hatred”
even through to “the wicked Treaty of Versailles, and War 2.” Apparently, in Williamson’s
view, the Second World War could also be credited to anti-German propaganda, whereas the
truce revealed the true feelings of the soldiers on both sides. 567
Williamson’s memories, being strongly informed by both his fascist ideology and his
later opposition to the conflict, made the inclusion of his solitary and unchallenged version of
the truce troubling in the context of a series purporting to be the definitive word on the First
World War. At the same time, as illustrated by his later letter to a fellow soldier, Williamson
made no secret of his support for fascism and the impact this had on his opinion of the war.
The producers of The Great War should have been aware of this and, at minimum, balanced
his account of the truce with that of a veteran who had no particular axe to grind, but
Williamson’s version of the armistice doubtless proved too useful at underlining the series’
main theme, that of the pointlessness of the war. The final episode in the series, “and we were
young,” ended with images of young, happy soldiers marching off to war and crowds cheering
them on, ironically contrasted with photographs of piles of dead bodies and blighted
landscapes. 568 The Great War helped establish, as Todman later notes, “the myth that it had
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been a uniquely horrific experience for those who had fought it,” underlined by Henry
Williamson’s embellished version of the truce, which sought to demonstrate that the soldiers
from both sides had the same motivations and had been trapped into a conflict by their
uncaring governments.
It was through such distortions, errors and inventions – many of them well-meaning,
as there is no doubt that Williamson later developed a hatred of the war which informed his
views retrospectively, but others, such as the juxtaposed photograph, which deliberately
encouraged false conclusions – that the series promoted a certain narrative of the First World
War. The Great War, however, did not invent this view of the conflict, which until the
approach of the fiftieth anniversary of 1914 had been just one strand in a diverse discourse
encompassing a spectrum of opinions about the war, from disillusionment through fullthroated patriotic support. The five years before the documentary aired had seen a dramatic
shift in the discourse of the First World War, with the imposition of a single narrative that
exaggerated contemporaneous disenchantment with the conflict, and even more damningly,
blamed it for causing the Second World War.
With the trauma of the later war still fresh in the mind of the British public –
rationing, for example, only ended in 1954, and damaged and destroyed buildings remained in
many large cities, serving as a reminder of the extensive German bombing campaigns – the
First World War was now, in retrospect, available to serve as a handy scapegoat. During the
1960s, the diminishing numbers of First World War veterans helped contribute to an altered
narrative; as Todman observes, as the conflict “receded into history and personal contact with
it has been lost, it has become increasingly easy to judge the war as futile.” 569 The impact of
this phenomenon would be exacerbated by the fact that the least likely survivors, fifty years
on, would be those who were already serving in the army at the time that war was declared,
the professional soldiers who were the vast majority of the fighting force in Flanders during
1914 through 1915, and who fought in the war because it was their job to do so. These troops
had, as Janet Watson would later describe, “(an) attitude of work, rather than service,” which
made their outlook on the war very different from those who volunteered after war was
declared, and their proportionately larger loss from the body of veterans who were now
solicited for their views on the war surely helped contribute to this more monolithic
narrative. 570
In the early 1960s, however, this altered discourse was driven primarily by historians
re-evaluating the First World War. James Cameron, whose work 1914 appeared in 1959,
569
570

Todman, The Great War, pg. 121.
Watson, Fighting Different Wars, pg. 26.

162

anticipated the very different view of the conflict that was to prevail in the 1960s. 571 Enlarging
upon Liddell Hart’s notion of inevitability, Cameron discussed the “machine” of war, which
“seemed to be grinding irresistibly on,” and which “(n)othing could stop.” 572 Cameron further
explored many of the themes that were to later dominate the conflict’s discourse, including
the censorship that made truths about the war “contraband,” and the gulf between the homefront and the war-weary soldier. 573 Most soldiers, he claimed, endured trench warfare mutely,
with only a few able to express “their personal trauma…in writing and verse, endeavouring to
exercise something of the horror by expressing it horribly, defining with irony the pain of fear
and despair.” 574
Cameron ended his history with the story of the Christmas truce, the better to
emphasize its role as a counterpoint to the senseless slaughter that had not only preceded it,
but also was to follow it for four long years afterwards. He described the “curious
phenomenon” of lit Christmas trees on the German trenches, and the sound of the Germans
singing hymns. Cameron accurately noted that French as well as British soldiers “saw the
Germans climb one by one from their trenches, singing and signalling as they sang,” and then
also “climbed out, leaving their rifles behind them.” The enemies, comprising “many hundreds
of men, many thousands of men,” met in No-Man’s-Land, “exchanging gifts and sharing
cigarettes.” This, Cameron proclaimed, “was the Christmas truce that the Commands had
refused; it was the subject of many disciplinary measures and was never to happen again.” 575
Although he placed the main fraternization on Christmas Eve, Cameron’s version of the truce
was mainly accurate, and even included French soldiers, which was a rare acknowledgement
at the time. However, the context in which he situated the cease-fire, as an ironic challenge to
the war itself, and his report of the “many disciplinary measures” that followed it, established
the narrative elements that were soon to overtake the story of the truce and become
increasingly accepted as hard facts.
Alan Clark, who, according to his biographer Ion Trewin, worried that Cameron’s 1914
would narrow the market for his own work, need not have been concerned: The Donkeys, his
famous 1961 critique of the blundering British First World War generals who destroyed “the
old professional army of the United Kingdom that always won the last battle,” saw an
unparalleled success that enshrined the belief in the British military leadership’s general
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incompetence, previously only hinted at in histories by Liddell Hart and Cruttwell, in the
public’s mind. In this work, Alan Clark paid tribute to the members of the original B.E.F., who,
he claimed, “have no memorial” in print. 576 Because of the ineptitude of their military
leadership, he claimed, these soldiers were repeatedly “called upon to do the impossible, and
in the end they were all killed. It was as simple as that.” 577 It was certainly not as simple as
that: while the British army was asked to undertake battle campaigns in 1914 and 1915 that
turned out very badly indeed, the histories, memoirs and fiction written by ex-soldiers such as
Montague, Sassoon, Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, Wylly, Sassoon and Henriques demonstrate that
numerous veterans of the first year of the war survived the conflict, and what is more,
published many memorials to their fallen comrades. Clark, however, was never one to let facts
stand in the way of a good story, and his account of the 1915 campaigns suffered from a
number of easily disproven and rather dubious assertions, all in pursuit of a pre-determined
moral. 578
While Clark’s discussion of the Christmas truce provided a fairly correct summary of
the armistice itself, his assertions about its aftermath echoed those presented by Cameron. He
first noted that, on 25 December, “there had been no firing, and in many sectors the troops
had climbed out of their trenches and, meeting in No-Man’s-Land, had talked and exchanged
gifts,” but then stated categorically that the cease-fire “met with the strongest disapproval at
G.H.Q. and the officers responsible were punished.” As a result, the truce “did not happen
again.” 579 Clark’s account, which was sourced to French’s memoir 1914, interpreted the B.E.F.
leader’s claim that, after hearing about the truce, he “called the local commanders to strict
account, which resulted in a great deal of trouble,” to mean that those who participated in the
truce were disciplined and therefore suffered for their actions. This supposition, advanced by
Clark as fact, underlined his contention that the “lion” soldiers, the “flower of the richest, most
powerful, nation on earth,” who brought to the trenches “decency, regularity, a Christian
upbringing, a concept of chivalry; over-riding faith in the inevitably triumph of right over
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wrong,” were betrayed by their idiotic leadership, who punished them for displaying civility
towards their enemies. 580
Although the complementary opinions of Cameron and Clark on both the war and the
1914 cease-fire echo some of the judgments offered about both events during the previous four
decades, the difference in their influence on the prevailing narrative can be attributed, at least
in part, to the lack of prominent opposing viewpoints. During the inter-war years, the
characterization of the conflict as senseless and futile, an interpretation promoted by Graves,
Sassoon, Gibbs and Montague, was offset by the histories written by Carey and Scott, Liddell
Hart and Cruttwell, all of whom, while they had specific criticisms of the way it had been
fought, believed that the war had been a necessary evil. In the 1960s, however, Clark’s
interpretation of the war, as exemplified by his main theme, that of the idiotic leadership
sacrificing its brave soldiers in a useless cause, went largely unchallenged. As a result, in the
aftermath of the more worthwhile Second World War, the First World War became, in
retrospect, the “bad” war, a chronicle of stupidity, horror and waste, fought for no good
reason, prosecuted incompetently, and only worthy of remembrance as a lesson in how the
old-fashioned British values of patriotism and loyalty had betrayed an entire generation, who
had been slaughtered in service to beliefs that were now exposed as naive.
Within the new growing consensus, the First World War, now blamed for causing the
Second World War, became retrospectively established as a futile and senseless conflict – an
interpretation that was widely assumed to date back to 1918 and the end of the war. As a result
of this narrative shift, the truce was pressed into the service of the new view of the war, and
suddenly became transformed from its previous characterization as a minor curiosity in the
history of the war, evidence of the lack of rancor on the part of British troops towards their
enemies, and a cherished memory for the soldiers involved. The new “Christmas Truce,”
repurposed to serve as proof that on 25 December 1914, the troops who fought in the First
World War had rebelled not only against the politicians and generals who were sacrificing
their lives for nothing, but also against the war itself, would have been largely unrecognizable
to the soldiers who had participated in it, but voices of the few soldiers left who had actually
joined in the holiday armistice were either drowned out in the clamor of the truce’s
reimagined story, or were swayed by the new analysis of the war, leaving their memories
vulnerable to a view that had great narrative appeal.
The power of the new discourse of the war to drive out previous interpretations can be
demonstrated by Cameron’s contention that the armistice “was the subject of many
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disciplinary measures” and Clark’s insistence that the officers who allowed their men to
participate in the Christmas truce suffered for it. In spite of the statement made by French in
his memoir (which never, it should be noted, specified that the officers involved were
disciplined), the myth that soldiers who joined in the truce were punished for their actions
was noticeably absent from the majority of works written between 1920 and 1960 that
discussed the impromptu armistice. Although there were a few exceptions to this rule,
including Haldane’s 1948 autobiography, the histories, memoirs and regimental histories
published during the First World War and in the first four decades after it ended did not
mention any penalties imposed after the truce. In the 1960s, however, the idea that strict and
immediate disciplinary action was taken against those who joined in the armistice became a
now-standard feature of the Christmas truce, asserted without proof and accepted without
question. Similarly, the myth that the First World War had been an exercise in futility, as
presented in the new popular histories by Clark, A.J.P Taylor and Barbara Tuchman, was
reinforced through the media of television and film, which offered similar conclusions about
the war. As a result, historians who advanced what were previously more mainstream
positions on the conflict, such as John Terraine or Llewellyn Woodward, found their works
sidelined in the rush to pass judgment on the now ironically titled “lovely war” of Joan
Littlewood and Richard Attenborough.
The main myth-maker of the First World War was the acclaimed historian A.J.P.
Taylor, described by his biographer Chris Wrigley as “respected by much of the academic
history profession as well as appealing to a wide readership beyond the bounds of higher
education.” 581 His works on both the First and Second World Wars gained an especially large
readership in Britain and beyond, and his influence on the public discourse of the war cannot
be over-estimated. His 1961 publication, The Origins of the Second World War, pronounced a
fatal judgment upon the earlier conflict, noting that “(t)he first war explains the second and, in
fact, caused it, in so far as one event causes another.” 582 The Germans, Taylor went on to
explain, “fought specifically in the second World war to reverse the verdict of the first and
destroy the settlement which followed it,” but the subtleties of this argument were lost in the
easier-to-grasp concept that the First World War and, more specifically, the war-guilt clause
and reparations imposed upon Germany through the Treaty of Versailles were to blame for the
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Second World War. 583 This was a charge from which the reputation of the 1914-1918 war was
never to recover, and the following year, Barbara Tuchman’s equally successful The Guns of
August underlined these ideas by wildly inflating the human cost of the conflict. “Sucking up
lives at a rate of 5,000 and sometimes 50,000 a day,” Tuchman wrote, “absorbing munitions,
energy, money, brains, and trained men, the Western Front ate up Allied war resources and
predetermined the failure of back-door efforts like that of the Dardanelles which might
otherwise have shortened the war.” 584 It is the horrifying figure of 5,000 to 50,000 killed each
day (which, even at the minimal rate, would have meant 8,250,000 killed on the Western front
alone between 1914 and 1918 – and Tuchman’s figures just apply to Allied casualties) that is
remembered, rather than her point that the focus on that front doomed other efforts that
might have ended the conflict earlier. 585
The timing of these histories underlines another influence that contributed to the
formation of the narrative of the First World War during the early 1960s, which was the post1945 development of a state of hostility and a permanent warlike footing that dominated
relations between the Soviet bloc and the West. As Gary Sheffield notes, A.J.P. Taylor’s history
of the First World War was “coloured by contemporary concerns about the Cold War,” and the
popularity of such anti-nuclear weapons organizations as the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (CND), of which Taylor was one of the most famous members, was part of the
impetus behind the shift in attitude towards the 1914-1918 conflict, which was seen by many as
emblematic of the way minor tensions between countries could easily escalate and result in
horrendous unintentional consequences. 586 If it was now difficult to justify involvement in the
First World War, or even understand why it had started, what guarantee was there that
another, and even deadlier, war could be prevented? In the frigid depths of the Cold War, with
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis underlining the ease with which the world could slip into a third
global war, it became harder for those defending involvement in the First World War to be
heard above the voices appealing for an end to all wars before those wars could doom
humanity to extinction.
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Taylor’s History of the First World War, published the year after the standoff between
Soviet Russia and the United States, and described by Niall Ferguson as “the most successful of
all books on the subject,” presented a narrative of both the war and the armistice that was
clearly informed by Taylor’s political beliefs. 587 In this history, Taylor enlarged upon his earlier
work, advancing his famous theory that the war had begun because no one knew how to stop
it. “Nowhere,” he declared, “was there conscious determination to provoke a war.” 588 The
European powers, all of whom were committed to a belief in attack as “the only effective
means of modern war,” had enormous armies which, once set in motion, could not be
stopped. 589 “The plans for mobilizing these millions rested on railways; and railway timetables
cannot be improvised,” Taylor argued. “Once started, the wagons and carriages must roll
remorselessly and inevitably forward to their predestined goal.” 590 As a result, the First World
War was “imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables.” 591 This argument, so
appealing in its simplicity, must be read carefully in line with Taylor’s political beliefs and
ideas that, as expressed in his book on the origins of the Second World War, “(h)uman
blunders…usually do more to shape history than human wickedness.” 592 His fears that “human
blunders” might lead to the destruction of the world in the 1960s through the inadvertent
triggering of nuclear war surely influenced his attempt to recast the First World War as an
accident of history.
Taylor, in an effort to underline the futility of the conflict, also emphasized the lack of
articulated aims of First World War combatants, contending that “(n)o one asked what the
war was about. The Germans had started the war in order to win; the Allies fought so as not to
lose.”593 As discussed in countless histories, the Germans had a definite aim in promulgating
war: their goal was to dominate central and western Europe, both economically and militarily.
Although Taylor may have dismissed it in 1963 as an unworthy motivation, the Allies’ fight
“not to lose” was a valid war aim, since against German aggression, it was either fight or
capitulate, leaving Belgium, northern France and parts of central and eastern Europe under
German control, with the victors no doubt eyeing Britain hungrily across the Channel.
As a result of his attitude towards the war, Taylor’s take on the truce opted for full-out
irony, claiming that on Christmas Day 1914, while those at home in Britain and Germany were
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beseeching the Almighty to destroy their respective enemies, those “enemies” were at the
same time cheerfully “exchanging cigarettes” and displaying a complete lack of rancor towards
each other in No-Man’s-Land. 594 A similar view of both the war and the truce was promoted
by the Theatre Workshop’s Oh What a Lovely War, which premiered in Stratford in 1963. The
drama enlarged upon many of the themes already introduced by Cameron, Taylor and Clark,
singling out for particular censure the ignorant home front and the shockingly inept
generals. 595 Although the play’s script and direction are credited to the Theatre Workshop as a
whole, Joan Littlewood is generally recognized as the guiding spirit behind its production.
Littlewood saw the theatre as a vehicle for social awareness, with a focus on class struggle. 596
This outlook is very apparent in the play, where the uncaring, upper-class commanders
of the British military are presented as being more concerned with their own standing in
society and their personal reputations than the safety and security of their men.” 597 Oh What a
Lovely War portrays the common soldiers as working-class puppets (“pierrots”) enticed
unknowingly into the “War Game” and therefore at the mercy of the insensitive monsters who
send them off to be “senselessly killed.” 598 The new narrative of the Christmas truce fit
seamlessly into this version of the war, and its “pathos,” according to the plot notes, “comes
through the way in which the two sides of the conflict are depicted as vulnerable human
beings. Despite the carnage around them, the German and British soldiers are able to share
their cultural differences and basic similarities through the singing of their songs and the
exchange of gifts.” 599 Unfortunately, the relevant scene, in keeping with the Theatre
Workshop’s emphasis on improvisation, contained little information that would promote this
idea of the truce, and consisted mostly of “Tommies” and “Jerries” shouting inanities across at
each other in working-class dialect: “Right, Jerry, ‘ere’s your Christmas box,” being a
representative sample of dialogue. 600
Although the public was very taken with the Theatre Workshop’s view of the war, as
demonstrated by the play receiving a premiere in London’s West End later in 1963, the Times’
theatre critic was somewhat less impressed, dismissing its “familiar view of the 1914-18 War as
594

Taylor, First World War, pp. 39.
Theatre Workshop, Oh What a Lovely War, edited and introduced by Joan Littlewood, with
commentary and notes by Steve Lewis (1965; repr. London: Methuen Publishing Ltd, 2006).
596
Theatre Workshop, Oh What a Lovely War, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
597
Theatre Workshop, Oh What a Lovely War, pg. xlii.
598
Theatre Workshop, Oh What a Lovely War, pg. xxxi. It should be noted that the soldiers of the First
World War, so idealized by those writing between 1920 and 1939, were in this drama reduced to puppets
manipulated by the monstrous generals and politicians, demonstrating that Littlewood and the
company saw the British troops as stand-ins for an exploited class rather than as individuals making
conscious choices.
599
Theatre Workshop, Oh What a Lovely War, pg. xli.
600
Theatre Workshop, Oh What a Lovely War, pg. 32.
595

169

a criminally wasteful adventure in which the stoic courage of the common soldiers was
equaled only by the sanctimonious incompetence of their commanders and the blind jingoism
of the civilians.” 601 The impact of the works of Clark, Taylor and Tuchman can be deduced
from this offhand criticism, which assumed that the British public was not only wellacquainted with this view of the war, but by 1963 found it hardly earth-shattering. The review,
however, did praise the production for its “presentation of the men at the front,” noting that it
took “an unusually well-developed sense of truth to stage a scene like the Christmas night
fraternization in no-man’s-land without becoming mawkish.”602 This quite casual mention of
the holiday armistice, tossed in at the end of the review, demonstrates just how well known
the event was to the British public in 1963: the Times’ theatre reviewer, without even using the
word “truce,” assumed that the newspapers’ readers needed no explanation to understand this
reference. The myth propagated by Brown and Seaton that the Christmas truce was “brought
to general notice” by its inclusion in Oh What a Lovely War is contradicted by this review,
which appeared the day after the play premiered in Stratford and certainly assumed the Times’
readers general familiarity with the event. 603
Fifty years after it had begun, the battle-lines of the First World War narrative were
clearly drawn: either historians must now try to defend a conflict increasingly seen as
senseless and futile, or line up on the side of Clark, Taylor and Tuchman, opponents of a war
that had served no purpose except to create another one, while at the same time becoming a
byword for unparalleled horror and misery. The reinforcement of this monolithic discourse
through such popular works as The Great War or Oh What a Lovely War gave the impression
that no other interpretation of the conflict was permissible, or even possible. In this
atmosphere, a sensible history such as Llewellyn Woodward’s 1967 work, Great Britain and the
War of 1914-1918, was unlikely to garner much attention. Woodward himself explained why,
noting the recent popularity of what he called “‘donkey’ studies,” which reduced the war to a
few simplified facts: that “the armies were badly led; the officers were unsuited to their tasks;
(and) they ordered the maiming and killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent soldiers in
unnecessary military combat.” 604
Woodward, in fact, agreed that many “commanders just did not know how to set about
their task of winning the war,” for which he blamed the British, “who had allowed this
dangerous state of affairs” and therefore “could not complain of the consequences when they
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had left the fate of a generation in the hands of a custom-bound clique.” 605 At the same time,
he took exception to many of the elements of the recent war narrative, noting that it was
erroneous to state that “the war broke out accidentally, and that given more time and greater
skill in negotiation it would have been avoided,” as the Germans, “if they had been willing to
do so, could have called off the war before it was too late.” 606 Similarly, John Terraine’s 1964
defense of Haig’s leadership in The Western Front: 1914-1918, and his complementary argument
that there had been no alternative to the terrible losses on the Western front made no dent on
the now overriding narrative of the war, which had overtaken the words of those who still
disagreed with this viewpoint. 607
Surprisingly, a very different take on both the First World War and the holiday
armistice was presented by a man famous for his disillusionment with the 1914-1918 conflict. In
Robert Graves’ work of fiction “Christmas Truce,” which was published in 1962, a soldier’s
grandson tries to persuade his grandfather to join him in a protest march against nuclear
weapons, citing the 1914 armistice, in which the veteran had participated, as proof that it was
possible for enemies to see reason and get along with each other. “‘And you didn’t hate the
Germans even when you were fighting them – in spite of the newspapers,’” the grandson
argues. “‘What about the Christmas Truce?’” 608 According to his grandfather, however, the
younger man had “drawn the wrong conclusions and didn’t want to be put straight.” 609 To
correct his misconceptions, the grandfather again tells the story of the truce, with all its
standard details, including a football match where the Germans “beat us 3-2” and follows it up
with the tale of the second (albeit very muted) armistice in 1915. 610
Graves added some surprising touches to his story, including a complimentary word
for French, who “commanded the B.E.F. at the time – decent old stick. Said afterwards that if
he’d been consulted about the truce, he’d have agreed for chivalrous reasons.” 611 Graves, more
predictably, also had the fictitious colonel who allows his troops to participate in the 1915
cease-fire punished for his actions, as Colquhoun was, except that Graves imposed a more
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severe penalty on the unfortunate officer. Haig, Graves wrote, ordered a court martial on
Colonel Pomeroy, who “wasn’t shot” for permitting fraternization, “but got a severe reprimand
and lost five years’ seniority.” 612 The lesson to be learned from the two separate cease-fires, the
veteran argued, was that if another Christmas truce could not have happened “‘in the days
when ‘mankind’, as you call ‘em, was still a little bit civilized, tell me, what can you hope for
now?’”613 The soldier concluded that the threat of nuclear attack was the only thing that
prevented a third world war, and therefore refused to march against “the bomb.”
While Clark saw the truce as a rebellion by the brave front-line soldiers against the
uncaring and inept military leadership, the character in Graves’ story viewed it as proof that
pessimism about the future of mankind was justified. However, to complicate this conclusion,
another veteran of the holiday armistice who is present during the conversation tells the
soldier’s grandson that “‘(t)here wasn’t any feeling of hate between the individuals composing
the opposite armies. The hate was all whipped up by the newspapers.’” 614 After the grandfather
presents his opinion on the significance of the truce, the second soldier advises the grandson
that he shouldn’t “be talked out of your beliefs” and should make up his own mind on the
subject. 615 This double narration, which provided conflicting views of the cease-fire, enabled
Graves to avoid providing an unambiguous moral to the story of the Christmas truce, which
was consistent with his refusal, in his autobiography, to credit the event to rebellion against
the war he despised.
In the year after this story appeared, Peter Jackson, another veteran of the fighting,
recorded a version of the truce that, like Graves’ fiction, avoided the simplifications of Clark
and Taylor, but also included certain inaccuracies. Jackson described seeing heads emerge
from the German trenches on 24 December, which “was a very dangerous thing to do,” but as
the British were aware there were Bavarians opposite, they held their fire. 616 An officer came
forward, and Jackson ventured out to meet him. Jackson had instructed his men not to fire,
but if the Germans started, then they should respond “with everything you’ve got.” The two
officers arranged to bury the “one hundred and fifty bodies of our men who had died in an
abortive attack about ten days previously,” and Jackson was able to collect their identity disks.
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One of the British soldiers got in an argument with a German, and Jackson had to order him
back to the trench to prevent him starting “another private war.” The two sides began
fraternizing enthusiastically, but “things were getting a bit out of hand,” and Jackson was
beginning to feel “a bit sorry that I had ever started this fraternization business,” when he
suggested a football match as a distraction. The two sides played what Jackson described as “a
melee” rather than a proper match, which only ended only when the football was impaled on
barbed wire.
The truce continued the next day, with more fraternization, and Jackson conversed
with a German officer, who told him that they expected to be in London in two months.
Jackson’s reply to this was the mild statement that “if you get past this bit of trench that’s as
far as you are going to get.” After two days’ of truce c0nditions, the Bavarian battalion was
replaced during the night by a Prussian one, and the war started again with “very heavy fire”
from the German trenches. That, according to Jackson, “concluded the unofficial armistice
which was frowned upon by all the brass-hats afterwards, they said of course it should never
have happened but it did happen.” Jackson’s truce, although recalled 49 years after the event,
displayed many of the elements of more contemporaneous accounts: an obvious ambivalence
towards the enemy, the idea that the “brass-hats” did not approve of the armistice, although
no record of any punishments, a football kick-about that actually seems to have happened,
and the inaccurate but contemporaneously expressed theory that troops were shuffled in the
front line in order to restart the war. However, Jackson did not credit any of the soldiers
involved with a desire to end the war, noting, in fact that tensions existed between the two
sides even in the midst of fraternization, and that, in this case, a football match between the
Germans and British was seen not as a shared pastime, but as a way to distract from an
argument between two enemy soldiers.
The diaries of Brigadier General James Jack, edited by John Terraine, which were
published in the same year that the BBC series The Great War was aired, also demonstrate
how opinions that contradicted the now predominant narrative of the war and truce were
sidelined. 617 Jack, whose battalion, the 1st Cameronians, did not participate in the armistice,
only heard of it afterwards. Remarking on the “extraordinary” stories being told about the
“unofficial Christmas truce,” including a football match between the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders and the Saxons, Jack noted on 13 January 1915 that these incidents seemed to
suggest that, “except in the temper of battle or some great grievance, educated men have no
desire to kill one another; and that were it not for aggressive National Policies, or the fear of
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them by others, war between civilized peoples would seldom take place.” 618 Jack’s level-headed
view of the war, which men were fighting because of a “great grievance” rather than because
they had demonized the other side, stood in direct contrast to Williamson’s disingenuousness,
but in the end it was Williamson’s interpretation of the truce that was granted a national
audience, while Jack’s diary was no doubt perceived as just another war memoir. 619
George Coppard, whose memoir With a Machine Gun to Cambrai was edited and
printed by the Imperial War Museum in 1969, also swam against the tide of the emerging First
World War and Christmas truce discourse. 620 Coppard, who joined the 6th Queen’s Royal West
Surrey at the start of the war, did not leave for France until May 1915, when “Kitchener’s Army”
arrived at the Western Front. 23 December 1915 found Coppard’s battalion in trenches at
Festubert, and the wet conditions and continuous rifle fire took their toll on the soldiers, who
were immediately “reduced to a state of exasperating misery and discomfort.” 621 Although the
troops they relieved told the new battalion that “they could hear the Germans talking,”
Coppard did not feel any sense of fellowship with the enemy whose trenches were so close,
and who were suffering under the same terrible conditions. 622
On being reminded of orders that “there was not to be any fraternizing with the enemy
on Christmas Day,” Coppard scotched all notions that the British were in the mood for
another truce. “Speaking for my companions and myself,” he observed, “I can categorically
state that we were in no mood for any joviality with Jerry. In fact, after what we had been
through since Loos, we hated his bloody guts. We were bent on his destruction at each and
every opportunity for all the miseries and privations which were our lot.” 623 In spite of the
collective memories of the Christmas 1914 truce, which he acknowledged was widely known,
and the speculation among front line troops in 1915 as to “whether a repeat performance would
develop,” Coppard’s anger at the enemy would not have permitted any recurrence of
fraternization or even friendly conversation across No-Man’s-Land. 624 In fact, on noticing that
the Germans were being careless about exposing themselves on Christmas night, Coppard and
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his mates reckoned that “if we were careful we could bag a good many of them,” and opened
fire on an enemy wiring party. 625
The bitterness of the continued war, which Coppard believed made the “age-old
sentiment of ‘goodwill to all men’” untenable, had destroyed the desire for further truces on
the part of at least one soldier. 626 In the same year, J. Davey, a former sapper with the Royal
Engineers who was in the front line in late December 1914, reported a relatively happy memory
of the truce. 627 Observing that the Imperial War Museum might “care for” information on the
“1914 Christmas ‘truce,’” Davey recalled the “fancy lights” on the enemy’s trenches, the
Germans “constantly calling out to this effect – ‘Don’t fire, its Christmas; if you don’t, we
won’t; come over and talk,’” and the subsequent fraternization in No-Man’s-Land. Davey
received a field post card with a Christmas greeting from a German soldier, which he had kept
ever since, recalled that the truce “went on for 2 ½ days,” and mentioned a hare chased by the
two sides. “In all, this was a most interesting experience,” Davey concluded mildly, “and quite
true in spite of many times such happenings have been discredited.”
The transformation during the 1960s of the narrative of both the war and the truce
culminated in the film production, Oh! What a Lovely War, directed by Richard
Attenborough. 628 While the film was neither an unqualified critical or commercial success – it
won some BAFTAs and a Golden Globe for “Best English-Language Foreign Film,” but few
other accolades – Oh! What a Lovely War did present a cinematic vision that echoed the antiwar narrative of the earlier stage production and similarly resonated with the public. 629 In it,
the Christmas truce received a more thorough treatment than it had in the 1963 play. In fact,
the film’s dramatization of the event, which lasted for over six minutes of screen time, drew
heavily upon Hulse’s letter about the cease-fire, but, quite predictably, it did not include any
instructions from headquarters not to fire upon German soldiers.
Considering that Richard Attenborough’s directorial style has always leaned towards
the heavy-handedly explicit, the Christmas truce scene in Oh! What a Lovely War is
surprisingly understated. Although one German soldier asks, rather discretely, whether the
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British are “sick of the war,” the majority of the dialogue between the enemy troops remains
superficial. The two sides joke mildly with each other, as when a British soldier, saying
goodbye to his German counterpart after a shared drink of schnapps, offhandedly tells him
“thanks very much mate, and give my love to the Kaiser.” The movie is famous for its final
scenes, which feature a soldier who was killed just before 11 a.m. on November 11, 1918 walking
through a room where the leaders of the belligerent nations are drawing up the peace treaty;
they all look up as the soldier walks by, but he remains invisible to them. The soldier then
goes out into a field, where he lays down with other victims of the war while his mother, wife
and daughter picnic nearby. At the end, the daughter asks the soldier’s wife what her father
did in the war, while the camera pulls back to show 16,000 white crosses planted evenly in a
field and in the background a male chorus sings “And when they ask us, and they’re certainly
going to ask us/The reason why we didn’t win the Croix de Guerre/Oh, we’ll never tell them,
oh, we’ll never tell them/There was a front, but damned if we knew where.”
After a period in the 1940s and early 1950s when both the First World War and the
Christmas truce were mostly ignored in favor of the all-encompassing Second World War, the
earlier conflict returned to the public’s attention with the approach of the fiftieth anniversary
of August 1914. The renewed notice that the First World War received could not avoid taking
into account the knowledge of the second war, making it clear that the Great War had not, in
fact, achieved its stated purpose as “the war to end all wars.”630 Not only had the 1914-1918
conflict conspicuously failed to bring an end to all disputes between nations, it now, in the
light of the destruction and misery caused by the Second World War, became blamed for the
new war that had engulfed the world, caused an estimated fifty-five million or more deaths,
and spawned the seemingly endless Cold War, with its threat of nuclear annihilation. The last
major campaign on the Western Front, The Great War maintained, “resulted finally in the
collapse of German resistance and deep humiliation for them in the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles: a humiliation which festered in the German psyche until a man called Adolf Hitler
promised an end…,” closely tying the two conflicts and blaming the first for the second. 631
Burdened with this now deadly reputation, it was difficult for the First World War to
maintain the pre-Second World War image that many held of it as a conflict that had
occurred, quite rationally, in response to German aggression and that had been fought by
leaders trying their best under miserable conditions. Additionally, the pre-1939 beliefs that the
soldiers who had served in the 1914-1918 war had understood the reasons for their service and
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the terrible sacrifices they had been asked to make were also held to be myths. With the
ascent in the early 1960s of the waste and futility narrative of the war, which drew on elements
that had previously been a part, but not a whole, of the inter-war discourse, other views of the
war were driven to the sidelines and largely negated.
With this shift, the Christmas truce, which previously had been noted by historians as
an interesting but insignificant event, started to move to the forefront of the narrative, and
became increasingly used as proof of the anti-war feelings of the soldiers who had participated
in the armistice. This use of the armistice was most blatant in the works of Clark and Taylor,
and further emphasized in the stage and screen versions of Oh What a Lovely War. In a sense,
the truce, which had formerly been part of the general narrative of the First World War, now
became a crucial element in the chronicle of resistance to that same war. At the same time,
while histories of the war that subscribed to the senseless and futile view of the conflict began
to feature the truce more prominently, those historians, such as Woodward and Terraine, who
took a more ‘old-fashioned’ attitude towards the war, a view in which the truce had never
been more than a minor curiosity, ignored the event altogether.
The focus on such flawed versions of the armistice as Williamson’s account, or the
insistence by Clark and Cameron that truce participants were punished for joining in the
event, ensured that the myths of the truce, propagated by those who promoted an altered view
of the war, became enshrined as fact during this decade. While the evidence from the 1960s
demonstrates that many of the legends about the 1914 armistice, such as the falsehood that the
public was largely unaware of it before The Great War and Oh What a Lovely War brought it
into national prominence, were untrue, the sources from that period, such as Taylor’s work on
the First World War, also illustrate how those myths became the new reality of the truce. As
the decade that saw the great transformation of the British public’s view of the conflict ended,
the Christmas truce was steadily moving from its old place in the war narrative to its new
position as a crucial part of the anti-war narrative.
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Chapter Nine
“The Legendary Christmas Truce”:
The First World War, the Christmas Truce and Social History, 1970-1989

Against that background, the Christmas Truce of 1914 stands out with particular poignancy.
While there had been truces for religious and secular holidays since classical times, the events
that occurred 90 years ago this week were a spontaneous, unled cry for sanity before the
advent of industrialized war.
-David Brown
“Remembering a Victory for Human Kindness: WWI’s Puzzling, Poignant Christmas Truce”
Washington Post, 25 December 2004
I don’t think we discussed the war itself all that much, and I am quite sure that we didn’t say
that this is silly, let’s chuck it altogether, neither side talked like that at all, we all remained
absolutely loyal to our side, and it was perfectly clear to both sides that at the end of the day
we would go back and we would start killing each other again.
-M.L. Walkinton
Queen’s Westminster Rifles
1985 Interview

The Christmas truce, as described by Malcolm Brown in the documentary Peace in No
Man’s Land, “is an event still vivid in the minds of those who took part in it.” 632 The program,
which aired on Christmas Eve, 1981, was the first work that focused on the holiday armistice as
a separate event rather than just one episode in the larger story of the war. The thirty-five
minute broadcast consisted almost entirely of excerpts taken from interviews with three
veterans who had participated in the 1914 cease-fire. By featuring these soldiers so prominently
in his presentation of the truce, Brown’s documentary followed the trend begun in the 1960s
and pursued more thoroughly in the two following decades, in which accounts of the war,
particularly histories and documentaries, were re-fashioned as part of a rejection of “top-down
history.” That approach to studying the past, where politicians and generals were perceived as
the guiding forces behind events and therefore the only figures worth examining in depth, was
largely swept aside by the innovative focus of social history. This new historiography
emphasized a broader understanding of the past through the study of social groups and the
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expansion of historical enquiry to “cultures and mentalities,” or as E.P. Thompson labelled it,
“history from below.” 633
This method of examining the past, however, was not entirely novel, particularly
within the context of a contemporaneous understanding of the First World War. As early as
1914, the British press, by featuring letters written home from those on active service (and the
closer to the front line the better) as a vital component of the conflict’s narrative, had
conditioned the public to believe that the words of ordinary soldiers provided the ‘truth’ about
the war. The spate of memoirs in the late 1920s and early 1930s written by literate and
articulate junior officers who made the horrors of life in the trenches of the Western front
vivid and accessible to interested readers not only contributed to the diversity of the inter-war
discourse, but also favored front-line experience over political or military analysis as a way of
understanding the 1914-1918 conflict. In other words, while historians could argue over the
causes of the war, or condemn the way it was fought, only a soldier who had served in the
front lines could say what it was like to actually fight in that war. The emphasis on eye-witness
accounts undoubtedly influenced the interpretation of the First World War in the 1960s and
beyond, when the narrative of the conflict was increasingly constructed based on what the
common soldier felt and remembered.
Peace in No Man’s Land used the words of three ‘average’ Tommies, H.G.R. Williams,
an N.C.O. with the 1/5th London Rifles at Christmas 1914, Albert Moren, a private serving with
the 2nd Queen’s Royal West Surreys, and Leslie Walkinton of the 1st Queen’s Westminster
Rifles, to offer a version of the truce that underlined the futility of the First World War. Brown
chose carefully from the recollections of these three soldiers to present a Christmas truce that
tallied with the version that had become standard by the end of the 1960s, featuring a belief
that if the cease-fire had continued the conflict would have come to a halt, enraged generals
threatening courts-martial, battalions pulled out of the front line as punishment for
fraternizing and the troops’ humanity eventually becoming “lost in bigger battles.” In their
interviews, which are available in their entirety in the Imperial War Museum archives, the
veterans who appeared in the documentary recalled the carol singing on Christmas Eve and
fraternization the next day, when the two sides exchanged chocolate and cigars. However,
Peace in No Man’s Land disregarded certain other aspects of the armistice that the men
discussed when questioned about the event, demonstrating how an account purportedly based
upon the direct recollections of participating soldiers – those in a position to speak the truth
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about the Christmas truce – could, with careful editing, instead support a narrative that
contradicted many of their recollections.
Williams, who served in the 1/5th London Rifles, Henry Williamson’s battalion, noted
in his interview that the truce may have been frowned upon in other areas, but that “in our
sector, anyway as far as brigade was concerned, it was encouraged because it enabled us to
work on the trenches and also on various fortifications which were being built in Plugstreet
Wood without the nuisance of continual machine gun fire.” 634 That subversive statement
however, did not make it to the final broadcast. Moren’s contention that the armistice “could
have finished the war” was, predictably, highlighted in the first few minutes of the
documentary, while Williams’ claim that the cease-fire had not changed his attitude towards
the enemy – that “while the truce was on it was quite all right to be friendly with them, but
directly it ended, we just went back to normal, I say, being shot at or shooting at the other
people was one of the jobs we were out there to do and we sort of took it as a matter of course”
- was left out. 635 In fact, as Williams noted casually, “even on the next day after the truce if
there had been an attack or anything we should quite cheerfully have shot them and they
would have quite cheerfully shot us I am sure of that”- yet another statement that failed to
make the final cut. 636 Walkinton was even willing to consider the truce from the point of view
of the leadership as well as the front-line soldiers, observing that the troops’ fraternizing was
“very unpopular with the staff of course, but it would have been a bit awkward for the generals
if the Germans had decided to attack.” 637 This sort of even-handedness was, however, also not
deemed suitable for inclusion in Brown’s “twentieth-century story of temporary peace.”
As demonstrated by the interview he conducted with Moren, in addition to choosing
the statements that most apt to prove his overall point about the truce and the war, Brown
also was at times determined to guide the veterans in the direction he wanted the armistice’s
interpretation to flow. The following exchange between the two illustrates the attempts Brown
made to shape Moren’s version of the truce:
Moren: Only one German could speak English. He had wife and two children,
he was thinking of them, he was definitely against it.
Brown: and he said it was a silly war, didn’t he.
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Moren: Yes, he was definitely against it.
Brown: I’d like you to go on if you would, and you said to me, I’d like you to say
this, that if it had gone on much longer – if you could tell us –
Moren: Well, there was a mention of that, they said it was a silly war, and I felt
in the way he spoke that it could have gone on, it could have stopped all
fighting. You know, the feeling of the troops that day, felt on both sides. Could
have gone into, sort of, you know, we don’t want to fight any more. Who
knows?
Brown: If it had been left to the troopsMoren: I think so, yes, because the conditions were appalling, water, mud, poor
rations and no laundry, no cleaning up or anything.
Brown: And none of you really wanted to fight?
Moren: I don’t think so, no. 638
Such pointed questioning and later selectivity in editing the veterans’ memories for the
broadcast resulted in a documentary that appeared to be based on recollections of the soldiers
involved, but in fact led to a deliberately-moulded narrative of the truce that ignored many of
those memories. When the armistice was presented by a participant as an opportunity that
could have ended the war, Brown included the statement in the broadcast, while the words of
a soldier who enjoyed the fraternization but saw no special significance in it were not
included.
Brown’s views on the truce, as expressed in Peace in No Man’s Land, built upon his 1978
history, Tommy Goes to War, in which he argues that “(t)he Tommy had no wish to be in
trenches killing Germans and he realized that the German almost certainly had no wish to be
in trenches killing Tommies.” 639 What Brown describes as the “camaraderie of the victim” led
to “the legendary Christmas truce of 1914,” the only time “when British and German soldiers
saw each other face to face and did not fire.” 640 Brown takes this approach towards the
armistice even further in Christmas Truce, his 1984 collaboration with Shirley Seaton, a work
which demonstrates how easily contradictory or dissenting memories can be used to shape a
discourse. In that work, Brown and Seaton, drawing heavily upon contemporaneous letters
and diary entries about the truce, as well as a number of interviews conducted between 1960
and 1980, readily acknowledge that the vast majority of the misconceptions that have arisen in
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connection with the holiday armistice – many of which were promoted by Brown to begin
with - are untrue. They note, for example, that officers as well as privates and common
soldiers took part, that uncensored letters about it were published in the newspapers, and that
“(c)ontemporary histories of the war included it as a matter of course.” 641 Brown and Seaton
further concede that the “special circumstances” of the new type of warfare contributed to the
atmosphere that allowed the truce to happen, that burial of the dead was an important part of
many cease-fires, that there was no armistice in many parts of the line, and that many highranking officers, while not “conniving at fraternization,” used the “lull to improve what all
commanders knew were very inadequate lines of defence.” 642 They disclose the fact that no
battalions were taken out of line and that no punishments were handed down as a result of
the truce, although they make as much hay out of Ian Colquhoun’s court martial as possible.
Brown and Seaton even admit that the truce could not possibly have ended the fighting,
acknowledging that “(t)here was no chance that this could have happened.” 643
Even while conceding that it was “a relatively obscure event,” however, the authors
continue to insist upon the truce’s real and lasting importance. 644 “But what gives it greater
historical interest and significance,” Brown and Seaton argue forcibly, “is that it happened so
soon after a violent explosion of nationalist hatred, the result – and the intention – of which
was to inspire the peoples at war with a loathing and contempt for their opponents.”645 As a
result, the Christmas truce - according to these two historians – negated the initial outbreak of
blind antipathy that accompanied the start of the war, and therefore continues to serve as a
source of inspiration. In fact, as Brown wrote in the preface to the 1999 edition of the book,
the 1914 armistice “can genuinely be seen as a precursor, a portent indeed, of the spirit of
reconciliation now powerfully abroad as one century ends and a new age begins.” 646 As Brown
and Seaton declare, “while it would be easy to dismiss the events of that far-off Christmas as
little more than a candle in the darkness,” they in fact “offer a light where no light might have
been, and are thus a source of encouragement and hope that should not be overlooked and
forgotten, rather acknowledged and, indeed, celebrated.” 647
In spite of having access to, and citing as sources, the contemporaneous accounts of
such truce participants as R.J. Armes, Edward Hulse, Wilbert Spencer, and Lt.-Col. FisherRowe, all of whom strongly contradicted the inferences offered at the end of their history,
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Brown and Seaton resolutely refuse to view the holiday cease-fire as anything other than the
“candle in the darkness” that illuminates the moral of their work. 648 As with Brown’s
documentary Peace in No Man’s Land, the interviews conducted for the book were carefully
screened to avoid memories that contradicted this monolithic narrative of the truce. Brown,
for example, spoke with another veteran for Christmas Truce, Ernie Williams of the 6th
Cheshires, but got little from him in the way of the now-preferred story of the cease-fire.
When asked to explain the truce, Williams, although stating that he thought the conflict was
“crackers actually,” believed that “we had a sense of duty and loyalty to our country and they
would have the same idea, and they were fighting for their own country, or thought they
were.” As a result, he had no issue with the Germans themselves, but still thought it important
to win the war. For inclusion in their work on the truce, however, Brown and Seaton preferred
to quote Williams on the subject of a football game, during which he noted that “(t)here was
no sort of ill-will between us,” rather than his desire to support his country by fighting the war
in which it had engaged. 649
Brown’s various attempts to force the discourse of the truce into the pattern of the
now-standardized narrative of the First World War, in which the soldiers had become the
war’s victims and fraternization a manifestation of their fellow feeling for the enemy troops,
were at least ostensibly based upon the recollections of the veterans themselves, a
historiographical methodology which was now considered essential to the authenticity of any
history or documentary about the conflict. The interest, therefore, in interviewing and
collecting memoirs from soldiers who had served in the First World War arose not only from
the realization that it would be wise to get their recollections down on tape or in print while
they were still alive, but also as part of the growing interest in social and cultural history, and
the need to draw conclusions about the war from the views of the men who had taken part in
it. As a result, the focus in works about the First World War written after the 1960s now
shifted to those who had experienced the conflict first-hand, moving the spotlight from the
politicians and generals who had directed the war to front-line soldiers or junior officers. Paul
Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory exemplified the new approach, in which the
words of those who had served in and written about the war were adopted not only as the
“truth” about the war, but also as the only valid way to understand what had actually
happened between 1914 and 1918. For Fussell, soldiers’ recollections of the conflict were the
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sole point of view through which the war could be correctly perceived. As Leonard Smith, in
his critique of this work, points out, “‘(m)emory’ is a wonderfully unproblematic and selfevident concept in Fussell’s book. Memory always seems a clear window on the nature of
reality, one opened by the hand of the war writer.” 650 Through an examination of the works,
generally fictional, written by soldiers about their experiences in the First World War, and an
accompanying assumption that they were the most accurate possible representation of that
war, Fussell argues that memory is history, because only these soldiers could accurately
convey what the First World War was like, and knowing what the war was like was the only
possible way to understand it.
This is a point of view that has informed the narrative of the First World War ever
since Fussell first articulated it. Although previously the memoirs and poetry of soldiers such
as Graves, Owen, Sassoon and Blunden were considered an important part of the war’s
discourse, they were never taken to be the literal truth about the war, and were always offset
by histories and other writings that provided more of an overview of the conflict. Fussell,
however, strikes no such balance. He is a professor of English rather than an historian, and as
a result often relies upon sources that were not completely accurate and points of view that
were far from universal. Fussell, for example, discusses the “prewar summer,” which “was the
most idyllic for many years,” during which Sassoon played cricket, Graves walked in the Welch
mountains, and urbanites enjoyed “splendid evening parties, as well as a superb season for
concerts, theatre, and the Russian ballet,” without further noting that this was hardly the
representative experience of ordinary soldiers, who far outnumbered these privileged few and
whose experiences of both peace and war were often very different. 651 Most importantly,
Fussell, while acknowledging that the works he used to support his argument were
fictionalized and generally written well after the war ended, does not appear to question their
validity as genuine and reliable artifacts. In fact, the poems and novels from which Fussell so
liberally quotes were mostly intended to convey general “truths” about the First World War,
and more largely the experience of fighting in a war itself, but were not necessarily meant to
be directly representational.
As a result of this selectivity in the use of primary sources, Fussell has no trouble
making his case. Because the soldiers whose works he has examines saw only senseless
massacre and horror in the war, he concludes that “the German and British are not enemies;
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the enemy of both is the War.”652 Consequently, the Christmas truce, which according to
Fussell “outraged” the military leadership, is taken as proof that the soldiers’ adversaries were
not on the other side of No-Man’s-Land, but were instead their own leadership sitting behind
the lines directing the troops’ movements with callous disregard for the lives they threw away.
Fussell even stretches this moral to the following year, 1915, when repeating an anecdote
related by Stephen Graham in the post-war polemic The Challenge of the Dead regarding a 6th
Black Watch sergeant, who was shot “when he went forward in violation of orders to fraternize
with the enemy on Christmas Day,” although this anecdote is fiction rather than fact, as the 6th
Black Watch were not in line on 25 December 1915, and in addition sustained no casualties
during that entire month. 653
As Fussell notes in the preface to his work, by focusing on “places and situations where
literary tradition and real life notably transect,” he tries to understand “the simultaneous and
reciprocal process by which life feeds materials to literature while literature returns the favor
by conferring forms upon life.” 654 Taking the anti-war literature written by an articulate and
disaffected group of junior officers and extrapolating those attitudes to all involved in the
conflict, as well as using that literature to define soldiers’ experiences in the First World War
in general, Fussell permanently shaped the narrative of that conflict, underlining the belief
that it was, as Graves put it, “wicked nonsense.” The Christmas truce, with its murderous
leaders and rebellious and victimized soldiers, provides Fussell with further proof that the war
could be comprehended through the ideas and actions of the men involved rather than the
views of their leadership.
The problem with this approach to the analysis of the First World War is that memory,
while it can convey some of the emotions felt at the time, is far from “wonderfully
unproblematic and self-evident.” In fact, at the same time that veterans were being lionized as
the best source of truth about the war and probed for every last detail of the conflict, their
recollections often refused to fall into line with the First World War’s prevailing narrative, or
were so influenced by the modern discourse that they too imposed new meanings upon the
truce and the war. Interviews with soldiers who had been in the front lines in Flanders in 1914
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demonstrate how problematic memories could be in trying to determine what happened
during Christmas of that year. 655 For example, R.G. Garrod, a soldier with the 20th Hussars
during the First World War, wrote sceptically about the truce in the early 1970s, observing
that “(a)lthough it was said that on Christmas Day there was an unofficial armistice, I myself
have never met a man who took part in it.” 656
However, Garrod’s assertion that he had never known anyone who participated in a
truce actually demonstrates how the previous decade had informed not only the narrative of
the First World War, but also that of the armistice itself, as he then went on to describe his
experiences in the front lines of Flanders on 25 December 1914, when “some Germans exposed
themselves and a few of our chaps did the same, each side called out “Happy Christmas” to
each other and although no order was given, no firing took place.” Nevertheless, since on that
day “certainly no one went across to actually meet the enemy,” Garrod did not understand
that he had indeed taken part in the Christmas truce, the event that had now become so
famous. While Gilbert Smith, who served with the 1st Queen’s Royal West Surreys, did recall
participating in the truce, during which British soldiers who had died during the 18 December
attack were buried, he observed very little fraternization on that day, except when “some men
did go over to the German wire but they kept on their side and received cigarettes from our
fellows.” 657
A. Self, who served with the 2nd West Yorks, also discussed the truce in his privately
printed memoir A Gunner at a Ring Side Seat. 658 Self’s armistice consisted mainly of a ceasefire to bury the bodies in No-Man’s-Land. “You have read all sorts of stories, ciggarettes,
football etc; on what has been termed the ‘Armistice’,” Self wrote, but “here are the facts in my
sector, this was at Bois Grenier, South of Armentiers.” He described the burial of an “L/Sgt.
Friend,” who had been killed during the German counter-attack on 19 December, “in a grave
about four yards behind our front line.” The burial took place “in full view of the German front
line – no mourners – no chaplain – just myself, a shallow grave, and a small wooden cross.”
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Once Self had finished burying his friend, he “jumped down into our trench thankful that Fritz
had kept faith to the truce.” For the rest of Christmas, the two sides faced “each other in the
muddy trenches” in the “uncanny” quiet of the cease-fire. Philip Neame, who served in the
Royal Engineers, described a similarly low-key event when he was interviewed in 1974 about
his memories of the conflict. 659 Prompted by the interviewer, who referred to the armistice as
“one of the most publicized events of the winter,” Neame recalled that, on the front to which
he was posted, “there was a complete cease-fire, and I would remember walking along our own
front line, but there was no fraternizing, both our own infantry stood up and strolled about
and the Germans did too, but they never got together and talked to each other at all.”
These four veterans, all of whom were recalling their war experiences more than fifty
years after the conflict had ended, referred to their respective armistices very off-handedly,
clearly believing that the cease-fires and mutually agreed burials in which they participated on
Christmas Day 1914 did not in fact constitute a ‘real’ truce, as the event had been described in
so many histories and documentaries, and therefore weren’t worth dwelling upon. Only a
decade after the narrative of futility had generally overtaken the discourse of the First World
War, and the armistice had become a prime example of the soldiers’ rebellion against that
hated war, the belief that participation in the holiday truce meant fraternization with the
enemy, a game of football, and threats from authorities to resume the war, as well as a cynical
attitude towards the conflict, had become so ingrained that even veterans who had been in the
front lines at Christmas 1914 could not recognize their individual armistices as part of the
legendary ‘Christmas Truce’ about which they had heard so much.
Veterans of the conflict were also often confronted with the prejudices of their
interviewers, which in turn complicated their struggles to provide unbiased memories of the
war and the truce. In 1975, Colin Wilson, a former Grenadier Guard, was interviewed about the
armistice by someone who made no bones about being an impartial questioner. 660 The
interviewer began the session with the statement that “what interests me very much is that
episode of the First World War where you had that wonderful thing on Christmas Day, it’s the
most wonderful thing of the war, and I’ve never had the privilege of meeting anybody who was
actually there.” Thus encouraged to claim a part in “the most wonderful thing of the war,”
Wilson related a truce in which he had participated that took place on 31 rather than 25
December, when the Germans sang in their trenches and the two sides called back and forth
to each other, and then met and fraternized in No-Man’s-Land. Wilson recalled how other
659

th

Philip Neame, 15 Field Company Royal Engineers, Interview, 1974, Imperial War Museum Collection
No. 48.
660
st
Colin Wilson, 1 Grenadier Guards, Interview, 1975, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 9083.

187

battalions in the 7th Division, particularly the Scots Guards and Gordon Highlanders, also
socialized with the enemy, and that the “truce was then spreading, by then the general
headquarters behind the line had found out that there was a truce on, and that didn’t go down
very well, so they issued an order that fraternization was to cease forthwith and any German
soldiers that were seen to leave their trenches for the purpose of fraternizing was to be fired
on” - in spite of the fact that the Grenadier Guards were part of the 7th Division of IV Corps,
whose leadership was so tolerant of the truce. 661 Wilson was also ready to fall in with the bynow expected moral of the armistice: when the interviewer concluded that the “episode of that
unofficial truce was to me the most wonderful thing that occurred in the whole war and I wish
it could have stopped the whole war,” Wilson most cooperatively responded that “(i)f it had
been left to the soldiers it probably would.”
In the same year that Wilson’s memories of the truce were recorded, J. H. Acton, who
was with the 1st Devons on the Western fr0nt from 1914 through 1918, described a much more
conventional truce in his interview. 662 Acton noted that the armistice lasted seven days, during
which time there was no shooting, and that it had begun on Christmas Eve, when “during the
night Jerry came out and shouted, it’s Christmas, if you no shoot we no shoot.” One of the
Devons’ soldiers went over to the German trenches, exchanged cigarettes with the Germans,
and agreed to a cease-fire for the rest of the night. “Well, the next day at daylight on our right
and on our left everyone was out in no-man’s-land,” Acton continued, describing the burial of
two British soldiers who had been killed the night before when the Devons rotated into the
trenches, and how “a German officer read the burial service.” When questioned about the
repercussions of the truce, however, Acton obviously did not react as the interviewer expected.
“I believe the higher authorities frowned upon it afterwards, didn’t they?” the interviewer
asked. Acton shrugged off the question. “Ours didn’t,” he said. “I believe it went right along
the line after, right along the line.”663
As revealed by the recollections of these six veterans, whose written and oral memoirs
were produced before 1976, the influence of the 1960s on the discourse of both the truce and
the war itself is plain: four former soldiers more or less disavowed their cease-fires, as they did
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not fit into the pattern of the now-familiar narrative of Germans and British meeting in NoMan’s-Land, and one soldier spoke about observing fraternization that he heard about rather
than saw, while only one veteran discussed a truce that echoed the more contemporaneous
versions of the event, with a leadership that did not seem too bothered by the impromptu
armistice. This pattern of inconsistencies in soldiers’ recollections of the event was to continue
throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the memories of First World War veterans were probed for
the details of their service in the conflict.
Major Leslie Walkinton, who served with the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, was another
soldier that, like Acton, did not buy into the general shift in the truce’s narrative, as illustrated
in his 1979 interview about his experiences in the war (featured in the Brown documentary),
which was followed by the 1980 publication of his autobiography, Twice in a Lifetime. 664 In
that memoir, Walkinton noted that although officers had previously warned the soldiers
“against fraternization with the enemy,” Christmas was viewed by the troops as “a time of
friendship and goodwill towards men.” In any case, the veteran observed, the British soldiers
had “nothing against” the enemy: “He shot at us and we shot at him – but that’s what we were
there for after all.” 665 He discussed previous cases of friendly behavior, such as the two sides
singing to each other from their respective trenches, and remarks shouted across No-Man’sLand “generally with less venom in them than a couple of London cabbies after a mild
collision.”666 Walkinton even speculated that, during the war’s first winter, the two sides
might have been able to settle things between them:
How furious the politicians and generals would have been if the John Citizens
of both sides had got together and said ‘This is too damn silly, and it’s very cold
and uncomfortable. Let’s chuck it and go home.’ But no! I must admit that it is
an impossible dream. If the plain man had tried to start a pow-wow some wellmeaning lance-corporal, anxious for a second stripe, would have opened fire
and spoilt everything. Also, another admission (this is my disillusioned postwar self writing this), in 1914, as one of the keenest and most patriotic (what
pitfalls there are for the world in patriotism!) of very young soldiers, I would
have spoilt it myself. 667
664

Walkinton, Interview, 1979, and M. L. Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime (London: Samson Books, 1980).
The foreword of Walkinton’s memoir, written by Field-Marshall Lord Harding of Petherton, who
served, like Walkinton, in a London Territorial Infantry Brigade, unapologetically placed the First and
Second World Wars on the same footing. “I often wonder if the younger generations of today realise
how different, how difficult, how restricted and how tedious our lives would be,” Lord Harding wrote,
“if the author and his comrades and mine had not been prepared to face all the fearfulness of war rather
than submit to the Kaiser and his Prussians or Hitler and the Nazis.” (Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime,
pg. 7)
665
As Walkinton noted, “(e)very fighting soldier also discovered, if he stayed long enough to get the
front line mentality well into him, that the further from the line the greater the hatred of the enemy. At
the real front he was called Fritz or Brother Boche.” (Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 43).
666
Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 43.
667
Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pp. 43-44.

189

Walkinton then described how the British and Germans gradually eased into a truce in
the evening of 24 December, with a cease-fire arranged for a twenty-four hour period, singing
on Christmas Eve, and fraternization on Christmas Day, with the exchange of food and drink.
Walkint0n recalled speaking with a German who “seemed a very pleasant sort of lad.” The two
soldiers “tried talking war, but I found he was full of newspaper propaganda, as I suppose I
was, and we couldn’t make any sense of it.”668 The Queen’s Westminster Rifles’ truce ended, as
Walkinton noted, when they were relieved by the 1st Royal Fusiliers, but he retained the same
attitude towards the Germans throughout the war and even afterwards, noting that it was
important “to realize that much of the devotion and bravery of the common soldiers was
definitely the result of love of friends rather than hatred of the enemy’s soldiers.” 669
Walkinton’s recognition that his views on the enemy had changed since the early part of the
war was more than most veterans would admit to, although he did not necessarily
acknowledge that many of those changes owed much to the post-war narrative.
John Wedderburn-Maxwell, whose contemporaneous account of the truce had been
published in the Daily Telegraph in January 1915, was also interviewed in 1985 about his
memories of the war. 670 Although at the time he had written that the truce was “the most
extraordinary show” and “(i)f we don’t take care there will be a permanent peace without
generals or COs having any say in the matter,” his attitude seventy years later proved quite
resistant to the modern narrative. “How did you feel about firing at these people to whom you
had been talking to?” the interviewer asked him, to which the veteran responded fairly
casually: “Oh, that was our job.” Wedderburn-Maxwell also maintained that the truce had no
“psychological effect on us, no, I think it was just an event” and that he did not believe that
anyone was punished for fraternizing with the enemy. In fact, the only negative thing
Wedderburn-Maxwell could recall about the Christmas armistice was that he got “an awful
dressing down” for the publication of his letter in the newspaper, as his superior officer was
able to figure out who wrote it from the details involved, and was most annoyed with
Wedderburn-Maxwell “for daring to write to the press.”
Major Walkinton, not yet squeezed dry on the subject of the truce, was interviewed
again in 1985, but this time was even more adamant about not falling in with the now668
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prevalent view of the event. While acknowledging that the two sides, during fraternization,
“couldn’t have been friendlier,” he scotched all notions that the cease-fire could have led to
the conflict’s end. 671 In response to a question regarding any disciplinary action taken after the
truce, Walkinton again punctured this myth, noting that there was “(n)one whatever in my
battalion, nothing at all, we were just told, look, you – don’t do this again, we said we
wouldn’t.”672 He summed up the entire experience as a “damn good joke,” that is, a “way of
laughing at one’s superiors,” as they could do nothing to prevent the truce, but in any case
they did not even try: “they had the sense to keep away.”
George Ashurst, who was interviewed in 1987, the same year that his memoir My Bit: A
Lancashire Fusilier at War 1914-1918 was published, discussed the truce in both accounts. 673
Ashurst complained, in his book and the interview, about the “comfortably housed and well
fed ‘Heads’ in the rear” who ordered the British artillery to fire, thus ending the armistice, and
how “a few days afterwards when we got our letters and papers from home we read of the
British public’s horror at their troops actually fraternizing with the horrible German troops.” 674
He was particularly bitter about the “parsons” who “condemned us for such un-British
conduct.” 675 Of course, there is no way to tell what was in any letters Ashurst may have
received after the event, and possibly a friend or relative may have written this, but as noted
earlier, no major newspapers condemned the truce, and in addition, no other soldier
contemporaneously reported receiving communications from home denouncing the
fraternization.
Similarly, C.A.F Drummond, who served as an artillery officer on the Western Front in
1914, wrote in a 1976 memoir that the cease-fire in his area had gone on for a week, “(b)ut of
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course the war was becoming a farce and the high-ups decided that this truce must stop.” 676 A
bombardier with the Royal Field Artillery, Colonel Harold Lewis, when interviewed in 1986,
had a completely different take on the truce: he doubted “whether anything of the nature or
magnitude that had been claimed for it took place at all.” 677 In fact, he thought that, because
of the discipline prevailing in the British and German armies, “the whole thing borders on the
fairy tale and may be classed with the Russian with snow on their boots and the angel of
Mons.”
As Todman aptly notes, “(j)ust because a veteran has said it does not mean that it is
true.” 678 The interviews and memoirs that were recorded or written during the 1970s and
1980s by now-elderly survivors of the First World War demonstrate that some of the soldiers
involved were just as susceptible to the shifting elements of the narrative of the conflict and
the Christmas truce as historians and the general public. There were veterans who believed
that those involved in the armistice had been punished and soldiers who maintained that
British civilians had condemned the truce, while others insisted that the event had never
happened. The focus on the recollections of soldiers during this time illustrates the pitfalls of
histories that emphasize personal narratives and rely upon the recollections of individuals
about events long past. The memories of the war recorded by veterans in these decades
reinforced many myths about the conflict, not least through the pre-conceptions of those who
were interviewing the veterans or selecting the topics on which they spoke. At the same time,
although many of the soldiers’ recollections about their service in the Great War diverged
sharply from the now-conventional narrative, these deviations were glossed over and largely
ignored in the rush to endorse a homogeneous discourse, as the many histories produced
during these decades demonstrated.
John Ellis’ Eye Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I, like Fussell’s work, focuses
on the war as experienced by the soldier in the trenches on the Western Front. 679 Not content
with noting that, “(i)n their letters home, soldiers were usually reticent about describing
conditions as they really were,” Ellis goes on to conclude that this voluntary behaviour led to
an antipathy on the part of the front-line troops to civilians. 680 “As the war progressed,” he
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observes, “this reticence began to express itself as a positive dislike of the home front as a
whole.” 681 Ellis contrasts this with the “definite sense of comradeship that united the whole
army,” which was “doing a task that people at home could not even understand.”682 This
feeling of “common identity” was, however, confined “to the select brotherhood of the
damned who had to suffer all the miseries of trench warfare.” In the ‘us v. them’ camaraderie
of the front lines, “both sides were quite prepared to adopt a policy of live and let live” when
lack of pressure from “higher commands permitted.” 683
Ellis, in Eye-Deep in Hell, notes that the “most famous example of fraternization” came
about at Christmas 1914, when “up and down the whole line, Frenchmen, Germans and
Englishmen spontaneously emerged from their trenches and met in no man’s land where they
exchanged cigarettes, drink, food, photographs and addresses,” and the Lancashire Fusiliers
even played the Saxons at football. 684 Ellis’ account of the armistice quotes an officer of the
London Rifles, who volunteered that he now had “‘a very different opinion of the Germans,’”
and includes the paragraph from Hulse’s letter where he discussed the inherent unlikelihood
of the event, but omits the orders Hulse received from headquarters telling him not to fire
upon the Germans. “But when news of these meetings reached the High Command,” Ellis
continues, “they were utterly appalled at the seeming disintegration of the ‘fighting spirit’.” 685
He also quotes the information from Field Marshal French’s memoir noting how upset he was
when he first heard of the truce, his immediate issuance of orders to prevent its recurrence,
and the “trouble” that resulted for those commanders whose troops had participated in the
event. 686 Ellis, however, does not mention the accompanying passage from 1914 which
expressed French’s regret that he had not endorsed the armistice at the time, thereby
supporting the conventional view of the cease-fire through selective use of participants’ words
to create the impression that the “‘absolutely astonishing’” truce, which changed the mind of
one officer towards the enemy, was suppressed by the army’s leaders.
Alan Lloyd’s The War in the Trenches went even further, observing that any temporary
cease-fires in the trenches were feared by the military leadership, who believed that “lack of
aggression in the proximity of the enemy - a live and let live attitude among the troops – once
condoned might become habitual.” 687 As proof of this, Lloyd maintains that the “fraternization
at Christmas had quickly been condemned by British generals, and a number of the
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participants court-martialed.” 688 As these examples demonstrate, the parts of the armistice’s
history that were inconsistent with the new narrative of the war were gradually being swept
aside in favour of a new discourse that emphasized the punishments meted out to participants
while ignoring the contemporaneous evidence that no such disciplinary measures were
implemented. At the same time, therefore, that historians were so heavily focused on using
soldiers’ contemporaneous documents and memories to present their histories as authentic,
they were busy editing out the parts that did not fit their theories, creating a monolithic
discourse that apparently captured the public imagination and drove out all dissenting views.
Tony Ashworth, in Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System, also
examined the war through the eyes of the front-line soldiers. In this work, Ashworth advanced
the theory that it was the lack of hatred for the other side that enabled men to survive in the
terrible conditions of the trenches. The live and let live system, “a process of reciprocal
exchange among antagonists, where each diminished the other’s risk of death, discomfort and
injury by a deliberate restriction of aggressive activity, but only on condition that the other
requited the restraint,” was, according to Ashworth, “the antithesis of the official kill or be
killed.” He compares the Christmas truce, which he maintains was neither the first nor the last
unofficial armistice on the Western front, “to the sudden surfacing of an iceberg, visible to all
including non-combatants, which for most of the war remained largely submerged, invisible
to all save the participants.” 689 However, for the validity of Ashworth’s argument, which is that
the soldiers in the front lines had worked out their own method of survival in defiance of the
leadership, any visible manifestations of insubordination had to be ruthlessly punished. The
truce, with its lack of subsequent penalties, does not support Ashworth’s theories as well as he
would like, so although he does maintain that the “reaction of high command to these truces
was immediate and negative,” he is at the same time forced to admit that “on the whole (it)
appears to have taken the form of admonishment and warning.” 690
The abbreviated 1915 truce is much better suited to Ashworth’s hypothesis, as orders
had been issued in advance preventing it, and “(t)wo officers of the Scots Guards were court
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martialed; one was acquitted, and the other convicted and reprimanded.” 691 Ashworth,
however, does not mention the quashing of Colquhoun’s reprimand, or the fact that at least
three battalions participated in the 1915 truce, out of which only two junior officers from one
of those battalions were brought up on charges. 692 The 1914 and 1915 Christmas truces, which
were ostensibly well suited to Ashworth’s theory that the soldiers in the trenches on both sides
were keen to defy their commanders by “thwarting” their instructions to fight, did not in fact
lead to the kind of punishments in which he believed such “unofficial and illegal” actions were
supposed to result, requiring more than a bit of manipulation to make these two events fit his
premise. 693
Another important work on the First World War that emerged during this period that
used the truce to prove its point, Modris Eksteins’ Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth
of the Modern Age approached the conflict from an entirely different angle. 694 Although his
view that the war heralded the birth of modernism was not unprecedented, having already
been advanced by Fussell and others, Eksteins further theorized that Germany was, “on the
eve of the war, the foremost representative of innovation and renewal,” while “Britain was in
fact the major conservative power of the fin-de-siecle world.”695 Britain, as a result, was fighting
not only to maintain her “pre-eminence in the world” but also her “entire way of life.” 696 Under
this scenario, Britain’s involvement in the war turned it “from a continental power struggle
into a veritable war of cultures.” 697 For Eksteins, therefore, the First World War was not a fight
for more colonies or a greater place in the sun, but rather a battle for the soul of the world, a
struggle that Germany dominated until the end of 1945.
In Rites of Spring, the Christmas truce therefore represents not the communal feelings
that the British had for their opponents across No-Man’s-Land nor a manifestation of their
hatred of war, but was a stand-in for the conservative British principles for which they were
fighting: “stability and responsibility,” in fact, civilization itself, which “was possible only if one
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played the game according to rules laid down by the time, history, precedent, all of which
amounted to the law.”698 Since for the British the war represented “a struggle to preserve social
values, precisely those values and ideals which the prewar avant-garde had so bitterly
attacked: notions of justice, dignity, civility, restraint, and ‘progress’ governed by a respect for
the law,” participation in the truce embodied those ideals of ‘fair play,’ those “time-honoured
courtesies” whereby “one saluted one’s opponent and paid one’s respects.” 699 Eksteins also
credits the armistice to the British “sporting spirit,” which had guided their decision to enter
the war and in which “most of the British participants joined in the Christmas truce. The war
was a game, deadly earnest, to be sure, but a game nevertheless.” 700
But what of the Germans, who joined equally in the truce and in most cases appeared
to have initiated it? Eksteins attributes their participation to the fact that “(s)ome of the
Germans who had spent time in England – and there were a surprising number of them –
clearly had acquired the British passion” for sport, without noting that, however many
Teutonic waiters London hotels had employed, there could never have been sufficient
numbers to sway the attitudes of the entire army. 701 Eksteins also tosses in the influence of
their Bavarian and Saxon heritage on the German peoples as a whole, for whom “history was
not subservient to a vision of the future, as it was for so many Prussians…The German quest
for modernity was led by Prussia. The Christmas truce of 1914 was, by contrast, a celebration of
history and tradition.” 702 For Eksteins, the holiday armistice represents the traditional values
of the British, Bavarians and Saxons, which took some time to be broken down by the modern
conflict: “That such massive fraternization was never to recur during the war suggests,”
Eksteins maintains, “that it was not the ‘guns of August’ but subsequent events that shattered
an old world.”703
Eksteins discusses the sequel to the impromptu truces, with the event being
extensively reported in the British press and less so in the German newspapers, while the
French “muzzled all mention of fraternization.” 704 Afterwards, “(s)trict orders went out to
troops in all armies that a recurrence of such incidents would have drastic repercussions; and
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since headquarters in each army pursued the matter for a time, seeking names and all
available information, soldiers did become wary of further contacts with the enemy.” 705 Even
though the “live and let live system” continued to allow mutual accommodation between the
opposing forces, truces later became rare, as the “enemy became increasingly an abstraction,”
with whom no relationship, sporting or otherwise, was possible. 706
For Eksteins, as for Montague sixty years earlier, the war had transformed European
society, destroying its previously shared social and ethical standards. For both, the Christmas
truce, “with its tales of camaraderie and warmth between supposedly bitter enemies in the
crater-scarred territory of no man’s land,” represented the last gasp of the old values before
they were shattered in the dehumanizing trenches that ushered in the new world of antitraditionalism and total war. 707 Modernism, Eksteins argues, was imposed upon the world by
the First World War; Fussell similarly maintains that the “essentially ironic” mode of “modern
understanding” had originated “largely in the application of mind and memory to the events
of the Great War.”708 These two influential writers saw in the First World War the origin of a
world-view that perceived events through a lens of irony, one that contrasted expectations
with disillusioning reality. The application of this modernist outlook to the “memory” of the
First World War has since informed the narrative of the conflict in a way that renders such
interwar works as Hutchinson’s Warrior and Thompson’s Lions Led by Donkeys not only
obsolete but almost unreadable: praise for the army’s “courageous and sympathetic
leadership” and complaints that the Germans “did not play the game” support modern
criticisms of the conflict by demonstrating the naïveté of early twentieth century views. In
fact, after the narrative shift during the 1960s and the hardening into established fact of the
futile discourse of the war in the decades thereafter, the conventional way to view the First
World War as the 1980s drew to a close was with despair at its waste and stupidity,
accompanied by a large dose of sardonic wit to wash the bitterness down, attitudes
exemplified in popular culture by the famous BBC television series Blackadder Goes Forth. 709
In that comedy series, the quintessential modernist and cynic Captain Edmund
Blackadder, stuck in the endless stalemate of the Western front, fights a rearguard action,
armed with only his wits and his ability to see through the idiocy and futility of the war,
against the moronic leadership (Colonel Melchett), the mindless upper-class officers
(Lieutenant the Honourable George Colthurst St. Barleigh) and the gullible common soldiers
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(Private Baldrick). Noting that an order to advance means that “Field Marshal Haig is about to
make yet another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin,” and
remarking that the whole conflict “would be a damn sight simpler if we just stayed in England
and shot fifty thousand of our men a week,” Blackadder was perceived as speaking the ‘truth’
of the war to an audience that, based upon the popular narrative of the conflict as it had been
presented for the previous thirty years, was well primed to receive it. 710 The series’
representation of the Christmas truce has Lieutenant St. Barleigh reminiscing lyrically about
the “wonderful” armistice, with the sounds of Silent Night “drifting across the still, clear air of
No-Man’s-Land,” and the meeting of German and British troops in No-Man’s-Land, and
Blackadder quickly deflating him by observing that more ground was gained “during one
Christmas piss-up than they managed in the next two-and-a-half years of war.” The show,
therefore, managed to present both a romantic and cynical interpretation of the truce while
reinforcing what had become the mainstream view of the futile fight on the Western front.
By the end of the 1980s, the narrative of senseless waste that had overtaken the
previously varied discourse of the First World War had almost completely driven out opposing
opinions. Histories, memoirs, interviews with veterans, documentaries, and various
manifestations of popular culture all reinforced a mainstream view of the war and the truce
that was increasingly homogeneous, in which Malcolm Brown’s perceived “camaraderie of the
victim” led bitter enemies to cross No-Man’s-Land and shake hands with those they had been
trying to kill for the first five months of the war, and only threatened punishment from army
leadership was able to force the men to fight each other again. While Eksteins argues that the
1914 holiday cease-fire was, in fact, the dying breath of the nineteenth century values that were
later destroyed by the war, the sophistication of his theories was no match for the breathtaking simplicity of the iconic last scene of Blackadder Goes Forth, when the do0med soldiers,
invited by “General Insanity Melchett” to participate in “a mass slaughter,” go over the top to
face certain death. With such images, the new orthodoxy of the war captured the public
imagination and led to reliance upon a narrative of the conflict that left little room for
disagreement.
Although the new approach towards history during the 1970s and 1980s emphasized
the importance of views of the common soldier in understanding the war, the voices of the
soldiers themselves either became increasingly lost in the drive to establish a more monolithic
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discourse of the war, or were reliant on the new discourse of the war as a touchstone for their
own memories. The well-intentioned efforts to let the words of the veterans themselves drive
the narrative of the war and produce genuine “history from below,” that would allow their
voices to be heard above the rhetoric of politicians and the analysis of the generals’ tactics,
failed to take into account the fallibility of soldiers’ memories, and the possibility that they
could also re-write the past to suit a pre-determined narrative or please a ready audience for
their war stories.
As a result of the new emphasis of historiography, the now generally-accepted
elements of the First World War’s conventions – stupid and callous generals sending the
helpless front-line victims to be slaughtered in a war that had no purpose and made no sense –
were apparently reinforced by the survivors of the conflict. The influence of the 1960s on the
narrative of the war, together with the new emphasis on the role of the truce as a soldiers’
rebellion against the conflict, came to inform not only popular culture, but also the memories
of those who fought in the war itself. Many veterans of the war, when recalling the cease-fires
in which their battalions had participated, succumbed to the discourse that had grown around
the armistice, and because they had not fraternized with the enemy in ways that echoed the
myth, did not perceive that they had nonetheless been a part of the famous Christmas truce.
By 1990, the image of British and Germans meeting each other in No-Man’s-Land had become
so ingrained in the public consciousness that it now defined the ‘official’ holiday truce, with
few mainstream variations on this theme available to counter popular attitudes. Although
some surviving soldiers still insisted on the armistice they remembered, with no punishments
handed out and no desire to end the war, it was Albert Moren’s belief that the truce “could
have finished the war, if it was left to the men” that was broadcast on Christmas Eve 1981. The
selectivity in the use of earlier sources utilized by those now writing about the war, and
equally selective reliance on the memories of those who had experienced it sixty or seventy
years earlier, meant that during the 1970s and 1980s the Christmas truce had become
increasing mythologized in support of a greater narrative that consistently reinforced the idea
of the First World War as a senseless conflict.
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Chapter Ten
“Memories of Christmas 1914 persist”:
Orthodoxy, Revisionism and the Christmas Truce, 1990 - 2013

Some of the British officers took a dim view of such sport, and when the game came to its
exhausted end, the men were encouraged back to their trenches for a carol service and
supper….Boxing Day passed without a game. The officers were alarmed at what had happened
on Christmas Day. If such friendly relations continued, how could they get the men to fight
again? How could the war continue?
-Michael Foreman
War Game: Village Green to No-Man’s-Land (1993)
The Christmas Truce of 1914, however, was unique. While some senior officers went out of
their way to ‘look the other way,’ most officers worked hard to put an end to it. The fact that
the men under them defied these orders is extremely unusual. In addition, this truce lasted
much longer and involved many more soldiers than any other previous truce.
-Jim Murphy
Truce: the Day the Soldiers Stopped Fighting (2009)

On the quiet Western front in early 1915, Lyn Macdonald writes in her 1993 book 1915:
The Death of Innocence, the state of affairs between the opposing sides was so peaceful that
“(s)uch belligerence as there was at present was largely directed by officers towards their own
troops.” 711 The hostility which Macdonald believes was shown by army leadership towards its
soldiers was the result of the 1914 truce, during which “(a)uthority on both sides of the line
had strongly disapproved of the Christmas spirit of goodwill that had brought the front-line
soldiers of both sides out of their trenches to swap greetings and gifts,” resulting in “rebukes
that had passed down the chain of command through discomfited Brigadiers, Colonels and
Majors to the rank and file.”
Although the holiday armistice took place just before the chronological beginning of
her history of the second year of the war, Macdonald’s work opens with the aftermath of that
truce on the Western front in early 1915. In fact, as Macdonald claims, the junior officers in the
front lines
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who had cast a benevolent eye on the friendly gatherings in No Man’s Land and been glad of
the chance to bury the dead in places where there had been an attack, spent the days after
Christmas miserably composing the written explanations for these lapses of discipline which
had enraged higher authority and for which higher authority was holding them personally
responsible. 712
The officers in the 5th Division, in fact, produced their very brief descriptions of the
armistice within a day after receiving Smith-Dorrien’s order to do so, and the officers in the
other divisions faced no such requirement, but Macdonald, who writes about those soldiers
“that might otherwise have gone unheard, the voices of a traumatized generation,” is intent on
proving that truce participants were punished. 713 Disregarding the lack of consequences for
those who joined in the wide-spread fraternization, the fact that Smith-Dorrein’s order only
applied to a very small percentage of truce participants, and the extensive reporting of the
truce in regimental diaries, Macdonald uses the 1914 armistice to prove her point: that the
“enraged” and callous authorities, condemning what they perceived as anti-war sentiment,
had punished the officers who had allowed the truce to happen. 714
Macdonald’s work, driven by the dominant narrative of the war as senseless and futile,
emphasizes the enthusiasm for the conflict among the willfully ignorant civilian populations
of Britain and Germany, and characterizes the British military establishment as hide-bound,
inflexible and short-sighted. She closes 1915: Death of Innnocence with the horror with which
the army leadership, who had issued orders “which forbade any contact with the enemy,”
greeted the 1915 truces by three Guards battalions. 715 As a result of the generals’ anger over
these mini-truces, Macdonald claims, “(t)he junior officer who condoned the meeting in No
Man’s Land was sent home in disgrace,” while “First Army Headquarters thundered its
determination to get to the bottom of the sorry episode and threatened dire retribution.” 716
Macdonald then references the urgent memo from Headquarters asking for a report on the
fraternization by the 1st Grenadier Guards and 1st and 2nd Scots Guards, and follows this with
the statement that the Guards’ fraternization was “hushed up,” as the British public would
have not appreciated the story. 717 “The comical Germans of the year before,” Macdonald wrote,
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“were now the hated Boche, progenitors of all the horrors and misery that had dashed the
hopes and expectations of a long and harrowing year.” 718
The omissions in Macdonald’s account of the 1915 truce are easily refuted. Colquhoun
was certainly not sent home in disgrace, but rather received permission to return to Britain
while his wife gave birth to their child. The threatened “dire retribution” for the 1915 truces
was never implemented. 719 No mention is made of the fact that the verdict returned in the
Colquhoun court-martial was only a reprimand (or of Haig’s quashing of that mild
punishment), or that a second officer was also court-martialed and immediately found not
guilty. Macdonald also does not acknowledge the fact that, while two other Guards battalions
participated in truces, no officers from those units were punished. Moreover, the 1914 truce
had not been condoned by the British public because they found the Germans “comical,” but
was instead readily accepted by the home front as an unusual Christmas celebration by its
troops. Macdonald’s view of the war, however, presumes overreaction on the part of the
British military leadership to any peaceable behavior from the soldiers they commanded, and
as a result, Colquhoun had to be banished to England by a furious leadership and severely
punished for his actions while the news of the 1915 truce – but not the one a year earlier - was
covered up by the government.
A completely different view of both the war and the truce, however, was presented by
Gary Sheffield less than a decade after Macdonald’s work. Sheffield, who argues in Forgotten
Victory that “the Great War was seen by the vast majority of British people as a just and
worthwhile war – while it was still going on,” believes that it was the failure of the conflict to
bring prosperity and security to Europe that contributed to its reputation of futility. 720 So
prevalent is this myth, he remarks, that “the First World War is often used as shorthand for
stupidity, blind obedience, failures of leadership, appalling physical conditions and
deadlock.” 721 According to Sheffield, the soldiers in the front lines tried to make their lives
more bearable “by informal truces and tacit agreements that developed between opposing
sides,” with the Christmas truce being the “most famous” of these temporary cease-fires. 722
After 1990, in spite of the presence of dissenting voices such as Sheffield’s, there was
little room in popular culture for variation in the narrative of the truce, or indeed of the First
World War as a whole. The soldiers who fought the war were now generally perceived to be
suggestions are that the newspapers were unaware of the event, or, as the minor 1915 armistices did not
present the mass appeal of the previous year’s extensive truce, uninterested.
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the traumatized victims of the callous and stupid British generals, and the 1914 armistice
became, as a result, an unorganized but powerful rebellion against the war, which, in turn,
had to be suppressed by the callous military leadership. This interpretation of the conflict,
based in part on the attitude of the famous anti-war poets and in part on the selective use of
the views of the soldiers who had participated in it, was during the same period scrutinized by
some revisionist historians, who looked at contemporaneous sources and drew different
conclusions about the First World War. In response to this opposition, the supporters of the
now-conventional views dug in their heels and insisted even more firmly that their
interpretation of the conflict was accurate. The 1990s and 2000s became, in a sense, a new
battleground for the war, with the orthodox narrative of the conflict, while under attack from
revisionist forces, so firmly entrenched in the public consciousness that no new offensive
could easily uproot it.
The conventional view of the war, in fact, continued to be promoted by a number of
historians who subscribed to that interpretation of the conflict. Martin Gilbert, in The First
World War: A Complete History, believes that the war started because “the European
sovereigns lacked the will to try to halt” it. 723 He then describes the “moment of peaceable
behavior” in the front lines at Christmas 1914, when “a spontaneous outburst of pacific feeling
took place in the war zones.” 724 Gilbert also quotes various truce participants before turning to
French’s statement, taken from his memoir 1914, that he had issued orders to prevent further
fraternization, and “‘called the local commanders to strict account,’” without noting French’s
admission that he regretted doing so, or the lack of punishments handed out following the
holiday armistice. 725
In The Great War, Jay Winter and Blaine Baggett also emphasize the war’s inexorable
progress, as the countries involved felt obliged to honor their obligations under various
treaties: “As soon as armies mobilized, war was unavoidable.” 726 They include the story of the
“unofficial truce,” which some saw “for what it was: a reassertion of decency by men who, as
1915 dawned, persisted in the belief that, while their enemies were misguided and dangerous,
they were still men like themselves.” 727 The British generals, however, “were appalled at the
news of the Christmas truce. Explicit orders threatened serious punishment should any similar
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incident ever happen again.”728 Gerald de Groot, who argues that the “German invasion of
Belgium was a godsend to the British government” as it enabled them to “sell” the war to the
British people and transform a “war of hegemony” into a “war of morality,” sees the conflict as
unavoidable, with mobilization leading quickly to declarations of war. 729 “No one wanted to
miss the train,” de Groot declares, enlarging upon A.J.P. Taylor’s theories. “Once war became
inevitable, the European nations obeyed the dictates of the stationmaster’s whistle.” 730 In spite
of the dehumanization of the conflict through the use of technology, “(s)hared sufferings
encouraged a common humanity” across No-Man’s-Land, and “civility occasionally sprouted
like a flower in the desert.” 731 As an example of the common soldiers’ resistance to the
mechanized “business of killing,” de Groot offers the “famous Christmas truce of 1914” which
“inspired a football match between Germans and British, much to the dismay of the
commanding officers who deemed it bad for morale.” 732
While all these accounts provide details that could be found in certain 1914 holiday
truces, they tend to treat the armistices as more consistent and homogenized than they
actually were. The Christmas truce was certainly a moment of “peaceable behavior,” as noted
by Gilbert, but participation was motivated more by the holiday season than a desire to lay
down arms. Certainly the cease-fire was partly inspired by the idea that the enemies opposite
were men like themselves, but few soldiers participating in the truce would have believed that,
by fighting a war that they perceived as necessary, they were not behaving decently the
remainder of the time they spent in the trenches. The football match that de Groot claimed
was inspired by the atmosphere of the truce did occur, but it was the exception rather the rule.
Additionally, French’s memoir is referenced in a number of works which all note that he was
against the truce at the time, but fail to report either the lack of punishment handed out after
the 1914 truce or French’s retrospective change of heart towards the cease-fire.
The “Horrible Histories” books, known for their popularity among British
schoolchildren who doubtless remember their ‘facts’ after what was taught in classrooms is
long forgotten, describe the First World War as “a story of what happens when machines go to
war and human beings get in the way.” 733 Terry Dreary and Martin Brown, the authors of The
Frightful First World War, compare the European combatants to “two big gangs” who “started
collecting weapons, making threats and swapping insults, the way gangs do. All it needed was
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for one gang member to throw the first stone and a huge punch-up would follow.” 734 While
observing that the assassination of the Austrian Arch-Duke in Sarajevo was the “first stone”
thrown, Dreary and Brown, astonishingly, focus on the France’s responsibility for the war,
contending that “Germany smashed France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and it was
just a matter of time before France tried to take its revenge.” 735 They remark upon the famous
truce that occurred on 25 December 1914, when “(e)nemies stop fighting for a day or two and
even play friendly football matches,” a state of affairs which “can’t last, and it won’t be
repeated,” before concluding that the “real tragedy” of the war was that it “didn’t solve any
problems and it didn’t bring peace. It led to the Second World War and far, far more misery,
death and destruction.” 736
Peter Simkins, in Chronicles of the Great War, agrees that technology promoted a
depersonalized conflict, which made fraternization between enemy troops impossible after the
first year of the war. 737 “At Christmas 1914, he writes, there was a spontaneous unofficial truce
in Flanders, when British and German troops fraternized openly between the front lines,
exchanging souvenirs and taking photographs,” he observes. However, “(a)s the war became
ever more impersonal and insatiable in its demands for men and material, there would be no
more such incidents on this scale, although a ‘live and let live’ attitude existed on both sides in
many ‘quiet’ sectors throughout the conflict.”738 John Simpson, as befits a journalist, sees the
armistice in terms of the government’s infamous censorship, which, surprisingly, “did not
prevent British newspapers printing full accounts of the Christmas truce of 1914, even though
GHQ disapproved of soldiers fraternizing with the enemy.”739 After Christmas, “all the main
newspapers published letters from front-line soldiers to their families at home, describing the
truce. The censors failed to stop them.”740 Simpson, however, does not question whether the
censors in fact did try to intervene and prevent these reports from reaching the British public,
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apparently believing that if the army leadership had disapproved of the truce, then the
government as a matter of course would have wanted to repress the news of it.
All of these histories written between 1990 and 2010 reference a narrative of the war
that appeared to be literally unquestionable, as if a single interpretation of the conflict had
been in place since the moment the guns stopped firing at 11:00 a.m. on November 11, 1918, and
no doubts about its validity had ever existed. The Christmas truce, in this monolithic
discourse, was understood variously as a “reassertion of dignity,” a rebellion against
mechanized warfare, an outburst of pacifism, or a revolt against the army leadership. During
this time, however, some historians began to push back against the homogenized narrative of
the First World War, providing not only a revisionist view of the causes of the war, a reappraisal of the tactics of the generals, and a defense of the post-war settlement, but also
explanations for the development of the various myths about the conflict. These authors,
however, while challenging the standard discourse of the war, correspondingly discount the
story of the truce, which appears to have no place in their less conventional interpretations of
the conflict.
Niall Ferguson’s c0ntroversial history, The Pity of War, argues that the image of a “bad,
futile war,” gained “academic respectability” through A.J.P. Taylor’s The First World War, and
was thereafter constantly reinforced by media representations such as Blackadder Goes Forth,
which added “to the folk memory of donkey-like leadership.” 741 As a result of this general
preoccupation with “the notion of the wickedness of the Great War,” Ferguson contends that
“(d)isproportionate attention has been paid to the famous Christmas truce of 1914, when
British and German soldiers ‘fraternized’ with one another in no man’s land, and even more to
the so-called ‘live and let live’ system which developed in certain sectors of the Western Front
in 1914 and 1915.”742 Michael Neiberg, on the other hand, maintains that the “aggression of the
Kaiser’s foreign policy in causing the war and the crimes of the German army in conquered
territory conveniently became submerged” in the 1920s and with it an understanding of the
conflict’s origins. 743 For Neiberg, the “continued fascination with the relatively minor and
inconsequential Christmas truce of 1914 reflects the idea that the war was an aberration in an
essentially fraternal Europe,” a theory that reinforces the view of “the soldiers as victims who
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would have preferred to commiserate and celebrate with the ‘enemy’ but were instead forced
to fight by vainglorious generals.” 744
John Morrow considers the First World War the result of centuries of imperialism,
which, by allowing Europeans to massacre natives without remorse, had prepared the
continent for the slaughter of the 1914-1918 conflict. “European youth set off to war in 1914 with
romantic images of glory and honor in their heads,” Morrow states, as “(t)heir intellectuals
and authors had spent a generation romanticizing their slaughter of other peoples; they
presumed to continue this tradition in August 1914.” 745 Describing a typical truce, including
shared “rations, liquor, and addresses, playing rugby and soccer,” Morrow also notes that, in
order to end the armistice, “(c)ommanders reminded their men that the other side was a
perfidious enemy with whom fraternization should not recur.” 746 It was this dehumanization
of the opposing side, Morrow contends, that imperialism had encouraged among Europeans,
and which now not only brought an abrupt end to the truce, but enabled them to not only
engage, without compunction, in more than four years of carnage.
In An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare,
Joanna Burke finds a place for the truce in her central hypothesis on modern combat. 747 While
arguing that the “characteristic act of men at war is not dying, it is killing,” Bourke maintains
that “(w)hile ‘love’ might be too strong a word, many combatants were surprised to find
themselves feeling intensely affectionate towards their foe.” 748 As a result, soldiers “at the
frontlines frequently expressed respect for their opponents – even to the extent of fraternizing
with them. Fraternization between German, British, and French soldiers during that first
Christmas 1914 became such an important war myth that practically every soldier claimed to
have defied High Command to participate.” 749 While the soldiers who participated in the truce
might have been surprised to hear their feelings for the enemy described as “intensely
affectionate,” Bourke is certainly correct that, as established by the regimental histories of
battalions that fought in the First World War, many more claimed a part in the truce than had
originally joined in the holiday cease-fires.
Janet Watson further argues that the focus “away from the cooperative and diverse
effort presented from 1914 to 1918 and primarily toward the view of useless sacrifice on the part
of soldiers in the trenches” has greatly influenced the way the public has come to view the
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war. 750 Trench warfare, the most common experience of war for British soldiers serving in the
First World War, was “what most civilians heard about, whether from members of their own
families, friends and neighbors, or the press.” 751 In Fighting Different Wars: Experience,
Memory, and the First World War in Britain, Watson maintains that this emphasis on the
experiences of soldiers in the trenches has obscured many truths about the conflict, among
them the different attitudes and beliefs that those fighting the war brought to their service. 752
Watson also delineates the “different wars” fought by many soldiers, including those who were
already serving in the army at the time the war broke out. The professional attitudes of these
men, Watson contends, “may go far to explain the famous Christmas Truce.” Since the
“volunteers who were fighting the war for a cause rather than because it was their job were
still in the training camps at home” in December 1914, “the professional soldiers, both British
and German, exchanged common courtesies and mutual respect.” 753 Watson further
characterizes the General Staff’s orders against future fraternization as “unnecessary. The
conditions had changed, the soldiers had changed, the war had advanced, and there was little
interest in befriending the enemy among the more service-oriented junior officers controlling
the front lines.”754
For historians with a less conventional view of the conflict, as demonstrated by these
examples, the Christmas truce is a minor and easily explained event. Ferguson and Nieberg
believe the emphasis First World War historians place upon the armistice is a manifestation of
the orthodox narrative of the war and the complementary idea that soldiers rebelled against it
by fraternizing with the enemy at Christmas 1914. Sheffield argues that the truce was nothing
more than an attempt by the troops to make front-line service more bearable and Morrow
contends the armistice ended because of colonial-influenced attitudes, whereas Bourke and
Watson both press the cease-fire into the service of their theories about killing and
professionalism. In all of these works, the truce is removed from the center-stage it occupies in
more orthodox histories of the war, while the meanings ascribed to it in these revisionist
histories are more reminiscent of the diversity of discourse found in writings about the
armistice during the 1920s and 1930s. On the other hand, those earlier memoirs, polemics and
histories all noted the importance of the truce to the men who had participated in it. In these
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later attempts to challenge the conventional notions of the war, the Christmas armistice is
pushed off to the side, devoid of significance and barely worth a mention.
With the exception of Ferguson, whose work has been widely read (although few of his
theories have been generally adopted), these revisionist historians, while often disputing the
image of the war as wasteful and senseless, have had little impact upon the conflict’s orthodox
discourse, which continues to be reinforced by popular culture, in the form of books, films,
documentaries, songs and websites. As Hanna observes, novels such as Sebastian Faulks’
Birdsong and Pat Barker’s Regeneration trilogy, which promote the idea that the war was
misguided and tragic, “have enjoyed great commercial success because they resonate with
what the readership expects to read: mud, blood, poetry and utter futility.” 755 In addition, by
this time there were few veterans left to challenge the conventional narrative: the last
available Imperial War Museum interview with a soldier who had participated in the
Christmas truce took place in March 1990. Stanley Archibald, who served with the 1st East
Kents (the Buffs) on the Western front, recalled that on 25 December, after building up their
parapets, “all of us just walked together and we met in No-Man’s-Land.” 756 He spoke with a
German who told him, in a very familiar accent, “oh, blimey, mate, I was in a London ‘otel
when the war broke out,” and the two sides exchanged tins of “bully beef for cigars.”
According to Archibald, his battalion’s truce ended the next day, when a recentlycommissioned officer shot a German soldier who was still out in the open.
Although Archibald’s truce ended in a fashion designed to endear it to the hearts of
those who support the orthodox discourse of the war, with a callous officer shooting an
unarmed German, his overall view of the conflict is not so easily categorized. He felt, for
example, that long before 1914 the army was aware that they would eventually have to fight
Germany: “that is why we were so well trained,” Archibald maintained. He believed that the
British “had no choice” but to declare war, and that the “majority had to accept” that fact.
After the 1990s, however, the statements of veterans such as Archibald, who saw the First
World War as a necessary evil, were no longer part of the living narrative. This lack of
personal testimony allowed others to continue to impose an interpretation upon the conflict
that would be unrecognizable to many who had fought in it.
After Blackadder aired in 1989, dramatizations of both the war and the truce followed a
set narrative. The play A Christmas Truce, written by William Douglas Home and first
performed in the same year that Stanley Archibald was interviewed, offers one such
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interpretation. 757 In Home’s play, a British junior officer advances the theory that if everyone
refused to fight, as the soldiers were doing on Christmas Day, “the war would have to end
because there is nothing anyone could do about it.” Another British officer agrees “(t)hat’s
what ought to happen,” but unfortunately “we all get taken in by bloody politicians telling us
that this war is the one to end all bloody wars and that we’ve got to win it, whereas it’s quite
obvious that, if we win the bloody thing – or if you win it – never mind which, all it will
achieve, apart from all us poor sods getting killed – will be to sow the seeds of the next bloody
war.” 758
Home’s dramatization contains all the now-standard elements of a typical Christmas
truce: the German offer of an armistice, the burial of the dead and soldiers discussing the
foolishness of the war, as well as featuring both a football match and a German soldier who
used to be a waiter in London. In the play, the truce concludes on Christmas afternoon when a
colonel comes down from headquarters to “make sure the whole escapade ends double-quick
and without any trouble.” The soldiers who fraternized, the colonel states, should count
themselves “damned lucky” because the brigadier in charge, “unlike lots of other Brigadiers
…(is) not planning to have anyone court-martialed. Just so long as this truce ends at
midnight.” A junior officer asks if those that get court-martialed will be shot. “Hung, drawn
and quartered, I’d say,” the colonel responds grimly. 759 This representation of the truce, so at
odds with the contemporaneous accounts of it, completely encompasses the popular view of
the event.
The other major dramatic representation of the truce from this era, Joyeux Noel, as
already discussed in Chapter 1, also situates the Christmas truce firmly within the orthodox
narrative of the war: a rebellion by the soldiers against the futility of the conflict, punished by
commanders who must ruthlessly stamp out any defiance. As this film asserts, the Christmas
truce was so shocking, so offensive and so threatening to the status quo that even the British
king and the German crown prince felt obliged to interfere to help punish the men involved.
The film, like Home’s A Christmas Truce, further promotes two myths about the cease-fire
that have increasingly become accepted as fact: that those soldiers who were involved in the
event were penalized for their participation, and that the news of the cease-fire was
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suppressed, kept from a public who would be horrified to hear that their soldiers had willingly
fraternized with the enemy. 760
The companion book to that film, Meetings in No Man’s Land: Christmas 1914 and
Fraternization in the Great War, jointly written by Marc Ferro, Malcolm Brown, Remy Cazals
and Olaf Mueller, promises to reveal “a story of the Great War that has long been forgotten or
lost in censored official reports or officer journals.” 761 Admittedly, the French press, as noted
by Eksteins, prevented contemporaneous mention of the truce in their newspapers, but
German and British papers printed many details of it, and, as already demonstrated, the story
of the truce remained public knowledge after the war ended. “(A)t last the story could be
told,” according to Brown’s introduction, of the event that “has slipped across the divide
between myth and reality, seizing the imagination of many people in the process.” 762 Not only
could the tale finally be disclosed, “it could be revealed to a new generation in a new Europe as
evidence of a step forward in terms of international understanding and reconciliation.” 763
Brown praises Joyeux Noel as “a worthy, honourable and brave” film, “(d)espite its bold
inaccuracies and certain other liberties that had been taken with the story” – as if there were
something particularly courageous about making a twenty-first century anti-war film that was
based on a well-known interpretation of a very familiar story. He also reassures readers once
again that “the curious story of the festive season at the front in 1914 might sound bizarre, or
crazy, or incredible, but it’s not another Christmas Carol or a historical leg-pull, it really did
take place. There will always be incredulity: there can no longer be doubt.” 764
Although the inclusion of the French as fellow-fraternizers is certainly welcome, their
participation was well-known long before Joyeux Noel or the publication of Meetings in No
Man’s Land. 765 Moreover, Brown’s continued crusade to have the Christmas truce accepted as
fact rather than fiction seems increasingly odd: the reality of armistice, which remained in
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public sight from 1915 onwards, and has been perpetually described as “famous” or “legendary”
since its occurrence, may have been doubted by a few skeptics but has never been seriously
questioned at any point since 1914. Brown also advances some of his favorite First World War
tropes: that, under the grim circumstances of the trenches, “it is almost natural that enemies
cease to be enemies; rather they become fellow human beings soaked by the same rain, frozen
by the same frost, whitened by the same snow,” who evolve into “companions in adversity,
allies fighting the same grim conditions, and therefore, at a basic human level, almost
friends.” 766 While admitting that the war diaries of the battalions involved did, in fact,
reference the truce, he also reports Smith-Dorrien’s call for the names of officers involved, and
calls it “curious” that “no one was court-martialed” after the fraternization. Brown even
reproduces a story about a Saxon battalion that, following fraternization with British troops,
refused to fire upon the men “with whom over the past two days they had become instant
close friends,” an action that he describes as “a virtual mutiny.”767 Brown’s account of the truce
in Meetings in No Man’s Land, therefore, merely expands upon his earlier theories about the
event, while adding little in the way of new material, aside from the information about the
purported German mutiny. 768
The increasingly simplified narrative of both the truce and the war also made these
subjects particularly suitable for children’s literature. Michael Foreman’s War Game: Village
Green to No-Man’s-Land, published in 1993, concerns a group of “Suffolk lads” who, pressured
by the local vicar and squire, join the Kings Royal Rifles at the beginning of the war. 769 The
new soldiers are immediately sent to France and the front, from which they are “ordered to
attack across No Man’s Land, even though many lives were always lost and little or nothing
was achieved.” However, the proximity of the two lines of trenches meant that “each army
could hear the other’s voices and could sometimes even smell their breakfasts. They all knew
that they were sharing the same terrible conditions.” On Christmas morning, the British
soldiers wake up to a world white with frost and quiet, where the “clock of death had stopped
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ticking.” The Germans offer a cease-fire, the British accept, and fraternization ensues. The
four Suffolk volunteers, who were all eager footballers before the war, join in a match where
the goalposts are marked by caps. “Apart from that, it was wonderfully disorganized,”
Foreman writes, “part football, part ice-skating, with unknown numbers on each team. No
referee, no account of the score.” Of course, those in charge disapproved, and soldiers were
instructed not to leave their trenches again, although Foreman adds that “(t)here were a few
secret meetings here and there along the Front, and gifts and souvenirs were exchanged.”
The “friendly Germans from Saxony” opposite having been replaced by “fresh troops
from Prussia,” the war starts again with a “full-scale attack” at dawn. When the British are
ordered to counter-attack, one of the Suffolk villagers kicks a football into No-Man’s-Land,
and the soldiers are mown down by machine gun fire, an appropriate end to an account so
thoroughly informed by the conventional narrative. Fictional works such as A Christmas
Truce, Joyeux Noel, and War Game encapsulate the contradictions of the now-orthodox
discourse of the Christmas truce. Fraternization was a sign that those in the trenches hated
the war and didn’t want to fight it – in spite of the fact that they then went back, apparently
quite willingly, to fighting it for four more years. The truce was proof that soldiers were eager
to defy the orders of their officers - even though, when ordered not to fraternize, troops
mostly obeyed those orders, and those who did not were careful to keep their cease-fires very
low-key rather than advertise them as acts of open defiance. The armistice still acts a beacon
of hope for the world – that has, since it occurred, engaged in many wars, large and small, with
no Christmas truces to leaven the violence. This conventional narrative emphasizes the
punishments handed out to those that participated, even though no penalties followed the
1914 cease-fires, and generally suggests the suppression of the news of the truce, in spite of its
prominence in British newspaper columns. Within the parameters of the accepted discourse of
the conflict, the tale of the truce was being taken as clear proof that the futile First World War
had been despised by the soldiers fighting it, and was rarely now presented any other way.
Stanley Weintraub’s history of the cease-fire, Silent Night: The Story of the World War I
Christmas Truce, follows the predictable story of “that remarkable moment” without deviation
and, in an attempt to present a seamless anti-war discourse, mixes fact and fiction while
presenting both as equally valid. Henry Williamson’s Fox Under My Cloak is extensively
quoted, the truce scene in Bairnsfather’s Bullets and Billets segues neatly into the one in Oh!
What a Lovely War and even Blackadder’s irritation at a German referee’s “decision that placed
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him off-side” gets featured among the letters and diaries written by truce participants. 770 “The
Christmas Truce of 1914 has lingered strikingly in the memory even when its details have
disappeared into myth,” Weintraub argues, while making no attempt to distinguish between
the reality of the truce and the falsehoods that have grown up around it, even including
Graves’ short story about the truce and Foreman’s War Game among the “accounts” of the
event. 771 Weintraub’s work also features John McCutcheon’s 1984 ballad, “Christmas in the
Trenches.” 772 Although the song details the experiences of a fictional soldier, John Tolliver,
who participated in a truce on Christmas Day 1914, Weintraub claims that it in fact relates the
story of Sir Iain Colquhoun, whom the song alleges joined in the 1914 truce and was courtmartialed and sentenced to death for that participation. 773 The only problem with this version
of events, Weintraub concedes, is that it is “inaccurate on almost every count.”774 In spite of
this admission, Weintraub concludes that, however “erroneous the song’s specifics were, the
conclusions were not,” demonstrating that he intends to support the myths of the truce in the
face of any and all contrary evidence.” 775
Illustrating his bias in favor of the conventional narrative of the truce, Weintraub
reproduces a story about the XIX Saxon Corps, in which he claims “there was almost a mutiny
in one regiment when it received orders to begin shooting again.” For this regiment,
the difficulty began on the 26th, when the order to fire was given, for the men
struck. Herr Lange says that in the accumulated years he had never heard such
language as the officers indulged in, while they stormed up and down, and got,
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as the only result, the answer, ‘We can’t – they are good fellows, and we can’t.’
Finally, the officers turned on the men with, ‘Fire, or we do – and not at the
enemy!’ Not a shot had come from the other side, but at last they fired, and an
answering fire came back, but not a man fell. ‘We spent that day and the next,’
said Herr Lange, ‘wasting ammunition in trying to shoot the stars down from
the sky.’ 776
This anecdote, the only documentation produced by anyone at any time that alleges that
participation in the truce was followed by an outright refusal among soldiers to obey orders
and fire upon the enemy, is sourced to a second-hand account of very dubious provenance, yet
Weintraub reports it faithfully as gospel truth, including it as such alongside the fictional
works of Williamson and McCutcheon. 777 For Weintraub, “Christmas 1914 evokes the stubborn
humanity within us, and suggests an unrealized potential to burst its seams and rewrite a
century,” and, as a result, he is willing to rely on fiction and highly questionable “facts” to
support the truce myths in which he believes. 778
The uncorroborated story of the German soldiers’ rebellion, which was also cited by
Brown in Meetings in No Man’s Land, where he used it as proof that the Germans in the front
lines on 25 December 1914 were, in the words of one participant, “’certainly sportsmen if they
are nothing else’,” was taken to another level in the aforementioned Days that Shook the
World series. 779 The Christmas Truce documentary shows a Saxon regiment that “takes the
truce further than anyone dares – to the very edge of mutiny. Sergeant Lange recalls that his
men went on strike. There is no record of what sparked the revolt, except perhaps for these
conscripts, the great patriotic cause had become nothing to the bond they felt with fellow
soldiers just thirty yards away.” 780 The documentary further embellishes Weinstein’s version of
this event by showing the German officer cocking his revolver and pointing it at the head of a
soldier while barking out an order in German. “The men realize that their protest can be
nothing more,” the narrator relates while the soldiers begin reluctantly shooting. “The strike is
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over.” Of course, the reason that there is “no record of what sparked the revolt,” is that there is
no record of any such revolt at all, beyond a thirdhand belated version told to an Australian
living in Germany during the war. The willingness of the Christmas Truce documentary to
ignore readily-available facts and accept poorly sourced accounts of the armistice in order to
prove a point about the war – that the truce was a demonstration of the soldiers’ hatred of a
futile and destructive conflict – was echoed eight years later in an ITV documentary that also
focused on the Christmas armistice. Find My Past, which promised to “reveal how three people
are related to someone from a significant historical event by searching the records on
findmypast.co.uk,” and “follow their journey as they discover who their ancestor is and the
part they played in history,” features three survivors of truce participants, in an episode that
simultaneously promotes both the genealogy service that sponsored the series and a very
conventional view of the First World War. 781
A number of military historians were enlisted to provide the survivors with graphic
accounts of what their ancestors endured between 1914 and 1918. George Ashurst’s descendent,
for example, is told that “(i)n the entire time your great-uncle was at war, he was in two feet of
water in the trench.” Another historian states that the Saxons “were prepared to have a truce,
where the Prussians, who were from the north of Germany, much more militant, were really
prepared not to play.” The documentary notes that the armistice, when “(m)en put aside their
weapons and they just go back to being men,” was in contravention of the orders SmithDorrien had issued on 3 December 1914, and, through a confusing lapse in the episode’s timeline, implies that Smith-Dorrien learned about the truce from the reports printed in the
British papers on Boxing Day.
Carol Smith-Dorrien, granddaughter of the famous general (who, the narrator
inaccurately claims, was in charge of half of the B.E.F. at Christmas 1914), tries to place his 26
December 1914 orders in the best possible light, observing that “he was in overall charge of the
troops and had to make the very difficult decision when the Christmas truce broke out, to say
no more fraternizing.” 782 She further contends that the fact that Smith-Dorrien did not punish
anyone for participation in a truce “shows that he understood that there was a desire to
fraternize obviously, and even to admire each other, but this was not going to win the war,”
and believes that it must have been “horrendous” for him to have to order the truce to cease.
The documentary also describes the truce as a day of “spontaneous peace,” and reports, based
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solely upon George Ashurst’s later account, how furious the soldiers were to have the ceasefire broken up by the military leadership. It further maintains that in some places in the line,
the truce lasted until March. What the Find My Past episode does not do, however, is admit
that most of the soldiers in Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps did not fraternize with the enemy, or that
the commanders of the III and IV Corps, whose battalions much more frequently entered into
truces, did not find it necessary to issue orders threatening punishment, as the cease-fires
ended on their own.
By 2012, the orthodox narrative of the First World War was so firmly established in
popular culture that a military historian could, without fear of contradiction, tell the
descendant of a soldier that his great-uncle had spent his “entire” war in two feet of water,
although Ashurst’s memoir (referenced in the episode) talks freely about time spent in the
reserve lines, intervals out of line in France, and periods spent in England, including the last
three months of the war. Similarly, the conflict’s conventional discourse enables the
granddaughter of a famous general to transform her ancestor into a victim of a war that
required him to make distressing decisions. 783 These views, however erroneous, are reinforced
by numerous Internet sites about the truce, including its Wikipedia page, which notes that the
holiday cease-fire is “often seen as a symbolic moment of peace and humanity amidst one of
the most violent events of human history” and further describes it as “the most dramatic
example of non-cooperation with the war spirit that included refusal to fight, unofficial truces,
mutinies, strikes and peace protests.” 784 This version of the Christmas truce, which few of its
participants would recognize, is now being widely disseminated via the internet, which
circulates many of the armistice’s myths while rarely providing alternative views about either
the truce or the war itself. The Christmas truce of 1914, the History Channel website claims,
“was never repeated—future attempts at holiday ceasefires were quashed by officers' threats of
disciplinary action—but it served as heartening proof, however brief, that beneath the brutal
clash of weapons, the soldiers' essential humanity endured.” 785 “The Soldier’s Truce: A Hidden
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History from the First World War” assures the reader that the story of the truce, while “once
largely unknown, has become widely circulated on the internet.” 786
From 1990 through 2012, the truce made further gains in a narrative of the 1914-1918
war that contended, however weak the evidence or contradictory the evidence, that it ‘proved’
that the soldiers involved in the conflict nearly a century earlier would have preferred to make
peace with each other rather than to fight. Even if the facts did not, in fact, demonstrate this,
as illustrated by Colquhoun’s failure to be shot for allowing a truce, then a fictionalized truce
always trumped reality, as the moral drawn from it was infinitely more interesting. As a result,
the lack of punishments handed out after both the 1914 and 1915 truces are truly an
inconvenient truth, and one that will never be read in a work promoting the conventional
narrative of the war. As Todman argues in The Great War: Myth and Memory, mainstream
ideas about the conflict “have achieved the status of modern mythology and as such are
knitted into the social fabric,” making it nearly impossible to challenge the modern discourse
of the First World War. 787 As the famous Sainsbury’s December 2014 Christmas advertisement
demonstrates, the story of the armistice has become knitted firmly into the fabric of the
conflict, and with the centenary of the Christmas truce upon us, the orthodox narrative of the
1914 armistice, however it may deviate from the experiences and attitudes of the soldiers
involved, has become the version incorporated into the British public’s memory of the war,
generally accepted without contradiction or contention, and cited in support of the First
World War’s discourse of waste and futility.
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Chapter Eleven
“It was peace that won”:
The Christmas Truce and the Narrative of the First World War
Most higher-ups had looked the other way when scattered fraternization occurred earlier. A
Christmas truce, however, was another matter. Any slackening in the action during Christmas
week might undermine whatever sacrificial spirit there was among troops who lacked
ideological fervor.
-Stanley Weintraub
Silent Night
By the way I don’t know whether I told you there has been a Peace with the people opposite
our section since Xmas Eve and it is still going on though the Germans sent in this morning to
say they would begin sniping at 11.30 am, but they haven’t done it yet. 2 pm, I don’t think they
want to start more than we do as it only means a few of each side being hit and does not affect
the end of the War.
-Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher-Rowe, Commander, 1st Grenadier Guards
28 December 1914 letter

In 1983, Paul McCartney applied his famous optimism to the subject of the Christmas
truce. “In love our problems disappear,” the former Beatle sang in “Pipes of Peace,” which was
accompanied by a video depicting the famous armistice, complete with a spontaneous football
match. 788 The video casts McCartney as both a German and British soldier – emphasizing the
point that “the people here are like you and me” - who exchange family photographs, while the
lyrics remind us that we should raise our children well by “help(ing) them to see” and teaching
them “how to play the pipes of peace.” In the video, the truce ends when the soldiers
fraternizing in No-Man’s-Land are shelled, presumably by orders of the cold-hearted but
absent generals, and must run back to “safety” of the trenches. Once behind cover, the
doppelgangers look longingly at the photographs of each other’s children, thus underlining
the implicit moral that the soldiers of the two sides had the same feelings and sensibilities,
and therefore had no reason to wage war upon each other. The McCartney song pulls exactly
the emotional levers it intends to: a comment on the video posted to youtube.com notes that
the song “shows you that they didn’t want to fight each other, but politics dictated that they
had to.”
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This 1980s variation on “All You Need is Love” demonstrates how an appealing and
uncomplicated story can promote a clichéd view of the truce while simultaneously reinforcing
certain myths about the First World War. As Alan Clark similarly maintained in his
introduction to The Donkeys, the story of the 1914-1918 conflict really “was as simple as that.”
He was wrong. The war was never that uncomplicated, and the problems of trench warfare
were never that amenable to an effortless solution, but Clark’s superficial portrayal of the
conflict was easy to grasp, which is how many of the myths about the First World War took
root in the 1960s: by presenting a narrative that was straightforward, had obvious heroes and
villains, and a clear moral. Having captured British cultural memory, that view of the conflict
has become so ingrained that any attempts to dispute it arouse scorn and revulsion, as
Michael Gove, the Conservative Secretary for Education, found out in early 2014 during the
course of a very public spat over the narrative of the First World War.
Gove’s clumsy and misguided attempts to reframe the First World War in heroic
terms, as a victory for Britain and therefore a cause for public celebration, inspired headlines
and censure in roughly equal quantities. 789 His assertion that “(o)ur understanding of the war
has been overlaid by misunderstandings, and misrepresentations which reflect an, at best,
ambiguous attitude to this country and, at worst, an unhappy compulsion on the part of some
to denigrate virtues such as patriotism, honour and courage” characterized the orthodox
narrative of the war as a creation of “left-wing academics” whose purpose is “to belittle Britain
and its leaders.” In addition, he criticized the use of Blackadder Goes Forth as a teaching tool
in school curricula relating to the war, condemning the popular television series as leftist
propaganda. Although Gove’s initial intention was to assert that “the conflict was a ‘just war’
to combat aggression by a German elite bent on domination,” his comments were seen as a
deliberately inflammatory attack on both the conventional discourse of the war and the
historians who support that interpretation.
Following this opening salvo in the dehate about the First World War’s narrative,
Gove’s detractors – and occasional supporters - quickly leapt into the fray. The Observer
featured a rebuttal from Tristram Hunt, Labour’s Shadow Education Secretary, who called
Gove’s arguments “crass” and “politically motivated.” 790 In the Mail Online, Sir Tony Robinson,
who played Private Baldrick in Blackadder Goes Forth, labelled Gove’s comments “very silly,”
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while strongly refuting the idea that the series supported any party line. 791 Richard Evans,
Professor of History at the University of Cambridge, who had already crossed swords with
Gove in 2013 over recommended changes to the British schools’ history curricula, pointed out
in the Guardian that Niall Ferguson, Alan Clark and Max Hastings, the historians who were
most famous for promoting a critical attitude towards the war and the failed military tactics of
its generals, were all noted conservatives. 792 Boris Johnson, Conservative Mayor of London,
then took up arms on Gove’s behalf via an editorial in the Telegraph, provocatively titled
“Germany started the Great War, but the Left can’t bear to say so.”793 In this piece, Johnson
argued that “(i)t is a sad but undeniable fact that the First World War – in all its murderous
horror – was overwhelmingly the result of German expansionism and aggression,” but
contended that the modern Labour Party, out of misplaced political correctness, found it
impolite to mention this inconvenient truth.
Shortly after Johnson’s contribution to the debate, Mark Steel, a commentator and
stand-up comedian, weighed in on the controversy in the Independent, asserting sarcastically
that Gove’s assertions about the conflict should prevail over the “poncey academic types who
criticised the war, like Wilfred Owen and those poets. Just because they spent a few years
being gassed and shot at, they thought that gave them a right to criticise it. Well, if they’d
joined the real world, like Michael Gove, they might not be so full of airy-fairy pacifist
nonsense.” 794 Brian Reade, a commentator on sports and current affairs for the Mirror, also
added his two cents to the debate. “Michael Gove's attempt at rewriting Great War history
would make my KKK-supporting Uncle Bud proud,” was the title of Reade’s piece, in which he
declared that “(a)nyone with half a brain knows no single country was totally to blame. It was
more about Europe’s ruling classes callously sacrificing 16 million lives in their dispute over
who should have the biggest empires.” 795
The Christmas truce, the event that so many assume proves that the soldiers fighting
the war found it futile and wished to bring it to a halt, plays a large part in the general mythmaking about the war. Margaret MacMillan, in an article entitled “The 1914 Christmas
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armistice: a triumph for common humanity,” featured in the Financial Times on December 20,
2013, highlights that widely-accepted view of the truce. 796 Her account, which traces the
development of the First World War’s narrative of “the horrors of the trenches, the senseless
waste of lives, and the meaninglessness of a war that apparently settled nothing,” discusses
how that interpretation of the conflict came to prevail over all others. While endorsing a
conventional view of the war, MacMillan nevertheless reminds the reader that “(a)t the time
people on all sides thought they had a just cause. It is condescending and wrong to think they
were hoodwinked.” Yet in spite of admitting that the war’s now-conventional narrative was
not endorsed by many of the soldiers who fought in it or the populations of the countries
involved, MacMillan still represents the truce in conventional terms, noting that it is
remembered now as “a moment when ordinary soldiers reacted against their leaders and the
monstrous folly of the first world war.” As a result, while she calls for “a new international
approach to the war,” MacMillan does not challenge the 1914 cease-fire’s orthodox narrative,
leaving the impression that, just as she wishes that “the first world war cemeteries where the
soldiers still remain separated into friend and foe will gradually crumble away,” she also
subscribes to the now-standard view of the Christmas truce, the event that provides such a
useful lesson about a war that was neither “glorious or noble,” but rather a conflict “where
men were killed from a distance by an enemy they rarely saw,” making the moment when they
fraternized in No-Man’s-Land all the more striking.
While MacMillan’s article admits that the orthodox discourse of the war is not entirely
representative of contemporaneous beliefs, she still maintains that the Christmas truce
represents “a small reminder of a common humanity.” Jeremy Rifkin, in his 2010 work The
Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis, argues that on 25
December 1914, the British and German soldiers who fraternized in No-Man’s-Land made a
conscious decision when leaving their trenches: they “chose to be human.”797 However, as
their letters and diaries demonstrate, the soldiers who took part in the truce were, and
remained, human from the day they entered the trenches to the day they left them. What
drew the men out of the trenches on that Christmas was not, as Rifkin contends, “empathy for
one another,” but rather a combination of curiosity, sentimentality, boredom and
homesickness. Although there was a sense of shared suffering between the opposing armies on
the front, this did not prompt the actions of the soldiers who participated in the armistice, as
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the joint miseries of the trenches would hardly become less apparent during the remaining
four years of the war, while inciting no further large-scale episodes of fraternization. Nor was
the truce inspired by resentment of the army leadership, who in most cases condoned it for
the sake of both morale and necessary repairs to the trenches.
The website www.firstworldwar.com goes even further in its support for the
conventional narrative of the truce, acknowledging the truth about the cease-fire while
asserting that, in fact, these troublesome particulars are irrelevant. 798 The site maintains that
the “most important legacy” of the Christmas truce is not the actual armistice – with the
readily available details about the “many high-ranking officers who took a surprisingly relaxed
view of the situation,” the way the truce was “wildly [sic] reported in Britain and to a lesser
extent in Germany,” and the willingness of the soldiers involved to resume the war and fire
upon the troops with whom they had fraternized – but rather the ideas that have overtaken its
reality. 799 The website’s authors readily admit that the truce has been romanticized, but argue
that the myths about it are so much more “comforting to believe” than the more prosaic truth
asserted by pragmatists, which is that the event was “a temporary lull induced by the season of
goodwill, but willingly exploited by both sides to better their defences and eye out one
another's positions.” The orthodox narrative the senseless and futile conflict that was the First
World War is firmly reinforced by the idea that participation in the Christmas armistice, “an
effort by normal men to bring about an end to the slaughter,” was a sign of mutiny by
rebellious soldiers. The desire to believe in this myth overrides all evidence to the contrary,
even for those, such as the authors of the First World War website www.firstworldwar.com,
who admit to the truce’s troublesome realities.
The Christmas truce, shorn of its mythology, is impossible to categorize simply, yet
even those, like MacMillan, who challenge the conventional narrative of the war can’t seem to
resist the conventional narrative of the truce. The myth of the 1914 armistice is based upon the
belief that the soldiers who took part in it shared our modern sensibilities, hated war as we
hate war, and rebelled against that futile conflict as we are certain we would have rebelled
against it. The truce resonates with us today because we have long since decided where our
sympathies lie, which is with the poets who represented the soldiers in the trenches and who
captured their plight in such vivid language. As a result, the story of what really happened
during the two weeks that started on Christmas Eve 1914 and finally ended about 10 January
1915 rarely cites the letters and diaries of the men involved, but relies instead on post-war
memories that largely reinforce what we already believe. Christmas was celebrated in the
798
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trenches on 25 December 1914 as a sentimental rather than a religious holiday, and the widespread but not universal cease-fires and fraternizations were entered into in that spirit by a
largely professional army composed of men who supported the war that they were fighting. To
comprehend that viewpoint, it is necessary to reject much of what we now believe about the
First World War, but to continue to impose a narrative upon the truce that is unsupported by
the contemporaneous views of those who took part in it does a disservice to the very soldiers
we now view as victimized. They did not see themselves in that way, and imputing to them a
consciousness that so thoroughly misrepresents their perception of the conflict does not help
us to understand either the war or the truce.
Nearly a hundred years after the 1914 cease-fires on the Western Front ended, the
varied elements of the Christmas truce have coalesced in public memory into one idealized
armistice. This event rarely includes the burial of the dead, suspicion of the enemy, or a refusal
to participate, although all were features of the 1914 cease-fires. In the now-standard
composite truce, soldiers meet in No-Man’s-Land, share cigarettes, food and drink and find
time for a football match before being ordered back to their trenches by the callous generals.
By consorting with their opponents, they make a mockery of the unwanted and purposeless
conflict, and create an example that will eventually inspire many with admiration for their
defiance of a war they hated and the shared humanity they displayed with their enemies.
The insistence upon a standardized view of the war and the 1914 truce, as well as the
proliferation of misinformation about both, ensures that many of these myths about the
Christmas armistice not only remain unchallenged, but are constantly being reinforced. As
demonstrated by the evidence, however, in the form of contemporaneous letters and diary
entries written about the truce, the armistice was hardly the monolithic event now portrayed
in the various media that feature it. The letters written home by soldiers, even before the
truce, illustrate the now-surprising frankness with which they wrote about their lives in the
trenches, providing their correspondents with vivid details about mud and death, destruction
and the plight of the Belgians, while also including stories about mutual jokes with the enemy
in the lines opposite. These particulars, freely shared with the home front, presaged both the
candor they would display when writing about the truce and the way the civilians back in
Britain were prepared to accept the truth about the events of Christmas 1914.
An examination of the accounts of the truce written by the British soldiers who had
participated in the event shows that, while many found the unexpected holiday from gunfire
and danger welcome, and enjoyed meeting their German counterparts in No-Man’s-Land, very
few expected, or even desired, that any lasting peace would occur as a result of the unofficial
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armistice. At the same time, they saw no need to hide from those at home their willingness to
join in the occasion, clearly expecting their friends and family to enjoy the story of their
impromptu Christmas truce as much as they did. Sparing few details, they wrote home about
the cease-fires, fraternizations, the burial of the dead, the sharing of gifts and the German
misinformation about the course of the war, as well as the occasional football match, and their
letters were neither subject to censorship nor did they record any actions taken against those
who had joined in the meetings with the enemy.
The evidence of the official war diaries for those battalions that had participated in the
truce further demonstrates the general lack of inhibitions front-line officers felt about
admitting to participation in the event. While battalions that were part of the B.E.F.’s 5th
Division (II Corps) did tend to be cagier about the details of the truce – with most recording
only “very quiet” times in the line over Christmas – the diaries of the battalions comprising the
4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions (III and IV Corps) demonstrated a willingness on the part of frontline officers to feature the incident, often at great length, in the documents that constituted
the official record of their activities during the war. While it is true that some officers in the
14th and 15th Brigades (II Corps) were required by their leadership, a few days after Christmas,
to write up a brief account of their truces, no further action was taken either against any of
these officers or against the soldiers whom they had allowed to participate in any truce
activities, including actual fraternization with Germans in No-Man’s-Land. In fact, an
examination of a number of the diaries from battalions in the front line in Flanders during
December 1914 and January 1915 reveals that on-going cease-fires were reported by some for
two or more weeks after Christmas without disciplinary action being taken against the troops
involved.
An examination of British newspapers reveals that accounts of the Christmas truce
were reported openly in late December 1914 and early January 1915. Although the British press
drew the line at writing articles discussing the event – no doubt finding it too difficult to
reconcile with their overall war reporting – the many descriptions of the unofficial armistice
that appeared in newspapers such as the Times, Daily Telegraph, and Manchester Guardian
make it clear that the truce became well known in Britain shortly after it occurred. Further, an
examination of the headlines and leaders that accompanied the soldiers’ letters about the
Christmas armistice shows that it was accepted by the British without censure: “Christmas
Truce/Mingling with the Enemy,” “A Christmas Truce at the Front/Enemies at Football,” and
“British and Germans Fraternize,” to give a few examples, illustrate the non-condemnatory
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nature of the press coverage of the event. 800 The numerous accounts published in the British
newspapers until mid-January 1915 demonstrate the level of public interest in the truce, while
the refusal to condemn those who participated in the episode illuminates the fact that the
newspaper editors that published these accounts, as well as the civilians who read about the
event, probably understood the reasons for the truce, and did not disapprove of the idea of
their soldiers enjoying a temporary holiday armistice.
As the war ground on for four more long and painful years, the Christmas truce not
only remained an important memory for those who had participated in it, but additionally was
often used as proof of the professionalism of the British army, who were assumed to be
fighting not out of hatred of the Germans, but rather a belief in the righteousness of their
cause. While it is true that many of those who served on the Western front and other theatres
of the war eventually found themselves disillusioned about the purpose and prosecution of the
conflict, the majority of the soldiers involved believed in the reasons Britain had gone to war,
and the importance of winning that war. This is reflected not only in the contemporaneous
histories of the war written between 1914 and 1918, but also in the letters and memoirs of the
soldiers still serving on, or invalided home from, the Western front.
A mild repetition of the 1914 cease-fires by three battalions in 1915 demonstrated that,
in spite of official warnings, the army’s appetite for punishing overt fraternization with the
enemy proved very feeble indeed. References to the truce continued throughout the interwar
years, as the histories of many of the battalions and divisions who had participated in the
Christmas truce appeared, and included accounts of the event that varied widely. Some
regimental histories celebrated it at great length, while a few ignored the armistice altogether
or passed over it briefly. For many, however, the truce was featured prominently, clearly
retaining its meaning for participants as an event fondly remembered and a memory shared
with fellow soldiers.
With the end of the Great War, a flood of memoirs, histories and polemics that
alternatively supported or condemned the war appeared, with no consensus either on the
significance or result of the conflict being reached. The Christmas truce, instead of being
consigned to oblivion by all but those who had participated in it, remained a vital part of the
inter-war narrative and became increasingly utilized by those who took a firm stance on the
war’s meaning. Many still credited the truce to the professionalism of the soldiers involved, or
took it as proof that Britain had not entered the war out of hatred against the enemy, but
rather for the justice of the cause. Some who condemned the recent war, such as Philip Gibbs
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or C.E. Montague, believed that the armistice demonstrated a fellow-feeling for the enemy
soldiers, or a manifestation of pre-war values. Surprisingly, the anti-war novels and memoirs
that began to appear during the latter part of the 1920s – All Quiet on the Western Fr0nt,
Goodbye to All That and Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man, which now constitute the trinity of
the anti-war canon – either ignored the truce entirely or, as was the case with Graves, touted it
as a tribute to his regiment’s traditions. As demonstrated by a survey of books written about
the Great War before 1940, including the official British history of the conflict, the narrative of
the Christmas truce in the first two decades after the end of the war continued to lack
coherence, much like the varied views on the conflict itself.
With the advent of the Second World War and its aftermath, the discourse of both the
Great War – now rechristened as the First World War, to denote its place as the precursor to
the deadlier conflict – and the truce began to undergo major revisions. The view of the earlier
conflict as wasteful and futile, which during the interwar years had been merely one strand of
its narrative, began to overshadow all other views of that war. The late 1950s and early 1960s
works of historians such as Cameron, Clark, Taylor and Tuchman, who all strongly endorsed
this interpretation, came to both shape and encapsulate the public understanding of the
conflict, in which the incompetent “donkeys” of the British army leadership sacrificed the lives
of the brave “lion” soldiers in a senseless and foolish war. The further connection drawn
between the First and Second World Wars – with A.J.P. Taylor in particular blaming the
second conflict on both the inept prosecution of the first war and mismanagement of the
peace that followed it – hammered home the point that the First World War had not only
killed and maimed millions of men for nothing, but had brought upon the world the second,
and even deadlier, war. With its reputation now firmly fixed, the First World War could never
be viewed again as necessary or worthwhile, let alone successful in its achievements. As the
anti-war narrative of the 1960s dominated all other views of the conflict, the Christmas truce
became ripe for rediscovery as proof that, as early as 1914, the soldiers in the trenches had
rebelled against their callous leadership and sought to make common cause with the equally
abused soldiers opposite.
This view was reinforced in Britain during the 1960s through multiple media, including
the works of the historians mentioned above, the 1964 BBC documentary The Great War, and
the theatre and film versions of Oh What a Lovely War. In the 1970s, these sources of
information were augmented by many interviews with surviving veterans whose memories
were prodded by those already persuaded by the now-conventional narrative. “Did you tell
them the truth?” George Ashurst was asked in 1985 about letters he wrote home during the
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war. “Oh, yes, yes,” he replied, obviously bemused by the question, but far too polite to ask
what the interviewer thought he would have written instead. With the insistence, from the
1960s onwards, on one interpretation of the First World War, reinforced by the emphasis on
the experiences of the men involved as well as the works of the soldier-writers who wrote of
their disillusionment with the conflict, the British view of the truce coalesced around a
narrative that supported the anti-war message of the second half of the twentieth century.
Over the past forty years, revisionist historians have tried without success to counter
this view of the First World War, but it appears to be too firmly fixed in the British
consciousness to be easily dislodged, as is the now-orthodox narrative of the Christmas truce.
An evaluation of sources written between 1914 and 2013 that reference the armistice
demonstrates that the conventional narrative of the truce, like that of the war itself, took
many decades to develop. Once the myth of the Christmas truce, the widespread rebellion by
traumatized soldiers against the war they hated, took root, however, the reality of the holiday
armistice became obscured. By misrepresenting the words and feelings of the soldiers who had
participated in the event, and ignoring the freely published accounts of it in regimental diaries
and the British press, or the lack of disciplinary action taken against those involved, many
have created a truce that bears little resemblance to the one which numerous soldiers joined
in Flanders on Christmas Day 1914. “In the end, however,” Murphy declares in his children’s
book about the armistice, “it was peace that won the day as hundreds of thousands of soldiers
simply decided, despite direct orders to the contrary, that they weren’t going to fight.” 801 This
is, of course, not at all what the men involved in the Christmas truce decided. Those soldiers,
in fact, wanted a day off, a holiday celebration, a temporary respite from fear and a break from
the monotony of the trenches. They achieved all this, but only at the cost of having their
actions and motivations misunderstood for the next century – in spite of the very clear record
they left to the contrary.
Since even some men who shared in the Christmas truce eventually came to believe in
the myths about it, it is hardly surprising that those who wish to press the temporary ceasefire into the service of the orthodox narrative of the war would also be inclined to distort both
the reality and significance of the episode. As demonstrated, however, by the
contemporaneous accounts of the soldiers involved, many of which appeared in the British
press, it is apparent that the truce was widely publicized, and received by the public in the
same spirit in which it was undertaken by those who participated in it: “We went out and met
them,” E.G. Morley wrote matter-0f-factly to a friend, describing the “the curious pleasure of
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chatting with men who had been doing their best to kill us, and we them.” 802 The “most weird
Christmas of my life,” as another soldier portrayed it, was just that: odd and unusual, a
memory to cherish and a tale to relate in the letters written home, and a story to tell to
grandchildren or reminisce about when meeting another veteran of the trenches, but not a
reason to end a war. 803
In his 1967 work on the conflict, Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918, Llewellyn
Woodward wrote that
in the last years of the war, the futility, inevitable, outrageous in its necessity,
overshadowed everything. I use the words ‘inevitable’ and ‘necessary’ because I
still thought that a German victory would fasten on Europe chains from which
there would be no hope of release except after even greater misery. If I did not
expect a much better world to come out of it, at least, though at far too heavy a
cost, our victory would have removed the threat of a mindless European
tyranny. 804
Wars are, by their very nature, senseless and idiotic: no one has ever started a sensible or
justified one. If one nation, or an alliance of nations, is determined to begin a war, however,
the countries attacked have few choices: either fight or give in. The First World War was
indeed, as Llewellyn maintains, “outrageous in its necessity.” The true outrage of the war arose
from the facts that fighting it was essential for Britain and that so many men had to die to win
it.
The 1914 cease-fire, the day of peace that has been romanticized by so many who
subscribe to the orthodox narrative of the war, was instigated by men who believed in the
cause for which they fought, and, in most cases, went on believing in that cause long after the
temporary armistice and even the war itself ended. The truce may encapsulate our modern
view of a hated war, but the First World War, and the 1914 armistice in particular, was
perceived very differently by those who participated in it. Bruce Bairnsfather, whose account
of the Christmas truce is renowned, characterized the episode as being “just like the interval
between the rounds in a friendly boxing match.” 805 The boxing match that was the First World
War was in fact a deadly and tragic conflict, yet the spirit in which the Christmas truce was
undertaken did generally reflect the attitudes of the soldiers who took part in it: determined
to win the war, but at the same time very glad to take a break from the battle.
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